Clicks versus Bricks: the role of durability in marketing channel strategy of durable goods manufacturers

Abstract

We develop a two-period dual-channel model for a durable goods manufacturer that can sell directly by its own e-channel and indirectly via an independent reseller to investigate how product durability and the channel structure create strategic issues that are significantly different from those in managing a dual channel for nondurables. Our game-theoretic model nests Arya et al. (2007) [Arya et al., 2007. The bright side of supplier encroachment. Marketing Science 26 (5): 651-659.] as a special case when product durability reduces to zero and thus generalizes it to the durable goods setting. The equilibrium solutions indicate that, when the product is durable, both parties’ profitability strongly depends on product durability and direct selling cost. In particular, we find that, compared to encroaching the reseller’s market by direct selling online, it is optimal for the manufacturer to open an inactive e-channel that serves only as an information medium. Moreover, we find that, contrary to Arya et al.’s (2007) results, if product durability is moderate, for any direct selling cost, manufacturer’s encroachment is always detrimental to the reseller, and thus its bright side disappears. We test our model’s theoretical predictions on the effects of product durability on manufacturer’s and reseller’s profitability with data from the U.S. x86 computer server market, and find strong empirical support—profitability of both parties is higher when product durability is sufficiently low or sufficiently high, and lower when durability is intermediate.

Keywords: Supply chain management; Dual channel; Durable goods; Manufacturer; Reseller

1. Introduction

Many durable goods manufacturers, including Lenovo, HP, Epson and IKEA, have adopted dual channels to market their products [Lenovo2016 Hewlett-
Packard, Epson 2016, IKEA 2016). There is scant literature, however, addressing product durability and its impact on players’ optimal strategies in a dual-channel supply chain\(^1\). Durable goods pose a number of questions that are quite different from those in nondurable goods marketing (Desai and Purohit 1998 1999). For example, when facing encroachment from an upstream agent (manufacturer), a downstream agent (reseller) of durable goods is in a more difficult position than the reseller of nondurable goods because with durable goods, the reseller is not only essentially competing with the new products from the manufacturer today but also dealing with the used units tomorrow. On the other hand, if consumers are able to anticipate the manufacturer’s incentive to increase product availability and lower prices, a time-inconsistency problem\(^2\) arises under which the manufacturer’s sequence of direct selling may not maximize both parties’ overall profitability\(^3\). In practice, in some durable goods industries (e.g., the home furniture industry), 66% of manufacturers report Internet channel conflict\(^4\) as the largest obstacle to their online sales (Lee et al. 2003). Indeed, finding the best way to utilize the e-channel in conjunction with the reseller channel continues to be a challenge for many durable goods manufacturers. For example, in the personal computer market, to avoid alienating its resellers, HP chooses to sell direct only to its 1,000 largest accounts and leave the large accounts to the resellers. Unfortunately, the reverse seems to be happening—HP’s resellers are clashing with HP over direct sales—“We are now nervous about engaging with certain HP people; they have taken business direct even though the deal was registered and approached some of our longest standing customers,” said Repton boss Greg Carlow (MicroScope 2009). In contrast, Gateway closed all its manufacturer-owned retail stores in 2004 and now

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\(^1\)Although Xiong et al. (2012) examine the reseller’s strategic choices of leasing and selling in a dual-channel supply chain, they assume that the product does not deteriorate over time, and thus they have ignored the issue created by product durability.

\(^2\)The time inconsistency problem refers to a situation in which rational consumers, anticipating that the monopolist has an incentive to increase product availability and lower its price over time, postpone purchases until the price falls to a competitive level. This issue is formalized in (Stokey 1981 and Bulow 1982).

\(^3\)Such issues are aptly addressed in a comprehensive review of several questions involved in durable goods marketing in (Waldman 1993).

\(^4\)Lee et al. (2003) use this term to describe a conflict that occurs when Internet and traditional bricks-and-mortar channels compete against each other when selling to the same markets.
distributes its products through its direct Internet channel and independent retailers such as Best Buy and Costco (Yoo and Lee 2011). Particularly, among the durable goods manufacturers that adopt dual channels to consumers, the marketing strategies chosen by them are quite different from one another. For example, Epson, HP, IKEA, and Lenovo sell their products in both channels, 3M, NEC, and Whirlpool, in contrast, accept no orders online but simply use the Internet as a medium for product information provision and reseller links.

In this paper, we develop a two-period game-theoretic model to investigate how product durability and the channel structure create strategic issues that are significantly different from those in managing a dual channel for nondurables. Specifically, we intend to answer the following questions: Under what conditions is it optimal for a durable goods manufacturer to open an e-channel? How does the addition of an e-channel affect manufacturer’s and reseller’s performance? What is the implication of product durability in the manufacturer’s choice of e-channel addition and in channel members’ performance? Our model accounts for the strategic effects of product durability, channel structure, and direct selling cost, and is able to capture several characteristics salient in many of today’s durable goods markets. Further, our model reduces to Arya et al. (2007) when product durability goes to zero, thus it nests Arya et al. as a special case and generalizes it to the durable goods setting. Therefore, our model can account for the strategic effects of product durability, channel structure, and direct selling cost, and is able to capture several characteristics salient in many of today’s durable goods markets.

