Multiple agency perspective, family control, and private information abuse in an emerging economy

Igor Filatotchev, Xiaoxiang Zhang, Jenifer Piesse

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

50 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

Using a comprehensive sample of listed companies in Hong Kong this paper investigates how family control affects private information abuses and firm performance in emerging economies. We combine research on stock market microstructure with more recent studies of multiple agency perspectives and argue that family ownership and control over the board increases the risk of private information abuse. This, in turn, has a negative impact on stock market performance. Family control is associated with an incentive to distort information disclosure to minority shareholders and obtain private benefits of control. However, the multiple agency roles of controlling families may have different governance properties in terms of investors’ perceptions of private information abuse. These findings contribute to our understanding of the conflicting evidence on the governance role of family control within a multiple agency perspective
Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)69-93
JournalAsia Pacific Journal of Management
Volume28
Issue number1
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 2010

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