Security in the Name of Human Rights. The Discursive Legitimation Strategies of the War on Terror in France.

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Abstract
This article aims to question the discourse on “the war on terror” developed by the French President in the wake of the two terrorist attacks that occurred in France in 2015. Drawing from Critical Discourse Analysis, it explores and discusses the discursive legitimation strategies deployed by President Hollande to legitimate France’s securitarian response to the two attacks. It reveals how the defence of human rights served as an overall justificatory framework, through rationalisation, appeals to authority and moralisation. It argues that Hollande implemented a discursive manipulation of reality to shield his actions from criticisms of illiberalism all the while reframing the notion of human rights, undermining it and paving the way for an authoritarian-driven executive.

Keywords: Discourse analysis; Terrorism; France and terrorism; Discursive legitimation strategies; Rhetoric; Security discourse.

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Biographical note. I have been a Senior Lecturer in French at Northumbria since 1997 and a Senior Lecturer in French and Politics at Northumbria University since October 2015. My research interests are French politics, discourse analysis, identity as well as France and the European Union.

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Introduction

Ever since the attacks of 11 September 2001, the terrorism discourse has “emerged as one of the most important political discourse of the modern era” (Jackson 2007, 394). This has led Western Liberal States to implement a vast array of anti- and counter-terrorism policies as well as a rapid expansion of security and intelligence services (Bigo 2008; Haggerty and Ericson 2006). Extended parallel legal frameworks have been established, which have included new terrorism-related criminal offences and prosecution procedures, vastly increased new powers of stop and search, surveillance, arrest and custody, exceptional forms of detention, and, in some cases, states of emergency (Aradau and van Munster 2007; Baker-Beall 2013; Simone 2009; Tsoukala 2006). Those measures, initially introduced to cope with exceptional circumstances, have gradually been transformed into permanent elements of domestic legal frameworks (Payé 2004, 62), which has brought to the fore the fundamental issue of the relationship between security and human rights in the response provided by liberal states to the threat of terrorism.

Research has indeed shown how States have become far more intrusive in the lives of their citizens through the proliferation of surveillance measures, and more controlling of their liberties through implementing laws that restrict civil rights, in the name of protecting security (EU Network of Independent Experts 2003; Jackson 2005; Simone 2009). This has led many scholars to argue that most liberal democratic governments have sacrificed some of their democratic substance (Cettina 2001; Jackson 2005; Tsoukala 2006). They have also pointed out the presence of illiberal practices within liberal regimes (Bigo 2008; Huysmans 2008; Salter 2008), through the dominance of the exceptional governance of risks and dangers (De Goede 2008), whereby exceptional measures have been legitimated “through claims about necessary exceptions to the norm” (Neal 2006, 31) in order to ward off perceived threats to the security of the nation (Bigo 2004b). A number of scholars have
demonstrated how this security paradigm has led to an acceptance of what Salter (2008, 246) referred to as “the exceptional as mundane”, through the inherent paradox of security governance: the desire to enhance security has led to a heightened perception and construction of security threats, covering ever broader fields (Bigo 2004b; Zedner 2009), in a bid to track down existing and potential terrorists, as illustrated by the radicalisation agenda aimed at detecting terrorist “tendencies” from an early age (Githens-Mazer 2012). This has led to the implementation of ever more security measures, so much so that the exception has become the norm (Agamben 1998).

However, as argued by Tsoukala (2006, 609), “if liberal governments cannot legitimate exceptional measures they cannot be morally distinguished from the terrorists, who believe that the end justifies the means, and may be denounced for their undemocratic, authoritarian-driven stance”. The discursive legitimation of anti-terror policies is therefore of the utmost importance for liberal states and necessitates a carefully constructed public communication strategy in order to provide a justificatory framework for measures that might restrict rights, and to gain consent. Thus, a rapidly growing body of research has shown how discursive practices have played a key role in the justification of the range of measures implemented since 2001 (Cap 2008; Collins and Glover 2002; Croft 2006; Jackson 2005; Hodges 2011), as illustrated, amongst others, by the “war on terror” and the “securitisation” discourses. As demonstrated by Jackson (2005), the practice of the “war on terror” by the United States would not have been possible without a very carefully constructed discourse specifically designed to make the war seem “good,” as well as to silence any counter-arguments. Similarly, research has revealed how Western States have employed a “securitisation” discourse with “a specific rhetorical structure” (Buzan, Weaver, and De Wilde 1998, 26) to legitimise and foster consent for exceptional anti-terror legislation. By labelling an issue as security, dramatizing it through linking it to concepts such as “the safety of the nation”,

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thereby presenting it as being of supreme priority in the fight against a ubiquitous “terrorist threat”, an “agent claims a need for and a right to treat it by extraordinary means” (Buzan, Weaver, and De Wilde 1998, 26). Analysing language and discursive practices is therefore key to understanding how liberal states have sought to legitimise their exceptional measures in response to terrorism.

In 2015, France was the target of two terrorist attacks carried out by ISIS, on 7 January against the satirical magazine Charlie Hebdo, and on 13 November against various locations in Paris. As a result, fighting terrorism topped the list of priorities for French citizens (Ifop 2016a), with polls further revealing that the risk of terrorism being deemed high rose from 52% in 2010 to 93% after the first attack and 98% after the second (Ifop 2016b). In response, the French President, the Socialist François Hollande, adopted a martial tone, declaring that France was “at war with terrorism” (2015a), that “the Republic will be inflexible and implacable” (2015b) and that France would “eradicate the terrorists” (Hollande, 2015c). His response was to implement a wide range of security measures within what can arguably be characterised as a militaristic framework of control and punishment, as they included the following:

- Declaration of war against Isis and military intervention through air strikes.
- Strong reinforcement of armed and security forces deployed throughout the French territory.
- Extra spending and staffing for all areas linked to security.
- Closure of French borders after the November attacks.
- Increased prison sentences for acts of terrorism.
- Proposal to strip anyone condemned for terrorism of his or her nationality.
- Expelling foreign nationals suspected of terrorism.
• All public authorities to detect suspicious behaviour through the radicalisation agenda.
• Schools to report suspected radicalisation to the police.
• New law to increase surveillance of the internet and international communications.
• The education system to instil and reinforce Republican values and punish suspicious behaviour.
• Declaration of a state of emergency after the November attacks, which included house arrests for anyone suspected to constitute a threat to security, police raid, random ID control, house, car and luggage search, power to restrict freedom of movement, ban associations and demonstration, and close down public places.
• Lobbying the European Parliament to pass the Passenger Name Record in order to track an individual’s itinerary throughout the European Union.
• Intercepting French citizens on their way back from Syria.