Our model provides new insights about marketing durables in dual-channel supply chains. The equilibrium solutions indicate that, when the product is durable, both parties’ profitability strongly depends on product durability and direct selling cost. In particular, we find that, under certain conditions, compared to encroaching the reseller’s market by direct selling online, it is optimal for the manufacturer to open an inactive e-channel that serves only as an information medium. Further, contrary to Arya et al. (2007) results, our model shows that, if product durability is moderate, for any direct selling cost, manufacturer encroachment is always detrimental to the reseller, meaning its bright side disappears. These results imply that durable goods manufacturers should be more cautious when adding an e-channel. Our findings are consistent with the industry practice that many durable goods manufacturers are using the Internet
only as a medium for providing product information and links to resellers but not accepting orders online. Some studies (e.g., Gilbert and Bachel dor [2000], King [2000], Webb [2002]) explain this practice may stem from manufacturers’ reluctance to upset their resellers. We instead find this choice as the manufacturers’ wish to use the Internet as a strategic channel for control because they can obtain higher profits from using a sham e-channel than accepting orders online.

Our model contributes to the literature in several important ways. First, we address an aspect mostly ignored by extant research in the dual-channel area: the fact that many manufacturers accept no orders online despite their potential flexibility and capability to sell products through an e-channel. Hence, unlike prior studies, which take the structure of the distribution system as a given and often assume that products are sold through both channels, we endogenize channel choice and allow the manufacturer to choose whether or not to sell units through the e-channel. Second, we examine an issue that is minimally covered in the existing literature, the role of product durability in a dual-channel supply chain. As shown by our model, both manufacturer’s and reseller’s profitability depends critically on product durability, and the equilibrium results and conclusions can be quite different when product durability is factored in. Third, although the question of whether manufacturer encroachment results in “Internet channel conflict” or brings Pareto gains to both parties has been well studied in dual-channel supply chains for nondurables, cost concerns aside, little is known about how product durability and channel structure can affect these results. In this paper, we analyze the importance of such factors in shaping both parties’ policies and determining their profits. Fourth, instead of examining dealer’s strategic choice of leasing and selling in dual channels (Xiong et al. [2012]), a very uncommon practice, we focus on the product durability and its impact on channel performance. Thus, our model has a much wider applicability. Fifth, we go a step further to test our model’s empirical validity. Our model predicts that both parties are likely to be beneficial if product durability is either sufficiently small or sufficiently large.

The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the related literature and explains our contributions in more detail. Section 3 describes the key elements of our basic model and introduces notations. Section 4 outlines two models—the single-channel and the dual-channel model—and
reports our main findings. Section 5 concludes the paper.

2. Relevant Literature

Because the manufacturer is both a supplier to and a competitor of the reseller, a dual-channel supply chain contains two main types of channel competition: vertical competition and horizontal competition (see Figure 1).

![Figure 1: Vertical and horizontal competition in dual-channel supply chain](image)

Vertical competition induces a double marginalization problem: all channel members independently seek to maximize their own profits, the manufacturer charges more than marginal cost, and the intermediary cuts supply, which leads to lower sales quantities and profits than in a vertically integrated channel (Spengler 1950). Many coordination policy remedies have been proposed to eliminate the double marginalization problem (e.g., Cachon and Lariviere 2005, Caldieraro and Coughlan 2007, Chick et al. 2008, Cai 2010, Chung et al. 2014). Xiao and Shi (2016) study the channel priority strategy in a dual channel supply chain where potential supply shortage is possible. They find that channel coordination may reduce the retailer’s complaint of supply shortage.
Horizontal competition research in dual-channel supply chains has two different tacks. The first emphasizes that manufacturer encroachment establishes the manufacturer as both a supplier to and a direct competitor of its reseller partners, which potentially exerts competitive pressure on the reseller by increasing the manufacturer’s negotiation power and decreasing the loyalty of retail customers. It thus results in Internet channel conflict, which has been the subject of several studies. For example, Webb (2002) and Lee et al. (2003) propose practical guidelines for Internet channel conflict management. Liu and Zhang (2006) explore whether a retailer can benefit from personalized pricing and how upstream personalized pricing or entry into a direct distribution channel affects the allocation of channel profit. They conclude that a retailer is worse off because of its own or upstream personalized pricing. Cattani et al. (2006) liken a manufacturer who adds a direct channel to the parable of boiling frog: if the costs and average convenience of the Internet channel become more favorable over time, then the manufacturer will be in a position to use the direct channel to undercut the prices in the traditional channel and so “boil” the traditional retailer. Webb and Lambe (2007) focus on the conflict internal to the supplier firm among the groups and individuals responsible for managing the various channels. The second research stream, in contrast, argues that both the manufacturer and the incumbent reseller benefit from manufacturer encroachment; that is, manufacturer encroachment can lead to Pareto gains. Chiang et al. (2003) construct a price-setting game between a manufacturer and its independent retailer, and demonstrate a Pareto zone in which both the manufacturer and the retailer can be better off after the manufacturer enters the direct channel. Chun et al. (2011) extend these findings by showing that, under certain circumstances, both manufacturers and retailers are better off in a dual distribution channel. Tsay and Agrawal (2004) demonstrate that the addition of a direct channel alongside a reseller channel is not necessarily detrimental to the reseller. Xiong et al. (2012) then address the strategies of selling and leasing in a dual-channel supply chain and find that both the dealer and the supply chain may benefit from the manufacturer’s encroachment. Luo et al. (2016) investigate the free ride effect in the dual-channel supply chain where pre-sales services are provided by the retailer and find that free ride effect has both positive and negative impact. When the manufacturing cost and customer demand are fuzzy, Soleimani (2016) develop two models using game theoretical
approach and fuzzy set theory to optimize the pricing decision.

