Designing contracts for a closed-loop supply chain under information asymmetry

Pan Zhang, Yu Xiong*, Zhongkai Xiong, Wei Yan

*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

61 Citations (Scopus)


This paper studies the problem of designing contracts in a closed-loop supply chain when the cost of collection effort is the retailer's private information. We investigate four cases: two contracts (a two-part nonlinear contract and a collection effort requirement contract), each under complete information and asymmetric information. We derive the manufacturer's optimal contracts for all four cases and analyze the impact of information on the equilibrium results of supply chain members.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)150-155
Number of pages6
JournalOperations Research Letters
Issue number2
Early online date4 Feb 2014
Publication statusPublished - Mar 2014
Externally publishedYes


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