(Vie Publique 2015)

This raft of measures arguably created a far-reaching security network, as they covered a tight control over the following: physical space, through the deployment of military and security forces internally and externally; minds through the radicalisation agenda, internet surveillance and the role of public authorities in instilling Republican values and reporting any suspicious behaviour; bodies through all the measures designed to track down, control and punish existing and suspected terrorists.

It is very important to note that François Hollande is a Socialist President. French Socialism has a long tradition of opposing militarism and any measures restricting human rights. The defence of human rights is high on the agenda of the Socialist Party (Parti Socialiste 2015) and has become a strong marker of its discourse ever since its programme of “changing life”
and overcoming capitalism was abandoned in 1983 (Knapp 2004). It is therefore not surprising that Hollande’s measures came under a barrage of criticisms from the Left, which described them as being securitarian and leading to a police state. More specifically, the criticisms focused on the following: the impact of a highly securitised country on human rights; militaristic response as opposed to diplomacy; air strikes and ensuing civilian casualties; the impact of internet surveillance on liberties; the severe restrictions on freedom of movement and demonstration inherent to the state of emergency; individuals being put under house arrest based merely on suspicion; emergency measures being applied without the prior consent of a judge; the creation of stateless individuals through stripping off their nationality; the danger of giving too much power to the security forces; the State turning authoritarian (Amnesty International 2016; Chemin 2015; Le Monde 2015; Manac’h 2015; Neuer 2015; Noyelle 2015; Wahnich 2016).

Hollande’s response to terrorism had to be legitimated in order to dismiss accusations of illiberality, authoritarianism and betrayal to the values of the Left. This article therefore aims to uncover the discursive strategies President Hollande implemented to legitimate his security-based response to terrorism, thereby adding to the literature on the role of language in shaping a justificatory framework for the “war on terror” in liberal States. It aims to enrich this growing body of work in two ways. First, there has been of lack of research in English analysing terrorism-related rhetoric deployed by French Presidents and this article aims to fill this gap. Second, most research on the “war of terror” has been carried out on the language used by the political Right, such as George W. Bush, or Centre-Left such as Tony Blair, whereas this article focuses on the legitimation strategies from the political Left, which will therefore add an extra dimension to the current body of research. After explaining the theoretical and methodological framework used to carry out the research, this article will contend that Hollande constructed a discourse designed to make France’s response to
terrorism seem reasonable, responsible and inherently good by framing it under a highly politicised and questionable human right paradigm.

**Theoretical framework and methodology**

This study focuses on François Hollande because of the special place a President has in the French political system. Not only does the constitution of the Fifth Republic grant him/her special powers in times of crisis but, following the presidentialisation process of the Fifth Republic (Grossman and Sauger 2013), the practice has led to the President becoming the decision-maker-in-chief. As a result, the President has shaped France’s response to terrorism.

The empirical source material of this study therefore consists of all the speeches Hollande made in relation to terrorism from the first attack on 7 January 2015 until its commemoration one year later. His speeches were collected from the official website of the French presidency (Présidence de la République 2016) and comprised 38 speeches, which are chronologically listed in Appendix 1, totalling 79,217 words. The original version was used in the analysis but the citations in this article were translated by the author.

The analysis is based on discourse analysis in general and more particularly the theoretical framework of critical discourse analysis (CDA). In this article, discourse, following Fairclough (1992), is not seen as a neutral way of describing the world but as “signifying the world, constituting and constructing the world in meaning” (Fairclough 1992, 64). Discourse is socially conditioned and socially constitutive, as it is through discourses that reality is constructed and accessed (Jorgensen and Phillips 2002). This means that, as argued by Jackson (2005), political discourses are not neutral reflections of reality, instead, they construct that reality through language. They also possess a clear ideological character by dictating what is possible and not possible to say about a certain subject, what counts as
“normal”, and what is accepted as legitimate “knowledge”. That is why, as Jackson (2005, 148) argued, analysing political discourse under CDA aims to reveal “how some forms of knowledge are privileged over others [...] how power is legitimised” and political practices “normalised”.

CDA is a particularly fruitful perspective for analysing political legitimation because this process is central to political power. Legitimation is defined as discourses that explain and justify the appropriateness of a social phenomenon within a “socially constructed system” (Suchman 1995). As Van Leeuwen (2008, 105) has suggested, legitimation provides an answer to the questions “Why should we do this?” and “Why should we do this in this way?” CDA-oriented work on legitimation has elucidated in particular the crucial role of discursive strategies and how they reflect power and ideology (Cap 2008; Chilton 2004; Chouliaraki and Fairclough 1999; Fairclough 2003; Van Dijk 1998). In particular, Van Leeuwen and his colleagues have worked on the “grammar of legitimation” (Martin Rojo and Van Dijk 1997; Van Leeuwen 2008; Van Leeuwen and Wodak 1999) and have identified a number of strategies. They include, amongst others, appeal to history, teleology (divine purpose or final cause), belief systems, authority, rationalisation, moralisation, narrativisation (construction of a compelling plot), mythopoeisis (storytelling), blame allocation, exceptionality, or effectiveness. This theoretical framework is considered suitable for this article because, as seen earlier, anti-terror measures must be assigned legitimation before they are undertaken in order to gain support and because the present study seeks to establish how ideology manifested itself through Hollande’s legitimation strategies of his measures.

CDA concerns itself with a qualitative analysis of discourse and its tradition is to engage in a close reading of specific texts (Fairclough 2003). However, in order to uncover more general patterns in a large corpus, as is the case in this study, CDA can be married with corpus linguistics, under corpus-assisted discourse studies (CADS). This approach, which has gained
considerable traction (Ädel and Reppen 2008; Baker 2010; Partington 2010), enables a quantitative and qualitative approach to a given set of texts. Corpus linguistics offers in particular the ability to uncover lexical patterns (O’Keefe and McCarthy 2010) in a large corpus, such as frequency, concordances (the context that terms occur in), collocations (terms frequently occurring near each other), as well as keywords (words that appear significantly more in one corpus compared to another one). This was considered appropriate for this study in order to uncover the linguistic patterns behind the discursive construction of Hollande’s legitimisation strategies as well as to track any evolution between the two attacks. A large corpus was therefore created, which was analysed in three stages: identification of topics, identification of discursive strategies, and examination of linguistic means.

