Dynamic behavior of multi-carrier energy market in view of investment incentives

Jaber Valinejad, Mousa Marzband, Yijun Xu, Hasan Uppal, Ameena Saad Al-Sumaiti, Taghi Barforoshi

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

9 Citations (Scopus)
14 Downloads (Pure)


In this study, a dynamic two-level framework is proposed to model investment incentives in a multi-carrier energy market from a strategic company’s point of view. Capacity payment and firm contract are assumed as investment incentives to encourage the strategic producer to invest in generation units. In addition, financial incentives to invest in combined heat and power (CHP) include tax rebate and loans. Strategic company’s behavior is considered as a two-level model so that, in the first level, the objective function is to maximize the profit of the strategic producer by participating in an energy hub market. The strategic producer can invest in transmission lines, generation units, CHP, and gas furnace. In the second level, the aim is to maximize a multi-carrier energy social welfare encompassing heat, gas, and electric energy. In this model, units invested by rival companies are modeled using possible scenarios. Electric energy loads in this energy hub system are envisaged to be elastic, while heat loads are assumed to be inelastic to the market price. On the other hand, gas loads are indirectly elastic to the price. Besides, in the proposed framework, DC power flow and an exact gas flow model with the linearized Weymouth equation are used. The proposed model is implemented on two case studies including 6-bus system, and an energy hub system encompassing 24-bus IEEE RTS power system and 10-node natural gas system.
Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)1033-1051
Number of pages19
JournalElectrical Engineering
Issue number3
Early online date3 Oct 2019
Publication statusPublished - 3 Oct 2019


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