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An Efficient Reinforcement Learning-Based Botnet Detection approach

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Abstract

The use of bot malware and botnets as a tool to facilitate other malicious cyber activities (e.g. distributed denial of service attacks, dissemination of malware and spam, and click fraud). However, detection of botnets, particularly peer-to-peer (P2P) botnets, is challenging. Hence, in this paper we propose a sophisticated traffic reduction mechanism, integrated with a reinforcement learning technique. We then evaluate the proposed approach using real-world network traffic, and achieve a detection rate of 98.3%. The approach also achieves a relatively low false positive rate (i.e. 0.012%).

Keywords: Botnet detection, Network security, Traffic reduction, Neural network, C2C, Reinforcement-learning.

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1. Introduction

Bot malware and botnets are two widely understood concepts in the cyber security literature. Specifically, a botnet is a network of geographically dispersed infected bots (e.g. any computing device including an Internet of Things (IoT) device, such as a smart TV, that has been compromised by a bot malware), which is remotely controlled by a botmaster. Such botnets are generally used to carry out a range of malicious cyber activities, ranging from sending of spams to launching of distributed denial of service (DDoS) attacks to dissemination of malicious programs (malware) to disseminating illegal materials (e.g. child exploitation materials) to click fraud, and so on [1, 2, 3, 4]. The communication channel between the botnet and the botmaster is also referred to as the command and control (C2C) channel, which can be either centralized or decentralized [5, 6, 7, 8, 9]. Decentralized C2C infrastructures, such as peer-to-peer (P2P) infrastructure, are generally harder to detect in comparison to centralized C2C infrastructures. This is also partly evidenced by the increased adoption of the P2P infrastructure in botnets [10], such as Waledac Bot [11], Conficker Bot [12], Zeus Bot [13], and Storm Bot [14].

A typical P2P botnet lifecycle comprises four main stages, namely: initial infection, peer discovery, secondary update and attack [10]. In the first phase, the bot malware is installed on an end-user computing device (e.g. Internet of Things device, such as a smart TV, an edge device, and/or an industrial control system), say by exploiting known vulnerabilities or using social engineering (e.g. via email attachments, drive-by-downloads) [15, 16, 17]. This is also done without the victim’s knowledge. During the second phase, the bot will seek to establish a connection with other bots (i.e. infected hosts) that are in the same botnet. In the third phase, the bot attempts to download and install the latest update of the bot malware, if it exists (this is analogous to installing a new version of a mobile app, or patching the system). This phase typically takes place via the C2C channel. In the last phase, the bots will carry out the various malicious cyber activities, on the command of the botmaster.
There are a number of ways to detect such bots. For example, an organization could analyze their own network traffic and attempt to identify suspicious hosts involved in malicious activity. Existing botnet detection systems, such as those described in [18, 19, 20, 21, 6], generally rely on DPI to analyze the packet contents. This can be computationally expensive and inefficient in recognizing unknown payload signatures. In addition, such detection systems when deployed in high-speed and/or high-volume networks, are generally not capable of performing a comprehensive analysis of all network traffic. Hence, mitigating P2P botnets remains a topic of going interest for both the research community and the practitioner community.

In this paper, we develop an effective reinforcement learning-based detection system, designed to detect and identify infected hosts in a P2P botnet, including new bot (with previously unknown behavior and payload). Specifically, our proposed system comprises a traffic reduction method, in order to deal with a high volume of network traffic. We also attempt to detect the bots as early as possible, for example during the propagation phase (i.e. before the bot launches any malicious activity; in other words, during the earlier discussed peer discovery and secondary update stages). To avoid having a high false positive rate, a set of host traffic features is adaptively set to differentiate between a host infected with a P2P Bot and a legitimate network host.

We will now explain the layout of this paper. In the next section, we will briefly review the relevant literature. In Sections 3 and 4, we present our proposed approach, and describe the evaluation setup and findings. The last section concludes this paper.

2. Related Literature

As discussed in the preceding section, there is an extensive literature on bot malware and botnet detection and it remains a topic of ongoing interest, partly evidenced by the number of research papers [22, 23, 24, 25] and literature review and survey papers on the topic published in recent years [26, 27, 28].
Botnet detection techniques can be broadly classified into anomaly-based, data mining-based, signature-based and DNS-based techniques. For example, Han et al. classified P2P botnet detection into those based on machine learning, data mining, traffic analysis and network behavior, and Wei et al. classified botnet detection techniques into unsupervised and supervised techniques.

In the survey of P2P botnet detection, Babak et al. also proposed a botnet detection system, referred to as PeerRush. The latter employs a one-class classification approach to classify P2P traffic into abnormal traffic and normal traffic. Other techniques used in the classification of abnormal traffic and normal traffic include Gaussian, Parzen, and K-centers data description. Also in, the researchers created an application profile based on the analysis of some P2P applications’ network traffic. In addition, features such as the interval delays between flow duration and packets were used to classify P2P applications. However, such an approach can be easily circumvented, for example by changing the delay between packets.