The first stage involved an overall inductive thematic analysis of the material, i.e. the organisation of the data into meaningful units, based on a common theme. This stage helps to identify the most important topics in Hollande’s speeches. Six main themes were uncovered, namely: (1) human rights under threat, (2) security as the bedrock of human rights, (3) a country in danger, (4) respecting the rule of law, (5) waging a good war, and 6) a barbaric “Other”. In the second stage, a content analysis of the legitimisation strategies was carried out, in order to classify the discursive strategies used, following Van Leeuwen’s overall framework of authorisation, rationalisation, moralisation and mythopoeisis as a starting point. This coding was subsequently refined by identifying mythopoeitic temporalisation as being closely linked to moralisation. As a result, the analysis focuses on authorisation, rationalisation and moral evaluation. The detailed explanation of each classification is provided in the analysis section. The final methodological stage included an examination of linguistic means. This lexical analysis was carried out mainly through CADS. Wordsmith Tools (Scott 2008) was used to create two sub-corpora, one representing Hollande’s speeches from 07 January to 11 November 2015 and one for speeches made after the second attack.
Corpus Linguistic techniques were implemented to identify lexical patterns of interest, more specifically the classification of lexis by frequency, concordances and collocations. The specific implementation of these techniques is expanded upon in the analysis section. Based on this methodology, the six topics highlighted earlier were divided into rationalisation, authorisation and moral evaluation. In the following section, each strategy will be analysed in turn and will be subjected to a first-level critique, i.e. an analysis of the discourse “on its own terms” (Baker-Beall 2009, 199). The point is not to establish the “correct” truth but to demonstrate how the discourse hinged on a number of highly contestable assumptions that underlined the ideological nature of Hollande’s legitimation strategies.

Analysis

**Rationalisation legitimation strategies: human rights under threat**

Rationalisation legitimation operates through instrumental rationalisation, by referring to the utility or purpose of a practice, and theoretical rationalisation, by referring to the “natural” order of things (Van Leeuwen 2008, 113-116). Instrumental rationalisation can be goal, means or effect-oriented. The first focuses on the purpose of an action, the second on an action as a means to an end, and the third on the outcome of an action. Theoretical rationalisation encompasses definition, i.e. one action being defined in terms of another moralised one, explanation, which focuses on the nature of the actors of an action, and prediction, which focuses on expertise. Rationalisation strategy was at work in Hollande’s speeches through the discursive construction and conflation of the first two themes uncovered in the content analysis phase: “security as the bedrock of human rights” and “France in acute danger”. By subsuming human rights under security and creating a powerful vision of imminent danger Hollande legitimated his security-based response on the necessary defence of human rights, which therefore made it look reasonable and necessary, all the while...
suppressing alternative representations and constructing a highly contestable conception of human rights.

The first theme rested on a discursive construction of security as the necessary condition for human rights to exist. The following two excerpts illustrate this relationship: “France is the land of human rights and must therefore protect and ensure the safety of each citizen” (20); “And there is no independence, there is no freedom, there is no democracy without the protection of an army” (5). Security was clearly construed as the very condition for any other rights to exist and therefore the most important to protect. Goal-oriented rationalisation legitimated this supremacy, through Hollande linking his measures to a range of positive values that needed to be defended. Not only was the conjunction “in order to” the most collocated with the verbs “insure”, “protect” and “defend” but their own collocations served to legitimise the primacy of security. As illustrated by the table below, protecting the nation and its values clearly justified the supremacy of security. As no significant differences were detected between the two corpora, the results were aggregated:

Table 1. Hollande’s measures were necessary in order to:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Protect (100)</th>
<th>Defend (104)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>- Fellow citizens (14)</td>
<td>- Ourselves (11)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Ourselves (11)</td>
<td>- Values (6)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Territory (10)</td>
<td>- The country (4)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- France (5)</td>
<td>- Homeland (4)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- The French (4)</td>
<td>- Freedom (4)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- The population (3)</td>
<td>- Our ideals (3)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Borders (2)</td>
<td>- Peace (3)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Our children (1)</td>
<td>- The Republic (2)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Our interests (1)</td>
<td>- The Nation (2)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Security (1)</td>
<td>- France (2)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Ensure (59)

- Security (15)
- Independence (2)
Two types of theoretical rationalisation nullified the potential liberticidal drift inherent to this supremacy. Definition theoretical rationalisation was implemented through defining France as the “land of human rights”, which implied that the supremacy of security could not possibly lead to illiberal measures. Second, Hollande deployed an explanation theoretical rationalisation by legitimising the predominance of security through the French citizens themselves. When Hollande declared, “The French are expecting that our institutions do everything to protect them”, his measures were legitimated through him acting on the will of the people. This rationalisation was further enhanced by Hollande constructing the French as cherishing virtuous values. These values, illustrated in the table below, served to fend off any accusation of illiberalism, as Hollande implied that the French would oppose any measures that would infringe them.

Table 2. Values defended by the French

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Values</th>
<th>Number of words</th>
<th>Frequency (as a percent of the running words in the text)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>151</td>
<td>0.18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Freedom</td>
<td>121</td>
<td>0.144</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Solidarity</td>
<td>68</td>
<td>0.081</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Respect</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>0.062</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Secularism</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>0.057</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democracy</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>0.045</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Culture</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>0.043</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peace</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>0.041</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Humanity</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>0.038</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Equality</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>0.03</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fraternity</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>0.032</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dignity</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>0.029</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Diversity</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>0.028</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
A close analysis of Hollande’s discursive construction of security as the bedrock of human rights reveals a highly politicised manipulation of supporting claims designed to make the argument of the primacy of security seem plausible. CDA has shown how history, tradition and customs can be manipulated to provide supporting claims and how what is backgrounded through exclusions from the text can be as politically significant as what is foregrounded through inclusions (Fairclough 2003, 149). It can be argued that Hollande made his claims look reasonable by anchoring them in a specific French cultural cognitive model (Martín-Morillas 1997), French Republicanism and its discourse on human rights (Marrani 2013), through a process of politicised omission and mythification, which led to what Van Dijk (2006, 371) has called a discursive manipulation of reality through imparting biased and incomplete knowledge. Omission can be detected through his reconstruction of one of the founding texts of the French Republic, the 1789 Declaration of Human and Civic Rights. Article two states, “These rights are Liberty, Property, Safety and Resistance to Oppression” (The Avalon Project 2008), without any hierarchy being established between them. By reducing it to “the Declaration of Human and Civic Rights states in its article 2 that safety and resistance to oppression are fundamental rights, therefore we will implement them” (20), Hollande implemented theoretical rationalisation through expertise by legitimating the primacy of security on a respected text, embodying the ideals of the French Republic, thereby making his measures look reasonable, all the while truncating it and therefore distorting its

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Openness</th>
<th>19</th>
<th>0.022</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Freedom of religion</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>0.02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Human Rights</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>0.009</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Freedom of expression</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>0.009</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>justice</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>0.005</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pluralism</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>0.004</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tolerance</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>0.004</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
meaning by establishing a hierarchy between security and the other rights. Mythification occurred when Hollande reactivated a core myth of the French Republic, France the land of human rights (Dembour 2001). Through the hyperbolic description of how France created human rights (“France is the land where human rights were written” [8]), was equated by the world with freedom (“France, which is considered as the land of freedom throughout the world” [30]) and was a country where citizens cherished a long list of rights, as illustrated earlier, Hollande shielded the primacy of security against any criticisms of a liberticidal drift by suggesting that it could not possibly be against human rights since they were elaborated by its inventor in the first place, all the while leaving aside the highly contestable nature of defining France and the French in such a hyperbolic way.

