TY - JOUR
T1 - Hybrid Dynamic Pricing Model for Transport PPP Projects during the Residual Concession Period
AU - Zhang, Yajing
AU - Yuan, Jingfeng
AU - Zhao, Jianfeng
AU - Li, Cheng
AU - Li, Qiming
N1 - Funding information:
Scientific Research Foundation of Nanjing Institute of Technology (YKJ201986) and National Natural Science Foundation of China (NSFC 71671042)
PY - 2022/2
Y1 - 2022/2
N2 - Public–Private-Partnerships (PPPs) have been adopted worldwide to deliver infrastructure projects and/or provide public services. Having a reasonable concession price (operation and transfer) in place is pivotal for sustaining a win-win relationship between governments and private sectors. However, historical data have shown that the concession price of PPPs when transfer is less than satisfactory due to the changing attribute of pricing parameters, causing substantial loss of residual value (RV). Nevertheless, a rational and systematic pricing model for PPPs, especially transport PPPs, is not yet available. To this end, a hybrid dynamic pricing model for transport PPPs during the residual concession period underpinned by the case-based reasoning technique is proposed. Furthermore, using a case study of the Western Harbor Crossing tunnel in Hong Kong, the proposed model is validated to be able to account for the dynamic pricing parameters and calculate a reasonable and accurate residual concession price. The contributions of this study are twofold: (1) it highlights that a reasonable concession price beyond the operation period is significant in maintaining RV; and (2) it provides a hybrid dynamic pricing model for governments and private sectors to calibrate the current less-than-satisfactory residual concession price.
AB - Public–Private-Partnerships (PPPs) have been adopted worldwide to deliver infrastructure projects and/or provide public services. Having a reasonable concession price (operation and transfer) in place is pivotal for sustaining a win-win relationship between governments and private sectors. However, historical data have shown that the concession price of PPPs when transfer is less than satisfactory due to the changing attribute of pricing parameters, causing substantial loss of residual value (RV). Nevertheless, a rational and systematic pricing model for PPPs, especially transport PPPs, is not yet available. To this end, a hybrid dynamic pricing model for transport PPPs during the residual concession period underpinned by the case-based reasoning technique is proposed. Furthermore, using a case study of the Western Harbor Crossing tunnel in Hong Kong, the proposed model is validated to be able to account for the dynamic pricing parameters and calculate a reasonable and accurate residual concession price. The contributions of this study are twofold: (1) it highlights that a reasonable concession price beyond the operation period is significant in maintaining RV; and (2) it provides a hybrid dynamic pricing model for governments and private sectors to calibrate the current less-than-satisfactory residual concession price.
KW - Case-based reasoning
KW - Public–Private-Partnerships (PPPs)
KW - Residual concession price
KW - Residual value
KW - Transport infrastructure
KW - Building and Construction
KW - Civil and Structural Engineering
KW - Industrial relations
KW - Strategy and Management
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=85121000148&partnerID=8YFLogxK
U2 - 10.1061/(asce)co.1943-7862.0002218
DO - 10.1061/(asce)co.1943-7862.0002218
M3 - Article
VL - 148
JO - Journal of Construction Engineering and Management - ASCE
JF - Journal of Construction Engineering and Management - ASCE
SN - 0733-9364
IS - 2
M1 - 04021200
ER -