Our work is distinct from this extant literature in two important aspects: First, the above papers, like much of the extant literature, ignore product durability and pay little attention to its impact on players’ optimal strategies. We attempt to help fill this void by addressing the issue of product durability and analyzing how it creates strategic issues that are significantly different from those in managing a dual-channel for nondurables. Second, as mentioned earlier, most studies in the dual-channel area assume both the structure of the distribution system and the sale of products through both channels, thereby ignoring a manufacturer’s flexibility in whether or not to sell through the e-channel. Our dual-channel model, in contrast, endogenizes the channel decision and allows the manufacturer to choose whether to sell through its own direct channel.

In particular, our work is closely related to Arya et al. (2007) and Xiong et al. (2012), but different from them in important ways. We generalize Arya et al. (2007) to the durable goods setting and nest it as a special case. We differ from Xiong et al. (2012) in two important aspects. First, they assume that the product is perfectly durable and does not deteriorate over time, and thus they have ignored the issue of how product durability affects the interactions between a manufacturer and its dealers. In contrast, we assume that the product will deteriorate over time and investigate how this parameter create strategic issues that are significantly different from those in managing a dual channel for nondurables. Second, they focus on the effects of encroachment on the dealer’s strategic choice of leasing and selling, which we find is very uncommon in practice—few resellers we contacted directly and searched in the PC magazine and other related publications adopt a mix of selling and leasing to consumers. We instead focus on a much more common channel issue facing manufacturers of durable goods in terms of e-channel choice, product durability and its impact on channel performance.

Our work is also related to the literature on durable goods, which argues that durability can interfere with the extraction of rents from consumers. Coase (1972) conjectures that rational consumers, anticipating a monopolist’s incentive to increase product availability and lower its price over time, postpone their purchases until the price falls to the competitive level. They label this likelihood the “time-inconsistency problem”. According to Bulow (1986), this problem can be avoided if the durable goods manufacturer adopts “planned obsolescence” to
kill off the market for old copies and force customers to make repeat purchases. An incentive to practice such planned obsolescence arises if a monopolist markets its output by selling rather than leasing. Waldman (1993). While, Chen et al. (2013) conclude that the size of the used good stock decreases, such as when products become less durable, when the number of firms decreases, or when firms can commit to future production levels, increase the profitability of opening the secondary market.

Unlike previous research on durable goods that focuses on durability issues that can interfere with the extraction of rents from consumers, we strive to understand how product durability creates strategic issues that differ significantly from those involved in managing a dual-channel for nondurables.

3. Model development

In this section, we introduce our notation and lay out our assumptions regarding the product, the manufacturer, the reseller, and the consumers. Assuming a two-period model in which a manufacturer markets a durable product through two channels—a reseller channel and her own e-channel, we adopt the Arya et al. (2007) assumptions about the sequence of the game between the manufacturer and the reseller, that is, the manufacturer decides whether to operate a direct channel and then announces the wholesale price to the reseller, who then responds by determining the optimal units of selling. The manufacturer then chooses the units to be sold through the e-channel.

3.1. Product

To capture the durable nature of a product, we use a two-period model in which the products produced in Period 1 provide two periods of service: they are “new” when marketed in Period 1 and then classified as “used” in Period 2. Products produced in Period 2, in contrast, provide only one period of service. Hence, in our model, only new products are available in Period 1, but both new

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5 For a thorough review of the literature on durable goods, see Waldman (2003).
6 In reporting our computations, for purposes of differentiation, we use the feminine pronoun to refer to the manufacturer and the masculine pronoun to refer to the reseller.
7 This assumption is consistent with previous literature (e.g., Desai and Purohit 1998, 1999). A two-period model not only allows us to study dynamic issues while retaining tractability but simplifies the presentation of our analysis.
and used products (i.e., those marketed in Period 1) are available in Period 2. We also assume that the manufacturer and the reseller always sell new products in both periods; that is, used products are traded between consumers on the secondary market.

To model the differentiation between new and used units, we designate the durability of the products produced in Period 1 using a factor \( \gamma \) (\( 0 \leq \gamma \leq 1 \)). If \( \gamma = 1 \), the product is perfectly durable and shows no deterioration over time, meaning that in Period 2, used units are identical to new units. If \( \gamma = 0 \), the product is nondurable and deteriorates fully after one period of use.

### 3.2. Manufacturer’s problem

The manufacturer’s problem is to set a wholesale price \( (w) \) and choose units to sell through the e-channel \( (q_{iM}) \) that will maximize her profits. Here, \( i = 1, 2 \) denotes Period 1 or 2. As in Arya et al. (2007), we normalize her marginal cost of production to zero and assume that her marginal cost of selling on the e-channel is \( C_d = c \geq 0 \).

### 3.3. Retailer’s problem

If the manufacturer sets her wholesale price, the reseller must choose the quantities that he intends to sell to maximize his profit. To ensure that the reseller has an advantage in the distribution channel and recalling that the manufacturer’s unit direct selling cost is \( C_d = c \geq 0 \), we, like Arya et al. (2007), assume that the reseller’s unit marketing cost is \( C_R = 0 \).

### 3.4. Consumers

To enable a focus on product durability and dual-channel characteristics, we assume that consumers value the product for the flow of services that it provides over time and that no consumer can use more than one unit of the product in any period. As in Desai and Purohit (1998) and Agrawal et al. (2012), we derive the inverse demand functions from the consumer utility functions, a derivation briefly explained below but detailed in the original studies. The size of the

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8For example, with the development of the internet and information technology, electronic peer-to-peer (P2P) markets become popular, and consumers can buy and sell used products among themselves in electronic peer-to-peer (P2P) used goods markets (e.g., eBay.com, Amazon.com). We thank an anonymous reviewer for pointing this out.
consumer population is assumed not to change over time and is normalized to 1. We use the parameter $\theta$ to represent a consumer’s valuation of the services provided by a durable, which is distributed uniformly in the interval $[0, 1]$. Consumer type $\theta$ has a valuation of $\theta$ for a new product. Recalling that the durability of the product $\gamma$ represents how well a unit sold in Period 1 holds up in Period 2 (when it is classified as “used”), then consumer type $\theta$ has a valuation of $\gamma \theta$ for a used product.