Hollande’s politicised discursive construction of security as the bedrock of human rights led to the seemingly rational conclusion that his measures were reasonable. Indeed, if security is the condition of human rights and if this supremacy is supported by the founding text of the nation, its history and its citizens then taking any measures to ensure the former, even if it means restricting the latter, becomes necessary and reasonable. Thus, when Hollande stated, “the state of emergency, it is true, justifies temporary restrictions to liberties but by resorting to it we have been given all the means to re-establish them fully” (22) his measures were made reasonable through means-oriented rationalisation as they defended the very condition of all human rights, i.e. security. In this sense, France was not restricting human rights, it was actually enabling them to flourish. The temporary suspension of rights, for example when he announced after the second attack, “I know that some of them [new measures] are against international conventions and our European commitments” (22), thus became legitimated, through effect-oriented rationalisation, by the greater good of furthering them in the future. It can therefore be argued that by reconstructing security as the bedrock for human rights Hollande made any measure to increase security appear reasonable since they led to
their very protection. However, for this legitimation to work, security had to be threatened in the first place, which led to the second theme of a country in serious and imminent danger.

Hollande developed a discourse of acute dangers faced by the nation, with supporting claims being constructed in such a way as to make the primacy of security over other rights look reasonable and necessary. As Jackson (2006, 172) has argued, “defining the threats facing a society is never an objective process, but is rather a highly charged and politicized process of ‘reality’ construction through the deployment of language”. One can argue that Hollande reconstructed reality through a discourse of fear and insecurity (Bigo 2004a; Huysmans 2004) based on effect-oriented rationalisation in that destruction would occur unless his security measures were put in place. This was accomplished through the discursive construction of three themes uncovered during the content analysis phase, “a country under attack”, “a country at war” and “a barbaric Other”.

The “country under attack” theme was constructed in such a way as to convey the vision of a country facing multiple deadly threats, which led to the goal and effect-oriented instrumental rationalisation that Hollande’s measures were taken in order to defend the country, leading to a safer place. This was achieved first by the linguistic process of over-lexicalisation, with the lexis of danger increasingly saturating Hollande’s speeches. The table below illustrates how Hollande constructed a climate of fear through a lexis of danger, which was amplified after the second attack.

Table 3. Country under attack.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Lexical field</th>
<th>Frequency before November</th>
<th>Frequency after November</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Frequency</td>
<td>%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Terrorism / terrorists</td>
<td>102</td>
<td>0.24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Attacks</td>
<td>79</td>
<td>0.19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Threat</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>0.12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>War</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>0.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fear</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>0.13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ordeal</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>0.10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-------</td>
<td>----</td>
<td>------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Casualties</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>0.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Victims</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>0.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Danger</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>0.01</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Second, Hollande enhanced fear through implementing a well-known device in rationalisation legitimation, the “language of exception” (Agamben, 2005), via a lexis designed to underline how exceptional this threat was: “exceptional” (19 times), “unprecedented” (4 times) and “new” (3 times). Third, the threat was inflated by being made ubiquitous (“Terrorism can strike anywhere” [27]), imminent (“Attacks are prevented, thwarted, dissuaded but the risk is always there” [15]) and constant (“I can’t say every day but every week, we stop, we prevent, we thwart terrorist acts” [14]). By alluding to these thwarted attacks but at the same time refusing to communicate on them (“I don’t have to set up press conferences to inform the French” [14]) Hollande made the threat even more dangerous through its invisibility. This danger theme, however real the threat was, cannot be considered neutral. Research has shown how peril metaphors make exceptional measures appear logical (Bates 2004) and how appealing to exceptionality supports the argument that exceptional times demand exceptional measures (Fairclough and Fairclough 2012, 119–133), which was clearly at work in Hollande’s speeches. Indeed, by re-constructing reality as a strident vision of a country facing exceptional multi-faceted dangers, Hollande was able to reach the seemingly logical and reasonable conclusion, based on goal-oriented rationalisation, that security had to be increased in order to protect the country, which was summarised by “this threat justifies the bills we are going to present to Parliament” (33).

This image of peril was further reinforced by the very strong war theme that emerged after the November attacks, which Hollande immediately described as an “act of war”. The table below illustrates how the language used after November was markedly intensified:
Table 4. Description of the events

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Before November</th>
<th>After November</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Attacks</td>
<td>23 (0.05)</td>
<td>28 (0.06)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Terrorist attacks</td>
<td>16 (0.03)</td>
<td>41 (0.09)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Slaughter</td>
<td>17 (0.04)</td>
<td>15 (0.03)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Assassination</td>
<td>10 (0.02)</td>
<td>7 (0.01)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aggression</td>
<td>6 (0.01)</td>
<td>12 (0.02)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Murder</td>
<td>2 (0.004)</td>
<td>1 (0.002)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Act of war</td>
<td>3 (0.007)</td>
<td>59 (0.14)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Hollande’s switch to a war lexis can be further illustrated by his speech before Congress on 16 November (20) when his very first utterance was “France is at war” and the word “war” was repeated 15 times, with a frequency of 0.34%. Describing the attacks as war was not politically neutral, as Hollande conjured up images of a nation whose very existence was threatened, thereby legitimating any measure designed to ensure security as necessary and reasonable through goal-oriented rationalisation (to protect the country) and the implicit effect-oriented rationalisation of making the country safer. In addition, as Bates (2004) has argued, a war metaphor makes a military response appear reasonable in order to stop the enemy from winning. That is why Hollande could reasonably state that “we are at war, therefore we have to implement military solutions adapted to the threats” (5).

