A Crack in the Mirror: Reclaiming the Human Rights Narrative from Strasbourg in Agenda Setting Theory and Legal Narrative

The Human Rights Act 1998 has been a contentious instrument since its inception. A particular challenge created by the Act has been ascertaining the weight to be given to the judgments of the European Court of Human Rights. The mirror principle was conceived by Lord Bingham to provide guidance on this, however, the courts' approach to the principle has been inconsistent. This article uses the UK Supreme Court's changing approach to the mirror principle to demonstrate that the court is now increasingly aware of its role as a communicative actor within the wider state. This phenomenon is demonstrated with reference to agenda-setting theory, frame analysis, and narrative which show that the Supreme Court appreciates its role as an institutional actor within the state and that in this role it is aware of how its judgments are perceived by other institutional actors and the public generally.