Denote $q_{iM}$ and $q_{iR}$, respectively, as the quantity sold by the manufacturer and the reseller in period $i$, and let $l_{ik}$ be the price of the services provided by product $k$ in period $i$, where $k = n, u$ refers to, respectively, new products and used products. Then, the one-period prices for a new and a used product in Period 2 are given, respectively, by

$$l_{2n} = 1 - \gamma(q_{1R} + q_{1M}) - q_{2R} - q_{2M}$$
$$l_{2u} = \gamma(1 - q_{1R} - q_{2R} - q_{1M} - q_{2M})$$

Because only new products are available in Period 1, the one-period price for a new product in Period 1 is given by

$$l_{1n} = 1 - q_{1R} - q_{1M}$$

The durable produced in Period 1 can provide a stream of services for both periods; hence, its selling price is the sum of the one-period price for a new product in Period 1 and the one-period price for a used product in Period 2; that is, $p_{1n} = l_{1n} + \rho l_{2u}$, where $\rho$ is a discount factor denoting the cash flows received in Period 2. To simplify, we assume a zero discount rate and a discount factor $\rho = 1^9$. Since a durable produced in Period 2 provides only one period of service, its selling price is $p_{2n} = l_{2n}$.

4. **Model analysis**

In this section, we consider both parties’ optimal strategies and analyze how they are affected by durability. That is, we look first at a single-channel model in which no e-channel is open and then consider a dual-channel model in which

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$^9$Although allowing the discount factor $0 < \rho < 1$ increases the complexity of the analysis, all our results remain unaffected.
the manufacturer opens her own e-channel and sells products through both it and a reseller channel. It should be noted that in the dual-channel supply chain, the manufacturer has the flexibility to sell or not sell her products through the e-channel.

4.1. Model S—a single-channel model

We begin our analysis by first considering a single-channel model that serves as a useful benchmark for the subsequent model, which allows horizontal competition in a dual channel supply chain. From Equations (1) and (2), we derive the following single-channel inverse demand functions:

\[ p_{1n} = l_{1n} + l_{2u} = 1 - q_{1R} + \gamma(1 - q_{1R} - q_{2R}) \] (3)

\[ p_{2n} = l_{2n} = 1 - \gamma q_{1R} - q_{2R} \] (4)

We perform the ensuing analysis using backward induction, that is, we first determine both parties’ optimal policies in Period 2 and then solve their problems in Period 1. This backward induction is necessary because consumers’ expectations are rational, meaning that a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium can be determined.

4.1.1. Second-period analysis

In this analysis, we use lowercase \( \pi_i^{j} \) (uppercase \( \Pi_i^{j} \)) to represent the reseller’s (manufacturer’s) profit in period \( i \) under model \( j \), where \( j = s, d \) refers to the single-channel model and the dual-channel model, respectively. The reseller maximizes his profits over both periods by choosing optimal quantities of \( q_{1R} \) and \( q_{2R} \). Then, under the single-channel model, the reseller profit in Period 2 is \( \max q_{2R} \pi_{s}^{2}(q_{2R}, w_{2}) = p_{2n}q_{2R} - w_{2}q_{2R} \). Plugging (3) into the reseller’s profit and solving the first-order condition yields \( q_{2R}^{s*} \), so that the choice of \( q_{2R}^{s*} \) is

\[ q_{2R}^{s*} = \frac{1 - \gamma q_{1R} - w_{2}}{2} \] (5)

Working backwards, plugging (4) into \( \Pi_{2}^{s}(q_{1R}, w_{2}) \) and solving the first-order condition yields \( w_{2}^{s*} \):

\[ w_{2}^{s*} = \frac{1 - \gamma q_{1R}}{2} \] (6)
4.1.2. First-period analysis

Given the optimal solution for the second-period problem, we now look at both parties’ first-period policies. In Period 1, the reseller’s objective is to maximize his profits in both periods, \( \max_{q_1^R} \pi^s(q_1^R, w_1) = \pi_1^s(q_1^R, w_1) + \pi_2^s(q_1^R, w_1), \) while the manufacturer’s problem is to choose a wholesale price \( w_1^* \) that maximizes her profits in both periods, \( \max_{w_1} \Pi^s(q_1^R, w_1) = \Pi_1^s(q_1^R, w_1) + \Pi_2^s(q_1^R, w_2). \) Maximizing the reseller’s profit yields \( q_1^sR, \) which, when substituted into the manufacturer’s profit, yields \( w_1^sR. \) Substituting the ensuing \( q_1^sR \) and \( w_1^sR \) into the quantities in (4) and the wholesale price in (5) provides the equilibrium outcome under the single-channel model, which is presented in Lemma 1 in Appendix A.

It is of particular interest to compare the result in Lemma 1 with that of the No-Encroachment Setting in Arya et al. (2007), in which a manufacturer distributes a nondurable through both an e-channel and a reseller channel. Their outcome is identical to our result for the fully deteriorated product, \( \gamma = 0. \) Therefore, our model nests theirs as a special case.