Hollande further enhanced the danger faced by France by constructing the attackers in such a way that they became barbaric demons ready to destroy the nation. Research has shown how representing the enemy as evil functions to legitimise unprecedented government measures (Salter 2002) in order to eradicate the threat. Such a goal-oriented rationalisation strategy of negative Other presentation (Van Dijk 1998) was at work in Hollande’s speeches, in the way the perpetrators of the attacked were nominated, i.e. referred to. As illustrated by the table below, nomination rested on lexical fields that constructed the Other as pure evil, which was further amplified after November:
Table 5. Nomination of the terrorist Other

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Lexical fields</th>
<th>Before November</th>
<th>After November</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Terrorists</td>
<td>64 (0.15)</td>
<td>114 (0.27)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Murderers</td>
<td>30 (0.7)</td>
<td>49 (0.11)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fanatics</td>
<td>9 (0.02)</td>
<td>11 (0.02)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Barbarians</td>
<td>8 (0.01)</td>
<td>16 (0.03)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fundamentalists</td>
<td>7 (0.01)</td>
<td>3 (0.004)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Criminals</td>
<td>6 (0.01)</td>
<td>4 (0.009)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cowards</td>
<td>6 (0.01)</td>
<td>16 (0.03)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mad men</td>
<td>3 (0.007)</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Totalitarians</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3 (0.007)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jihadists</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>11 (0.02)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

This nomination of the perpetrators transformed them into a lethal danger, and the reasonable goal-oriented rationalisation of “eradicating” them to protect the nation appropriate. Their predication, i.e. the traits they were attributed, reinforced their acute danger. Their threat was highlighted by contrasting France, the land of human rights worshiping the long list of values seen earlier, with the terrorist Other portrayed as hating everything France represented (“they wore the mask of hatred, a hatred that detest what France represents” [4]). This was reinforced by predicking them as being beyond civilisation itself (“It is a group who wants to deny the very idea of civilisation” [14]), celebrating death (“they worship death” [28]), and wanting to destroy humanity (“These fanatics target the living but also the dead, they target everything humanity represents” [21]).

The “evilification” of the terrorist Other reinforced the discourse of fear and insecurity articulated in the first two themes and legitimised the measures implemented through explanation theoretical rationalisation (the attackers are evil) and goal-oriented rationalisation (to put an end to the threat). This is not to say that the perpetrators of the attacks did not mean to kill or that the threat from ISIS was not real but it is argued that their discursive construction as thoroughly evil, through emotional and inflated lexis, demonised, de-humanised and de-politicised them to such an extent that any rational response had to involve
increasing security by all means necessary, as rational dialogue with evil attackers was by
definition excluded. Hollande’s discursive construction of the evil Other, coupled with a
strident vision of multiple dangers facing the country, left no other rational choice but to
conduct a war externally and create a security network internally to protect the country.
The analysis so far has revealed how, by constructing security as the necessary condition for
all human rights to occur and by portraying the security of the nation as severely endangered
by terrorism, Hollande was able to legitimate his security-based response on the seemingly
very reasonable need to defend threatened human rights. It is argued that this reasoning was
based on two contestable assumptions that reframed the very concept of human rights and put
forward a statist conception based on a discourse of fear that undermined them. First, it was
based on an implicit re-classification of rights, with security dominating all rights. As such,
Hollande constructed a very statist version of human rights in that their realisation could only
be guaranteed by the State through maintaining security. Second, by subsuming human rights
under security, Hollande effectively implied that terrorism was a threat from which the state
had to set its citizen free. In other words, freedom was no longer defined as freedom of action
but freedom from fear, i.e. as a release from the terrorist threat. Security-based measures were
therefore legitimated through the defence of threatened rights and the restrictions of these
same rights legitimated by the need to ensure security in order to free citizens from fear. It
can be argued that Hollande’s reconstruction of human rights ultimately undermined the
whole discursive logic of his argumentation, since it led to human rights being at the mercy
of the State, without any guarantee that they would actually be protected. The apocalyptic
discourse of fear and danger, which ignored serious questions such as why the vast anti-terror
legislation that had accumulated over the years in France, with 21 different pieces of
legislation passed since 1986 (Vie Publique, 2015), could not have sufficed or why
diplomacy could not have been activated instead of war, gave instead carte blanche to the
State to do whatever it deemed necessary to protect rights that had become hollow. Fear and danger are powerful legitimization strategies but ultimately rest on a crude version of the State imposing the vision that the end justifies the means and closing down any avenue for criticisms out of the seemingly rational defence of the nation and its rights. Invoking authorities that promote human rights, on the other hand, enables a speaker to anchor their actions within a less easily challengeable justificatory framework, which appeared in Hollande’s discourse through his authorisation legitimisation strategy.

**Authorisation legitimisation strategy: human rights and the rule of law as legitimising tools**

Authorisation legitimisation uses personal, impersonal or conformity authority to legitimise an action. In personal authorisation, legitimate authority is vested in people with institutional authority. Impersonal authorisation rationalises an action based on a regulation or law while conformity authorisation rests on the authority of “everybody does it” (Van Leeuwen 2008, 106). In Hollande’s speeches, personal and impersonal authorisation legitimisation was at work through his use of symbols of human rights and the rule of law that were reconstructed and, it is argued, manipulated, in such a way as to make his measures look reasonable for being under their control.

The first impersonal authority Hollande referred to was the rule of law. The preposition “in accordance with” and its collocations “law(s),” “liberties”, “our international commitments”, and “our values” (covering the long list of lofty rights seen in the previous section) appeared each time a measure was announced, which operated a double discursive function: to legitimise his response through the authority of a democratic legal framework and to mitigate their potential negative consequences through being sanctioned by national and international laws, which made the measures announced appear reasonable. The following excerpt is typical of this rhetoric: “We want to give the Republic all the strength necessary, […] to
enable it to eradicate terrorism, in accordance with our values, and without losing anything guaranteed by the rule of law” (20). The extremely strong and militaristic “eradicate”, with its connotation of death and destruction, became reasonable by being juxtaposed to “in accordance with our values” and “rule of law”. Similarly, when he stated, “we will defeat this enemy together, with the strength given by the Republic, our army, democracy, our institutions and law” (28), Hollande made the images of destruction implicit in the words “enemy”, “army” and “we will defeat” appear reasonable through being sanctioned by the rule of law.

