TY - GEN
T1 - System revenue maximization for offloading decisions in mobile edge computing
AU - Zhang, Juan
AU - Wu, Yulei
AU - Min, Geyong
PY - 2021/6/14
Y1 - 2021/6/14
N2 - Offloading decisions in mobile edge computing have been extended with multiple objectives, such as revenue maximization, energy conservation and latency reduction. Revenues of network/service operators, as the realistic and ultimate goal at intensive competitive markets, have not been thoroughly studied under a pricing scheme in combination with offloading decisions, especially with the aims of reducing and restricting energy consumption and latency. To bridge this important gap, this paper studies the revenue maximization of network operators through a pricing scheme in mobile edge computing, by explicitly formulating energy consumption and latency into the offloading strategy. A two-stage game-theory framework based on the Stackelberg game is established, through which the optimal price for both the network operator and the customer can be reached. The offloading data size can be dynamically adjusted according to the agreed price. The existence of equilibrium in the Stackelberg game is proved, and experiments are conducted to verify the effectiveness of our proposed model.
AB - Offloading decisions in mobile edge computing have been extended with multiple objectives, such as revenue maximization, energy conservation and latency reduction. Revenues of network/service operators, as the realistic and ultimate goal at intensive competitive markets, have not been thoroughly studied under a pricing scheme in combination with offloading decisions, especially with the aims of reducing and restricting energy consumption and latency. To bridge this important gap, this paper studies the revenue maximization of network operators through a pricing scheme in mobile edge computing, by explicitly formulating energy consumption and latency into the offloading strategy. A two-stage game-theory framework based on the Stackelberg game is established, through which the optimal price for both the network operator and the customer can be reached. The offloading data size can be dynamically adjusted according to the agreed price. The existence of equilibrium in the Stackelberg game is proved, and experiments are conducted to verify the effectiveness of our proposed model.
U2 - 10.1109/ICC42927.2021.9500485
DO - 10.1109/ICC42927.2021.9500485
M3 - Conference contribution
SN - 9781728171234
T3 - IEEE International Conference on Communications
SP - 2573
EP - 2578
BT - ICC 2021 - IEEE International Conference on Communications
PB - IEEE
CY - Piscataway, US
T2 - ICC 2021 - IEEE International Conference on Communications
Y2 - 14 June 2021 through 23 June 2021
ER -