To analyze the role played by product durability and the effects of endogenizing the reseller, it is of interest to compare the results in Model S with that of Desai and Purohit (1998)’s Pure Selling Model, in which the manufacturer sells durables to consumers directly. Using superscript \( b \) to represent the results from the Pure Selling Model in Desai and Purohit (1998) and representing the total profit in the pure selling model and the single-channel model by \( \Pi^b_T \) and \( \Pi^s_T, \) respectively, we can compare the two outcomes and summarize the findings in the following proposition:

**Proposition 1.** (a) The optimal total profit of \( \Pi^b_T \) (\( \Pi^s_T \)) is convex in \( \gamma^b \) (\( \gamma^s \)) and achieve minimum in medium durability of \( \gamma^b \) (\( \gamma^s \)).

(b) The presence of the reseller induces a double marginalization problem, \( q_1^sR + q_2^sR < q_1^bM + q_2^bM, \) \( \Pi^s_T < \Pi^b_T, \) which induces the minimum point of the optimal total profit to move leftward in the durability domain, \( \gamma^s < \gamma^b. \)

**Proof.** See the Appendix B.

Durability, particularly, plays an interesting and intuitively likely role in the manufacturer’s choice of the optimal quantity: Not only is there cannibalization of new products by used ones in Period 2, but as durability increases, used and new products become closer substitutes and the cannibalization effect intensifies,
causing the manufacturer to derive less revenue from new products in Period 2. Conversely, as durability increases, the consumer’s valuation of a used product ($\gamma \theta$) increases and the price of the used product increases, which causes the manufacturer to derive more revenue from new products in Period 1.

Proposition 1 (a) also shows that as long as durability is smaller than the threshold (i.e., $\gamma^b$ and $\gamma^s$), the former component dominates, that is, the difference between used and new products is sufficient and the cannibalization effect becomes less significant, so that the manufacturer obtains more revenue from new products in Period 2. The manufacturer should therefore sell fewer units in Period 1 and adopt higher prices for new products in Period 2. However, if $1 > \gamma > \gamma^b(\gamma^s)$, the latter component dominates, that is, the difference between used and new products is not sufficient and the cannibalization effect intensifies, so that the manufacturer obtains more revenue from new products in Period 1. The manufacturer thus needs to earn more revenue from new products in Period 1 by choosing a smaller quantity of new units in Period 2.

We then consider the effects of endogenizing a reseller, whose presence induces $q_1^{sR} + q_2^{sR} < q_1^{bM} + q_2^{bM}$, $\Pi_T^s < \Pi_T^b$, the well-documented double marginalization effect. We find that endogenizing a reseller also leads to a leftward move in the minimum point of the optimal total profit, that is, $\gamma^s < \gamma^b$ (see Figure 2). This observation can be explained as follows: the difference between $l_1^{sR} - l_1^{bM}$ and $l_2^{sR} - l_2^{bM}$ is increasing with durability, which means that the manufacturer
faces a more severe double marginalization problem in Period 1 than in Period 2 (see Figure 3). In other words, the relative amount of $q_{1M}^* - q_{1R}^*$ is larger than $q_{2M}^* - q_{2R}^*$, meaning that in Model S, as compared with $q_{1M}^*$ ($q_{2M}^*$) in the pure selling model, the manufacturer has a smaller (larger) zone in which to obtain more revenue from new products in Period 2 (1). In other words, the minimum point of the optimal total profit has moved left, that is, $\gamma_s < \gamma_b$.

4.2. Model D-Dual-channel model

The timing in Model D is as follows. Before the game starts, the manufacturer has opened her own e-channel and decided to operate a direct channel. Then the manufacturer and the reseller play the following game. The manufacturer announces the wholesale price ($w_i$) to the reseller, who then responds by determining the optimal units of selling ($q_{iR}$). The manufacturer then chooses the units to be sold through the e-channel ($q_{iM}$). Note that, although the manufacturer always opens an e-channel, she has the potential flexibility to sell products through an e-channel or adopt the e-channel only to provide product information and accept no orders online. From Equations (1) and (2), we can derive the inverse demand functions in the dual-channel model as follows:

\[ p_{1n} = l_{1n} + l_{2u} = 1 - q_{1R} - q_{1M} + \gamma (1 - q_{1R} - q_{2R} - q_{1M} - q_{2M}) \]  
\[ (7) \]

\[ p_{2n} = l_{2n} = 1 - \gamma (q_{1R} + q_{1M}) - q_{2R} - q_{2M} \]  
\[ (8) \]

4.2.1. Second-period analysis

In the dual-channel model, the manufacturer’s problem is

\[ \max_{q_{2M}} \Pi_2^d(q_{2M}, q_{2R}, w_2) = w_2 q_{2R} + p_{2n} q_{2M} - c q_{2M} \]  
\[ (9) \]

Performing the optimization in (7) yields $q_{2M}^d$. The reseller, anticipating the manufacturer’s response, $q_{2M}^d$, optimizes his profits by choosing the optimal quantity to sell ($q_{2R}^d$) in Period 2. That is, he maximizes

\[ \max_{q_{2R}} \pi_2^d(q_{2M}, q_{2R}, w_2) = p_{2n} q_{2R} - w_2 q_{2R} \]  
\[ (10) \]

We can then substitute $q_{2M}^d$ and $q_{2R}^d$ into (9) and maximize this expression to find the optimal wholesale price $w_2^d$. 