However, a close analysis of Hollande’s use of “in accordance with” reveals that his discourse was constructed on an incantation technique, whereby measures were said to be respectful of laws and principles but the reality of such respect never demonstrated. It is therefore argued that he implemented a discursive manipulation of reality through “omitting very important information” (Van Dijk 2006, 364). Three examples, among many others, will serve as illustrations. When Hollande called for the Passenger Name Record to be passed, he stated, “this database, which must not infringe on data protection, is vital to track those who go to or come back from the Middle-East” (20). Simply specifying that data would be protected was sufficient to legitimate it, as the vast amount of criticisms levelled against the PNR, precisely over infringement of data protection (Roy 2015), was simply ignored. Similarly, when he stated, “we need to control the internet more strictly […] , making sure liberties are respected, so that praising terrorism, racism or antisemitism does not occur on a number of websites” (8), the reference to the lofty ideal of liberties being respected was not supported by any corroborating evidence to demonstrate how that would be possible and the numerous criticisms (Le Monde 2015) ignored. The invocation and exclusion technique therefore led to a discourse that appeared, on the surface, to be respectful of the rule of law but which, in reality, excluded key information that painted a different picture. Hollande’s
use of international law provides another example of such exclusions. Thus, when discussing expelling dangerous individuals he stated, “we must be in a position to expel more quickly foreigners who represent a particularly serious threat for public order and the security of the nation but we have to do it in accordance with our international commitments” (20).

However, the legitimation through international law omitted the fact that, through its case law, the European Court of Human Rights set up a very strict framework before a country is allowed to expel a foreign national, especially if he/she is likely to be subjected to torture or ill-treatment in their native country (Gov.uk 2014), which suggests that such a measure could be illegal or at least not so easy to implement. Overall, it can therefore be argued that Hollande legitimated his measures through discursive manipulation by basing them on lofty principles and laws that gave them a seemingly irreproachable sanction when they were in fact constructed in such a way as to hide aspects which would have contradicted them, which only a specialist audience could pick up on.

The second impersonal authority Hollande referred to was the French constitution. Its legitimating authority was established by being constructed as “the collective pact of the nation” (20) and “our common charter” (20). It can be argued that Hollande implemented a “constitutionalisation” technique, whereby if a measure is written in the common charter its legitimacy is guaranteed, as was made apparent when he stated that “the constitution […] gives public authorities the power to act and to legislate” (35). The state of emergency is a perfect illustration of this technique. After explaining that due to the “newness” of the situation, the current regime regulating emergency situations, set out by a 1955 law, needed updating (“The law of 3 April 1955 is no longer appropriate for the technologies and the threats that we are experiencing today” [20]), he framed the new emergency powers as being sanctioned by the constitution itself (“I have announced a revision of the constitution in order to give an unquestionable (legal) basis when resorting to the state of emergency” [32]) and
controlled by it (“I considered that the Constitution must control everything that might appear exceptional or excessive compared to the normal working of the Republic” [35]), which made the state of emergency legitimate by being under the control of “our common charter”. The constitution-as-authority technique, however, also functioned through exclusions, as not only did Hollande omit to explain why the situation was so new that exceptional measures had to be taken or why, even if the newness of the situation was accepted, the current law on emergency was no longer appropriate, but he left aside the crucial issue that adding a new article to the constitution did not necessarily make it compliant with human rights, as the French system means that no authority is able to stop a determined government from adding any article it wants, provided it is accepted by Parliament or the French citizens through a referendum (Vie Publique 2014a). Being in the constitution therefore did not guarantee that it would not infringe rights, a crucial fact that was discursively omitted.

The second authorisation legitimation strategy implemented by Hollande was of the personal type, with multiple references to the highest French judiciary bodies, the Constitutional Council and the Council of State, which had several legitimating aims. First, by presenting them as the protector of the rule of law and human rights and posing as the virtuous president deferring to their authority, Hollande implied that if his measures were infringing any values protected by these bodies they would be struck down. Thus, when he explained, “it is the role of the Constitutional Council to set the limits, to state when breaching liberties becomes unjustified, to set a framework beyond which we would forget who we are and why we are fighting” (35), his measures were legitimated as reasonable for being strictly controlled by a protector of human rights, which implied that they could not be accused of being liberticidal. Second, by presenting every measure as being under the control of a judge, he mitigated their potential harmfulness. Thus, when presenting the emergency rule he stated, “All these measures will be controlled by a judge, because it is a guarantee for the lawfulness and
legality of these acts” (36), which therefore gave the measures full legitimacy. Third, by presenting his measures as having been given the go-ahead by those bodies they automatically became legitimate, for example when he mentioned that the Constitutional Council had validated house arrests under the state of emergency.

It can be argued that the reference to the judiciary followed the same incantation and exclusion strategy as seen earlier, whereby the mere mention of their name was sufficient to give his measures legitimacy, all the while excluding the more complex aspects of the relationship between the executive and the judiciary, which would have contradicted their legitimation. For example, the facts that the Constitutional Council can be bypassed by a revision of the constitution or that the executive does not have to follow the advice of the Council of State were never mentioned (Vie Publique 2014b). Similarly, the fact that the Constitutional Council struck down some aspects of his measures for breaching human rights was omitted, for example the limits the Council had put on house arrests (De Senneville 2015). Exclusion also served as a way to hide a very different reality, for example when Hollande stated that any measures would be under the control of a judge but crucially omitted to mention that this control was not carried out prior to a measure being implemented, as per normal, but after, which severely restricted judiciary control and opened the way for abuse (Dujardin 2016), that it was based on mere suspicion and not concrete proofs, and that the judges in question were from administrative courts and not criminal courts, which made a significant difference in terms of protection (Roret 2016). In effect, Hollande masked the reality for the non-initiated all the while anchoring his measures within seemingly strong legitimating authorities.

Overall, Hollande’s authorisation legitimation strategy rested on the invocation of the lofty principles of the rule of law, the French constitution and French judicial bodies as sanctioning the measures taken. By repeating twice that “law is a strength and not a weakness in a
democracy”, Hollande shielded his measures from the accusation of being liberticidal by constructing them as fully compliant with national and international law and under the control of established bodies. This implied that democracy itself was a powerful weapon against terrorism through giving liberal states the means to defend themselves without them having to infringe any rights. However, these arguments were undermined by functioning on a discursive manipulation of reality through exclusions and legal “fuzziness”. The same reconstruction of reality was at work in Hollande’s final legitimation strategy, which was based on the discursive construction of a moralised “good war” in the name of human rights.

**Moral legitimation strategy: Human Rights and a Good War.**

Moral evaluation means legitimation by reference to value systems (Van Leeuwen 2008, 109-111). It includes evaluation (direct evaluative lexis), abstraction (referring to practices and linking them to discourses of moral values) and analogy (by associating an activity with positive or negative values). Even though mythopoesis, i.e. storytelling, is considered a separate type of legitimation strategy it is argued here that this strategy is best analysed as part of moral legitimation. This is due to the heavily moralised account of temporalisation in Hollande’s speeches. Following Cap’s work on temporality as a legitimatory framework (2008), temporalisation can be defined as reconstructing the past and the future in such a way that they legitimate the present. By constructing a heavily moralised story about France’s past and future to legitimate France’s current actions under the overall concept of a “good” war, Hollande effectively implemented all the techniques of moral evaluation through mythopoesis.

