Equilibrium Selection by Co-evolution for Bargaining Problems under Incomplete Information about Time Preferences

Nanlin Jin

doi:10.1109/CEC.2005.1555028

Equilibrium Selection by Co-evolution for Bargaining Problems under Incomplete Information about Time Preferences

Nanlin Jin

Computer and Information Sciences

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceeding › Chapter › peer-review

Abstract

The main purpose of this work is to measure the impact of players' information completeness on the outcomes in dynamic strategic games. We apply co-evolutionary algorithms to solve four incomplete information bargaining problems and investigate the experimental outcomes on players' shares from agreements, the efficiency of agreements and the evolutionary time for convergence. Empirical analyses indicate that in the absence of complete information on the counterpart(s)' preferences, co-evolving populations are still able to select equilibriums which are Pareto-efficient and stationary. This property of the co-evolutionary algorithm supports its future applications on complex dynamic games.

Original language	English
Title of host publication	2005 IEEE Congress on Evolutionary Computation
Place of Publication	Piscataway, NJ
Publisher	IEEE
Pages	2661-2668
Volume	3
ISBN (Print)	0-7803-9363-5
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1109/CEC.2005.1555028
Publication status	Published - 2005

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Equilibrium Selection by Co-evolution for Bargaining Problems under Incomplete Information about Time Preferences

Abstract

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