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4.2.2. First-period analysis

The manufacturer (the reseller) optimizes her (his) profits over both periods by choosing \( q^*_1 = \frac{M}{w} q^*_1 \times R q^*_1 M \) in Period 1, yielding the following profits, respectively:

\[
\max_{q^*_1} \Pi^d(w_1, q_1 R, q_1 M) = w_1 q_1 R + p_1 n q_1 M - c q_1 M + \Pi^*_2(w_1, q_1 R, q_1 M) \tag{11}
\]

\[
\max_{q^*_1} \pi^d(w_1, q_1 R, q_1 M) = p_1 n q_1 R - w_1 q_1 R + \pi^*_2(w_1, q_1 R, q_1 M) \tag{12}
\]

As before, using backward induction, we first solve the manufacturer’s maximization problem with respect to \( q^*_1 \). The reseller then maximizes his profits by choosing the optimal \( q^*_1 \), and given \( q^*_1 \) and \( q^*_1 R \), the manufacturer determines her first-period wholesale price \( (w^*_1) \). These results are tabulated in Lemma 2 in Appendix A.

Lemma 2 indicates that, in the dual channel supply chain, the manufacturer can maximize her profit in two ways: opening an inactive e-channel and/or encroaching the reseller’s market by selling the products through the e-channel. And we find that this strategic choice is affected by both the relative direct sales cost \( c \) and product durability \( \gamma \) (see Figure 4). We summarize our findings in the following proposition, which can be obtained from Lemma 2.

**Proposition 2.** (a) when \( \gamma > \gamma_2, \sigma_6 < c < \sigma_6; 0 < \gamma < \gamma_3, \sigma_4 < c < \sigma_5 \) and \( \gamma_3 < \gamma < 1, \sigma_3 < c < \sigma_5 \), the manufacturer starts encroaching into the reseller’s market and sells the products through the e-channel only in Period 1.

(b) \( 0 < \gamma < \gamma_3, \sigma_1 < c < \sigma_4 \) and \( \gamma_3 < \gamma < \gamma_4, \sigma_1 < c < \sigma_3 \), the manufacturer is encroaching further and sells the products through the e-channel in both periods.

(c) \( 0 < \gamma < \gamma_4, 0 < c < \sigma_1 \) and \( \gamma_4 < \gamma < 1, 0 < c < \sigma_2 \), the reseller starts withdrawing from the retail channel in Period 2.

The above proposition shows that, in the dual-channel supply chain, the manufacturer’s strategic choice of encroaching her reseller’s market is affected by both product durability \( \gamma \) and the direct selling cost \( c \). As Xiong et al. (2012) show, the manufacturer begins to encroach into the market in Period 1 at a higher direct selling cost, and encroaches into the market in both periods at a

\[ \text{Note that Arya et al. (2007) outcome is identical to our result for the fully deteriorated product, } \gamma = 0. \] Therefore, our model nests theirs as a special case.
lower direct selling cost. On the other hand, the product durability can have an important impact on the manufacturer’s strategic choice as well. Take E and F in Figure 4 for an example. With a fixed direct selling cost \( c \), comparing the strategic choices of E and F based on the durability change, we can find that, the manufacturer is more likely to encroach the reseller’s market in period 1 with a higher durability, because, as durability increases, the consumer’s valuation of a used product (\( \gamma \theta \)) increases and the price of the used product increases, which induces the manufacturer to derive more revenue from new products in Period 1.

The general conclusion of previous research in this area (e.g., Arya et al. (2007), Xiong et al. (2012)) is that the manufacturer is better off by encroaching the reseller’s market and selling online. Yet it is not entirely clear whether this conclusion will hold if the manufacturer has the flexibility to open an inactive e-channel. In particular, we formulate the following proposition:

**Proposition 3.** When \( 0 < \gamma < \gamma_2 \), \( \sigma_5 < c < \sigma_7 \); \( \gamma_2 \leq \gamma \), \( \sigma_5 < c < \sigma_6 \); \( 0 < \gamma < \gamma_1 \), \( \sigma_7 < c < \sigma_9 \); \( \gamma_1 \leq \gamma < \gamma_2 \), \( \sigma_7 < c < 1 \); \( \gamma_2 \leq \gamma \), \( \sigma_8 < c < 1 \) and \( 0 < \gamma < \gamma_1 \), \( \sigma_9 < c < 1 \), compared to encroaching the reseller’s market
by direct selling online, it is optimal for the manufacturer to open an inactive e-channel, that is, opening an e-channel but not selling products through it, in other words, using the e-channel as a sham leads to higher profits than a direct selling strategy.

**Proof.** See the Appendix B.

This observation is partly similar to that of Chiang et al. (2003), who conclude that “it is sometimes optimal for an independent manufacturer to open a direct channel although no direct sales occur” (P.12). We further find, however, that durability plays an important role as well. Before explaining Proposition 3, we briefly examine the manufacturer’s profits, which come from two sources: selling products through the e-channel and product wholesaling. Note that opening an inactive e-channel means that the reseller faces the potential threat of direct selling, which leads to the reseller to lower his price and increase the number of sales units. Proposition 3 can thus be interpreted as follows: when the inactive e-channel is a strong threat (i.e., $0 < \gamma < \gamma_2$, $\sigma_5 < c < \sigma_7$ and $\gamma_2 \leq \gamma$, $\sigma_5 < c < \sigma_6$), the manufacturer benefits from adding an inactive e-channel because it can mitigate the double marginalization problem with her reseller. When $\gamma_2 \leq \gamma$, $\sigma_8 < c < 1$, direct selling becomes more costly, the manufacturer has no choice to open an inactive e-channel. When $0 < \gamma < \gamma_1$, $\sigma_7 < c < \sigma_9$ and $\gamma_1 \leq \gamma < \gamma_2$, $\sigma_7 < c < 1$, the durability is small (i.e., $\gamma \leq \gamma_2$) and the manufacturer derives little revenue from direct selling. She thus chooses to add an inactive e-channel because she can benefit from it by mitigating the double marginalization problem. When $0 < \gamma < \gamma_1$, $\sigma_9 < c < 1$, the durability is so small and the threat of an inactive e-channel is so weak that the manufacturer opens an inactive e-channel though it can be easily overcome by her reseller.