As explained by Oddo (2011, 293), temporal proximisation “involves construing the impact of past events in such a way that they seem to effect the current situation”. By reconstructing France’s past actions as intrinsically good and contrasting them to the morally abhorrent past
of ISIS, Hollande implemented evaluation and abstraction moralisation through a positive self-presentation / negative Other presentation (Van Dijk 1998) to legitimate his current actions as being a just cause. First, France’s moral standing was discursively constructed through Hollande deploying a “French generosity” story that hyperbolically reconstructed its past actions as having always been undertaken for the benefit of humankind and human rights. By implication, France’s current actions could only be “good”. Indeed, not only was France the generous country that created human rights, as seen previously, but it was a selfless country helping the weak and the innocent across the world (“France is the enemy of no-one […] its soldiers have gone wherever they have been called, in order to protect the weakest and not to satisfy a desire for domination” (28)). In addition, it came to the rescue of countries endangered by terrorism around the world (“we have been fighting terrorism wherever the survival of a State has been threatened” (20)), such as in Mali or Iraq (“they [Mali] are grateful to France to have enabled them to escape from the worst” [23]); it prevented a blood bath in the Central African Republic (“it was our duty” [15]); it always intervened in the world with a message of peace, tolerance and justice (“It’s the ideal of justice and peace that France has brought everywhere on the international stage. [It is this message] that we have been defending through our soldiers against terrorism and fundamentalism” [28]); it was always ready to “take its responsibility” for the world and that is why its soldiers were “the soldiers of humanity” (29). Intertextually, this lexis glorified France as an intrinsically good country that had always sacrificed itself for the benefit of mankind only and not for its own interests. Discursively speaking, Hollande therefore implied that in view of such a history of defending rights throughout the world France’s current actions could not be accused of being liberticidal or imperialistic.

Second, this positive self-representation was reinforced by a story that can be defined as “France the perfect member of the United Nations”, through portraying the country as having
always scrupulously respected its ethos and rules, which only allow military operations if a country asks for help or if it is sanctioned by the Security Council (United Nations 2016). Thus, by explaining that France’s intervention in Mali “was possible because Mali had asked for it, […] it was possible because we were […] supported by the United Nations, the Security Council, it was very important for France” (14) but that when it came to terror threats in Libya or Nigeria, “France has not been able to and has not wanted to take part in an operation that would not be sanctioned by the United Nations” (5), Hollande morally glorified France for being a perfect member of the international community. The current war against ISIS, supported by the United Nations, as Hollande repeated 8 times, was therefore legitimated through the moral evaluation of being undertaken by a country with a spotless record on the international stage.

Third, France’s moral standing was further enhanced by contrasting its generous past with the perpetrators of the attacks. Oddo (2011) showed how comparing “Our” glorious past with “Their” wretched past morally legitimated “Our” actions in the present. This process was at work in Hollande’s speeches in the way France’s past was further glorified by being contrasted with “Their” vilified past. The following table highlights how Hollande linguistically constructed a moral evaluation of “Their” past through morally negative evaluative verbs, which made them appear wholly immoral and a danger to the world:

Table 6 – Actions carried out by the terrorist Other in the past

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Action</th>
<th>Before November</th>
<th>After November</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Kill</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strike</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Slaughter</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wreck chaos / destruction</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oppress</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Divide</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Terrorise</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rape</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
This contrasting presentation of “Our” past and “Theirs” legitimated France’s measures, in that it was morally right for a country that had demonstrated its moral standing in the past to fight opponents who, instead, had been wreaking chaos and death, which therefore made Hollande’s response look reasonable and necessary.

As shown by Oddo (2011), temporal proximisation also extends to the future, and Hollande pursued the strategy of positive Self-presentation/negative Other presentation through a series of contrasts based on moral abstraction designed to show what would happen if France did not intervene and ISIS won. France’s current actions were constructed, through glorifying hyperboles, as leading to civilisation itself being saved in the future: France was going to eradicate ISIS for the benefit of humankind (“Our cause is civilisation and humanity” [30]), for humanity (“what we are defending is much more than our homeland. It is the values of humanity” [19]), for freedom and dignity to triumph (“they [French soldiers] fight so that the ideals of freedom and dignity that France shares with the world prevail” [21]), for cultural dialogue to be saved (“we will eradicate terrorism so that free movement of people and cultural interactions remain possible and human civilisation is enriched” [20]) and to defend life itself (“France will respond to fanaticism through the hope that life itself represents” [23]). By contrast, if “They” were not defeated, darkness and death would prevail, as implied by their current actions (“It is an organisation, a terrorist group […] who slaughters, kills and wants to implement rules that are degrading for humanity” [24]; “they want to see life stop” [23]). This representation of the future implemented a moral legitimation strategy because in order to save humanity France had to engage in violence against terrorism in the present. By constructing the war against ISIS as a war for humanity, France’s actions were therefore legitimated through the moral right to save it from death.

France’s moral standing was further reinforced by the category membership of “us” and “them” through the way Hollande constructed a “We are the World” category, with “Our”
side including all civilised peoples whereas “Their” side was represented by a tiny number of very evil people. Indeed, France was not only part of an international coalition under the United Nations but a “coalition of the whole world against terrorism” (27) as well as a self-glorifying “coalition for life” (25). Their side, by contrast, consisted of “fanatics” and fellow “totalitarians”. This kind of representation morally legitimated France by reference to conformity (Van Leeuwen 2007) as well as analogy. If all good people were supporting it, then its actions became morally legitimate as it was leading the fight of all those who believed in civilisation and humanity as opposed to thoroughly evil opponents.

