Information sharing and service channel design in the presence of forecasting demand

Pan Zhang, Yu Xiong, Zhongkai Xiong, Yu Zhou

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

24 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

This paper investigates the issue of demand forecast sharing in a supply chain, in which either the manufacturer or the retailer conducts demand-enhancing service. In the mode with manufacturer conducting service (Mode M), our analysis shows that if the service efficiency is high (low), the retailer should voluntarily (not) share its demand forecast. If the service efficiency is moderate, a side-payment contract or a bargaining mechanism can induce the retailer to share. In the mode with retailer conducting service (Mode R), no information sharing is the unique equilibrium. In both modes, supply chain members are generally better off when their forecasts become more accurate. Moreover, the positive impact of more accurate forecasts on both the manufacturer and the retailer is generally much stronger in Mode R than in Mode M. Finally, we find that both firms prefer Mode M to Mode R if the service efficiency is high, while they prefer Mode R if the service efficiency is low.
Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)1920-1934
JournalJournal of the Operational Research Society
Volume69
Issue number12
Early online date5 Mar 2018
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 2 Dec 2018

Keywords

  • Supply chain management
  • service operations management
  • information sharing
  • forecast accuracy
  • game theory

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