Proposition 3 shows that under certain conditions, opening an inactive e-channel may lead to higher profits than a direct selling strategy. This finding may be consistent with the attitude reflected in the dual-channel program of 3M, NEC, and Whirlpool, which accept no orders online and simply use the Internet as a medium for product information provision and reseller links. As

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11 Recall that, as durability decreases, the consumer’s valuation of a used product decreases, which causes the manufacturer to derive less revenue from new products in Period 1.
suggested by our model, this choice may stem from a wish to use the Internet as a strategic channel for control, that is, using a sham e-channel brings in higher profits than accepting orders online. And we also note that Gilbert and Bachelord (2000), King (2000) and Webb (2002) report that they do so for not to upset their resellers. In our view, however, this explanation is insufficient because none of these manufacturers has made a public commitment to give up the choice of direct selling through e-channel and provide product information only. And more importantly, instead of the path of self-sacrifice, they can easily find many other measures to avoid the “Internet channel conflict” and achieve win-win results. For example, Ethan Allen Interiors Inc. shares its online profits with its licensees. Equipment distributor W.W. Grainger Inc. awards commissions to area sales representatives when a customer purchases from Grainger.com (Goldman 1999). Bobbi Brown, however, transfers all her online orders to Neiman Marcus (Garner 1999).

4.3. Comparison of the Two Models

We are now in a position to address the question posed at the beginning of this paper: How does the addition of an e-channel affect both parties’ performance? We answer this question first from the manufacturer’s point of view:

**Proposition 4.** When \( \gamma < \gamma_1, \sigma_9 < c < 1 \), the manufacturer’s profit in the dual-channel model equals that in the single-channel model; otherwise, the manufacturer’s profit in the dual-channel model is higher than that in the single-channel model.

**Proof.** See the Appendix B.

Proposition 4 suggests that, in contrast to the conventional wisdom that the manufacturer is always better off by encroaching the reseller’s market (Tsay and Agrawal 2004, Arya et al. 2007, Xiong et al. 2012), the manufacturer does not always benefit from adding an e-channel.

Proposition 4 shows that the manufacturer motivates the reseller to lower his price and increase sales units by opening the e-channel. The effectiveness of this strategy, however, depends on the viability of the threat to sell directly, which, in turn, depends on the reseller’s cost advantage and product durability. Proposition 4 shows that the reseller’s cost advantage plays an important
role. That is, when the direct cost is below \( \sigma_9 \), the manufacturer benefits from adding the e-channel because two factors provide her with greater profits in the dual-channel model. First, it is usually assumed that the manufacturer is the Stackelberg leader, that is, she takes into account the profit-maximizing actions of the reseller and simultaneously sets the wholesale price. Second, she benefits from direct selling because it not only provides revenue to her directly but can also mitigate the double marginalization problem between both parties.

Proposition 4 further shows that the durability plays an important role as well. That is, when the manufacturer’s distribution disadvantage exceeds a certain threshold, specifically \( \sigma_9 < c < 1 \), and the product durability is so small (i.e., \( \gamma < \gamma_1 \)) that the manufacturer’s profit in the dual-channel model equals that in the single-channel model. The intuition underlying this is as follows: When \( \sigma_9 < c < 1 \), the manufacturer’s distribution disadvantage is so pronounced that the harm of the manufacturer’s encroachment to the reseller would seem to be small. On the other hand, when \( \sigma_9 < c < 1 \), we find that, if the product durability is below a certain threshold, (i.e., \( \gamma < \gamma_1 \)), the revenue in Period 1 of the manufacturer’s encroachment is too small to accept no orders online. Thus, when \( \gamma < \gamma_1, \sigma_9 < c < 1 \), the manufacturer’s profit in the dual-channel model equals that in the single-channel model. But when \( \gamma > \gamma_1 \), the manufacturer will encroach the reseller’s market by directly selling, because as durability increases, the consumer’s valuation of a used product \( (\gamma \theta) \) increases, which induces the manufacturer to derive more revenue from new products in Period 1.

As regards the variations in the reseller’s profitability, i.e., how addition of the e-channel affects the reseller’s performance — based on Lemmas 1 and 2, we provide the following response (see, Figure 5):

**Proposition 5.** When \( 0 < \gamma < \gamma_5, \sigma_{10} < c < \sigma_{11}, \gamma_5 \leq \gamma < \gamma_6, \sigma_4 < c < \sigma_{12}, \gamma_7 \leq \gamma < \gamma_8, \sigma_6 < c < \sigma_{14} \) and \( \gamma_8 \leq \gamma < 1, \sigma_{13} < c < \sigma_{14} \), the reseller benefits from the encroachment; otherwise, the reseller’s profit in the dual-channel model is lower than that in the single-channel model, especially when \( \gamma_6 < \gamma < \gamma_7 \), in which case, for any direct selling cost \( c \), the reseller is always worse off in the dual-channel model.