Overall, it can be argued that Hollande legitimated France’s actions through a moral duty to save not only France but also the whole world from the scourge of terrorism, with both past and future events legitimating immediate violence in the present. It can be argued that Hollande discursively manipulated reality through the hyperbolic glorification of France’s past, which conveniently left aside, inter alia, colonialism and its ensuing wars (Chafer 2001), neo-colonial interventions (Thomson 2016) as well as France not following the ethos of the United Nations, for example in Kosovo (Rytter 2001) or in its unilateral interventions in Africa (Charbonneau 2008), and through the glorification of its future, when both the reality of war in Syria, such as civilian casualties or the risk of retaliation as well as the intricacies of the reality in Syria, were omitted. In effect, Hollande closed down any alternative views on the measures implemented through a highly moralised legitimation strategy which made his response to terrorism appear an essentially good and just war and made questioning the reality of war and its effects seem petty when compared with the lofty aims of saving humanity.
Conclusion

In the wake of two terrorist attacks in 2015, France’s response, as articulated by its Socialist President, has been to set up a comprehensive set of measures based on a tight security network internally and military intervention against ISIS externally. This article has analysed how such a discourse was legitimated in view of the criticisms it has attracted in terms of being securitarian, militaristic and a danger for civil liberties. Van Leeuwen (2008, 105) stated that legitimation means replying to the following two questions: why should we do this? Why should we do this in this way? This study has revealed how Hollande answered these two questions by constructing a discourse legitimating his response through human rights and the rule of law that made them appear reasonable, necessary and intrinsically good.

His response to these two questions can be summarised as follows:

Table 7. Summary of discursive strategies

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Legitimation strategies</th>
<th>Instrumental</th>
<th>Authorisation</th>
<th>Moralisation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1 - Rationalisation</td>
<td>Goal-oriented</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>To protect the nation.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>To protect French citizens, their human rights and values.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>To eradicate evil terrorists.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Effect-oriented:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>The country will be safe</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>The French will be able to enjoy their rights.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Means-oriented:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>By restricting some rights now their full implementation will be restored</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 - Authorisation</td>
<td></td>
<td>Impersonal</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>France, in its response, acted in accordance with national and international law.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>France followed the rule of law</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>France acted in accordance with its constitution.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Personal</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>France is supported and controlled by prestigious bodies representing the rule of law and human rights.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>The Council of States</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>The Constitutional Council</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 - Moralisation</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Mythopeitic past temporalisation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Evaluation</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
This article contends that Hollande’s legitimation strategies were based on discursive manipulation through the following strategies:

- **Manipulation of the 1789 Declaration of Human and Civic Rights through it being truncated.**
- **Manipulative appeal to history and values.**
- **The construction of a climate of fear and insecurity through the emotional over-lexicalisation and exceptionalisation of dangers, and the evilification of the enemy.**
- **The implementation of omission technique through which very important information was omitted.**
- **The implementation of incantation techniques leading to legal fuzziness, as evidence was not provided.**
• The hyperbolic glorification and mythification of France through France being the land of human rights, the French being virtuous defenders of lofty values, France being the perfect member of the international community and the altruistic country that had always sacrificed itself for the benefit of humankind.

• The de-politicising evilification process of the enemy leaving no other alternative but war.

• The transformation of military intervention into a just cause.

This analysis does not purport to minimise what happened in France in 2015 but instead shows how political authorities are able to discursively re-construct reality in order to justify their militaristic and security-based responses to terrorism. In the case of Hollande it could be argued that he had to perform a delicate balancing act between staying true to his Socialist background and convincing his critics on the left that his measures were not illiberal on the one hand, and responding to the French putting terrorism as their main worries on the other, all the while facing the political Right who had been at the forefront of tough security measures for years and the Extreme-Right who had been calling for ever more security measures (Perrineau 2016). It can therefore be argued that Hollande had to react with a tough response, all the while attempting to placate his own political family through framing his security discourse on human rights. There are, however, very real dangers involved in this discourse that must be addressed. Pushed to its limits, this discourse opens the door to an authoritarian-driven executive power. If security is legitimated through the defence of human rights there are arguably no limits to its extension, as rights can so easily be declared in danger, and the democratic substance of the country all too easily altered. Thus, the terrorist attack that occurred in Nice on 14 July 2016 led many French politicians to call for further exceptional measures in order for security to be guaranteed, measures that are a serious risk for democracy and civil rights. The proposals (Bekmezian and Goar 2016; Goar 2016; Le
Monde 2016; Sarkozy 2016; Sud-Ouest 2016) included, amongst others, the suspension of legality to allow for the detention of anyone suspected of terrorism or radicalisation, thereby bypassing the key principles of innocent until proven guilty and not being arbitrarily detained; the constitution to be changed if the Constitutional Council objects to these measures and the article in the French constitution forbidding arbitrary detention to be revoked; France’s withdrawal from the European Convention of Human Rights or at the very least for its application to be suspended; the creation of a French “Patriot act” and a French Guantanamo Bay. When the former French President, Nicolas Sarkozy, explained that “legal quibbles, precautions and pretexts for an incomplete action are no longer acceptable” (Sarkozy 2016) or when the vice-secretary of the main right-wing party in France stated that “we can’t fight against terrorists who are armed with knives and Kalashnikovs with [our] legal Codes” (Bekmezian and Goar 2016), it becomes very clear that while Hollande’s justificatory discourse was seemingly anchored in a human rights paradigm, the primacy of security it contained sowed the seeds to serious breaches of those same rights. The danger becomes even clearer when one considers the fact that 77% of the French called for isolation centres for anyone suspected of terrorism, 85% called for their electronic tagging and 77% wanted “risky”, i.e. political, demonstrations to be prohibited (Ifop 2016b). If this danger is to be avoided, the dominant discourse on security must be imperatively challenged and deconstructed. While this study has enabled us to see how official discourses on terrorism were constructed in France, it did not fully consider the agency of the audience. Additional studies should analyse in depth the reaction of the French society to this type of discourse in order to determine how it was accepted, negotiated or opposed.

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«Après le drame de Nice, la droite n’accorde aucune trêve au gouvernement ». 


“Pourquoi la loi sur le renseignement cristallise les critiques ». 


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Appendix 1 Hollande’s speeches in chronological order:

1. Allocation à la suite de l'attentat au siège de Charlie Hebdo 07 January 2015
2. Hommage national à Robert Chambeiron Les Invalides – 8 January 2015
3. Adresse à la Nation à la suite des événements des 7 et 8 January 2015 09 January 2015
4. Hommage national aux trois policiers morts en service Préfecture de Police, 13 January 2015
5. Vœux aux forces armées 14 January 2015
6. Allocation lors de l'ouverture du forum "Renouveaux du monde arabe" à l'Institut du monde arabe 15 January 2015
7. Vœux aux corps diplomatiques Palais de Elysée – 16 January 2015
10. Discours à l’occasion des vœux aux Corps constitués et aux bureaux des Assemblées - 20 January 2015
11. Vœux au monde éducatif - 22 January 2015
12. 5e conférence de presse du président François Hollande 5 February 2015
13. Intervention du président de la République à la suite du Conseil de Défense- 29 April 2015
15. 6e conférence de presse du président de la République 07/09 - 7 september 2015