Causality, culpability and criminalising failures to rescue

Gavin Dingwall*, Alisdair A. Gillespie

*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingChapterpeer-review

Abstract

As is well known, there is no general duty to act under English criminal law. Legally, a person could sit down on the banks of a river and watch a stranger drown without incurring legal liability. Of course, there are exceptions to this general rule. Williams suggested that certain professionals owe a duty to rescue, but the limits of this duty are opaque. Additionally, rescuers are not restricted to professionals. There is a strong tradition of volunteers, including passers-by, rescuing people in distress, but does that mean they can then become culpable if they fail to rescue?

Building on previous work by the authors, this chapter will review how the principles of causation apply to rescuers. It will explore the limits under which a person can be found liable for failing to rescue another. This is an increasingly important area of the law because what constitutes ‘a rescue’ in a conjoined environment of ubiquitous communications could be as simple as calling for help. The chapter concludes by considering the argument that a ‘Good Samaritan’ rule should apply, obliging people to take ordinary steps to help others.
Original languageEnglish
Title of host publicationCausation in Criminal Law
Subtitle of host publicationA Research Companion
EditorsAlan Reed, Michael Bohlander, Bethany Simpson, Verity Adams
Place of PublicationLondon, United Kingdom
PublisherTaylor & Francis
Pages53-67
Number of pages15
Edition1st
ISBN (Electronic)9781040442913
ISBN (Print)9781032759920
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 15 Oct 2025

Publication series

NameSubstantive Issues in Criminal Law
PublisherRoutledge

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