**Proof.** See the Appendix B.
Figure 5: $\pi^{d^*} - \pi^{d^*}$

Figure 6: Total profits of the dual-channel supply chain ($c = 0.33$)
These observations—particularly that when \( \gamma_6 < \gamma < \gamma_7 \), the reseller is always worse off in the dual-channel model regardless of the direct selling cost \((c)\)—are obviously somewhat at odds with Arya et al. (2007). To explain this finding, we must briefly consider the role of durability in the total profits of a supply chain. Recalling that the optimal total profits of the single-channel model and the pure selling model, \( \Pi_s^* \) (\( \Pi_b^* \)), are the lowest for medium durability of \( \gamma^* \) (\( \gamma^b \)) and that the double marginalization problem induces the minimum point of the optimal total profit to move leftward, we can interpret Proposition 5 as follows: As in the single-channel and pure selling models, the total profit of the dual-channel supply chain is still convex in durability \( \gamma \) (see Figure 6). When \( \gamma_6 < \gamma < \gamma_7 \), the total profit of the dual-channel supply chain is so small that the manufacturer, acting as the Stackelberg leader, is reluctant to transfer the profit to the reseller. As a result, the bright side of encroachment disappears.

As regards the variation in the supply chain profit—that is, the effects of encroachment on the supply chain profit—based on Lemmas 1 and 2, we offer the following proposition (see Figure 7):

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Figure 7: \( \Pi_d^* - \Pi_s^* \)

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\(^{12}\)We depict the total profit of the dual-channel supply chain for a numerical example.
Proposition 6. When $0 < \gamma < \gamma_{10}, 0 < c < \sigma_{15}, \gamma_{10} \leq \gamma < 1, 0 < c < \sigma_{16},$
$0 \leq \gamma < \gamma_{11}, \sigma_{17}^d < c < \sigma_{19}^d, \gamma_{11} \leq \gamma < 1, \sigma_{18}^d < c < \sigma_{19}^d, \gamma_9 \leq \gamma < \gamma_{11}, \sigma_7 < c < \sigma_{20}, \gamma_{11} \leq \gamma < \gamma_{12}, \sigma_6 < c < \sigma_{20} \text{ and } \gamma_{12} \leq \gamma < 1, \sigma_6 < c < 1$, the supply chain profit in the dual-channel model is higher than that in the single-channel model; otherwise, the opposite is true.

Proposition 6 shows that encroachment can enhance the supply chain profit even when the manufacturer opens an inactive e-channel. The intuition behind this is that, in the encroachment setting, the manufacturer always provides lower wholesale prices to her reseller that leads to limited losses from double marginalization. Moreover, we can easily find that durability has an impact on the supply chain profit as well. For example, when $\gamma_9 \leq \gamma < \gamma_{11}, \sigma_7 < c < \sigma_{20}$, total profit in the dual-channel model is higher than that in the single-channel model. This can be explained as follows: notice that the manufacturer starts encroaching into the reseller’s market in Period 1 and, as durability increases, the price of the used product increases and the manufacturer derives more revenue from new products in Period 1. That is, as durability increases, the manufacturer is more likely to operate the online selling and starting to encroach the reseller’s market, i.e., the threat of an e-channel becomes stronger. As durability increases, to avoid the manufacturer’s encroachment, the reseller sells more units in his retail channel. For the manufacturer, anticipating that the reseller will sell more products through the retail channel, decreases the wholesale price and opens an inactive e-channel. The manufacturer thus benefits from the reduction of losses from double marginalization and her reseller can benefit from the lower wholesale prices.

5. Conclusions

Even though many durable goods manufacturers have adopted dual-channel supply chains to market their products, there is scant literature addressing product durability and its impact on players’ optimal strategies in a dual-channel supply chain. We thus generalize Arya et al. (2007)’s model to the area of marketing durables in dual-channel supply chains. Specifically, by analyzing a two-period dual-channel supply chain, we investigate how product durability and the channel structure create strategic issues that are significantly different from those involved in the management of a dual-channel for nondurables.
To generate managerial insights into the issues of product durability and the channel structure, we characterize the optimal strategies of both parties and derive a number of propositions and conclusions. One important result of our analysis is that the manufacturer may be worse off selling online; that is, under certain conditions, it is optimal for the manufacturer to open an inactive e-channel and not accept orders online. This finding is consistent with the practice reflected in the dual-channel programs of 3M, NEC, and Whirlpool, which accept no orders online but simply use the Internet as a medium for product information provision and reseller links.

Another important result of our analysis is that we are able to generalize the results in the literature on dual-channel supply chains, in particular, Arya et al. (2007), who show that the retailer can benefit from encroachment even when it admits no synergies and facilitates neither product differentiation nor price discrimination. In this paper, we show that this argument depends greatly on both product durability and direct selling cost. In fact, our analysis of a two-period dual-channel supply chain with different product durability demonstrates that, contrary to Arya et al. (2007)’s results, if product durability is moderate, for any direct selling cost, manufacturer encroachment is always detrimental to the reseller and its bright side disappears.

We acknowledge a few limitations of our model. First, given our focus on durability, we abstract away other factors, including strategic choice of leasing and selling, which can potentially play an important role in a dual-channel supply chain with durables. Second, some of our assumptions, such as the monopoly manufacturer, complete information, and zero production costs, could be relaxed in future research. Third, we view the reseller as a brick-and-mortar reseller, an assumption that, although common in the literature of E-commerce (Tsay and Agrawal 2004, Arya et al. 2007, Cai 2010, Chen et al. 2012, Xiong et al. 2012), does not reflect the actuality that many resellers have ventured into the online world. Finally, we assume that consumers show no preference between the e-channel and the reseller channel, whereas in reality, consumers may exhibit different preferences over different distribution channels, as is found in Chu et al. (2007). This latter in fact opens a potentially interesting avenue of research: incorporation into the model’s demand functions of consumer preferences for services provided by durables in different distributions.
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