دور لجان التدقيق الفعالة في الحد من سلوك إدارة الأرباح: مع دراسة تطبيقية في لبنان

The separation of ownership from management in corporations has led to a diminishing role of shareholders (owners) in controlling these companies. The managements control the companies’ affairs, which leads to a conflict of interests between the management and owners. Whereas the management resorts to making decisions and adopting methods to achieve personal benefits at the expense of the interests of the owners. They may adopt several methods to prepare unrepresentative financial statements, including earnings management practices.
This research aims, through its theoretical part, to identify the characteristics that ensure the effectiveness of the audit committee in performing its supervisory duties, and to highlight its role in limiting the behavior of earnings management. Moreover, through the practical part, this research aims to test the validity of a model proposed by the researcher that reflects the hypothesized relationships between the characteristics of the effective audit committee and earnings management behavior. The researcher conducted an empirical study in Lebanon based on a sample consisting of two groups, which are internal auditors in commercial banks and senior auditors in external audit offices. After testing the current research model practically in Lebanon and proving its validity, the researcher believes that the results of this research may encourage the boards of directors of many companies and banks operating in several countries to establish effective audit committees. Also, this may push the legislators of these countries to issue laws that define the role of audit committees in corporate governance, like the "SOX, 2002" Act in the USA.