Decision support systems are necessary and valuable. There are however legitimate concerns, both empirical and normative in nature as regards their impact on the application of the law. The hereby submitted evidence will shed light on some questionable assumptions underpinning discussions of ‘Law & Technology’ and explain that legal operations (notably: a judge’s activity) cannot be described in logico-mechanical terms. The abovementioned assumptions are nothing but misunderstandings, misrepresentations and misinterpretations of basic concepts underpinning normative systems. What is more, these misunderstandings about the very possibility of automated decision-making a) threaten to usurp the role of the legitimate decision-maker, and b) necessitate the development of a framework safeguarding the legal officials’ decision making prerogative. In view of the procedural architecture of Western legal orders epistemic considerations assisted by decision support systems need to be filtered, and validated through a network of constitutional rights, legal and evidential principles and values.
|Type||Written evidence (NTL0006)|
|Number of pages||7|
|Place of Publication||London|
|Publication status||Published - 30 Mar 2022|