Garg et al. studied the potential of using three machine learning algorithms in detecting P2P botnets, namely: J48, Naive Bayes, and Nearest-Neighbor. They aimed to explore the effectiveness of several classifiers. While their studied suggested that both J48 and Nearest-Neighbor achieved reasonably accuracy, the accuracy of detecting legitimate traffic is low. Jiang and Shao proposed relying on the dependency of botnet flows with other peer bots (in the same botnet) to detect bots. Specifically, they used a single-linkage hierarchical clustering mechanism to differentiate between a normal host and a P2P bot. However, it does not detect botnets that utilize irregularity that lies within the traffic flow (e.g. Storm Bot).

Zhang et al. introduced a system to detect hidden P2P botnet, by monitoring the traffic of suspected C2C. The researchers obtained four features from every network flow. Such features include bytes and packets numbers that have been received and sent. The authors used the BIRCH and hierarchical clustering algorithms for clustering network flow. The system showed high
accuracy rates in detecting malicious and legitimate hosts. It also showed TPR of 100%, and FPR rate of 0.2%. It should be noted that the latter system is capable of detecting botnets regardless of the way the botnets carry out their malicious activities. Despite that, the latter system targets P2P botnets only. This system is criticized for not being capable of detecting other botnet types, such as: the HTTP and IRC bots. In addition, the latter system is vulnerable to several methods of evasion. Such methods include: the flow disturbance packets, DGA and Fast-flux algorithms.

Liao et al. [40] employed a packet size-based methodology for distinguishing between legitimate P2P traffic and P2P botnet traffic. When they evaluated the performance of using Bayesian, J48, and Naive Bayes networks in classifying network traffic, they achieved accuracy rates of 98%, 87%, and 89%, respectively. They also determined that P2P bots' packets size is generally less than normal P2P applications. Similarly, Zhao et al. [41] used REPTree for classification of online P2P botnet detection. However, a key limitation of this approach is that it can be circumvented using random connection interval [42].

The approach of Masud et al. [43] is based on the premise that bots’ reaction patterns differ from the reaction patterns of humans. They then demonstrated how one can utilized such an approach to detect bots by identifying the relationship between incoming packets application startups, and outgoing packets and connections. In a separate work, the authors [44] evaluated the potential of using Boosted decision tree, Bayes network classifier, Naive Bayes, support vector machine and C4.5 decision tree in detecting IRC Botnets. It was found that the detection rates for these machine learning techniques are greater than 95 %, with a false positive rate of less than 3% and false negative rate of less than 5%. The Boosted decision tree had the highest overall performance. However, this approach is incapable of detecting botnets that utilized encrypted communication or contemporary bot botnets, such as P2P botnets. More recently in 2018, Wei et al. [31] introduced an unsupervised method based on clustering rather than classification methods. Their approach was not confined to a specific botnet type and is sufficiently flexible.
There have also been focuses on avoiding detection by existing botnet detection solutions, for example by using encryption [14, 45] or using regular protocols (e.g. P2P and HTTP) [35, 46].

It is clear from these discussed works that botnet, particularly P2P botnet, detection remains an ongoing challenge.

In the next section, we will present our proposed approach.

3. Our Proposed Approach

In the proposed system, we focus on the passive monitoring of network traffic and the frequent communication between bots and their C2C servers during propagation. Specifically, such (frequent) communication is often used to discover other peers and receive commands and related updates [47, 48], and hence can be leveraged to facilitate detection. Our proposed detection approach comprises the following phases: network traffic capture and packet reduction, feature extraction, malicious activity detection, and bot behavior detection using reinforcement learning – see Sections 3.1 to 3.4.

3.1. Network traffic capture and packet reduction

In this phase, network traffic will be sniffed based on the sliding time-window size, and then utilized for traffic reduction. In this paper, we passively capture the network packets using Jpcap [49], since a passive capturing does not (significantly) increase the volume of packets in the network. It also allows us to detect botnets without interacting with them. Given the volume of network packets to be analyzed, network traffic is divided into time-windows. Such a time-window is also required for delivering the results to the network admin on a timely basis. Bots may also seek to generate a temporal behavior after the infection phase [50]. Therefore, using time window can facilitate bot detection. However, we need to determine an appropriate size. For example, if the size is too small, very few captured packets will be captured and hence we are not able to learn the traffic characteristics. If the size of time-window is too large,
it can be lead to failure in the early detection of botnet behavior. More details on determining time-window size is discussed in Section [1]. As shown in Figure 1, W1, W2...Wn denote the sliding time window size.

Figure 1: Time-window sliding technique

Given the size of network traffic, we need to efficiently reduce its traffic (i.e. performing a triage). For example, we can use existing approaches such as those described in [51] to reduce the network traffic.

3.2. Feature extraction

We then need to analyze the reduced traffic to identify attributes that can be used to effectively characterize the botnet, and these attributes may collectively form a feature. Clearly, the quality of the features has a significant impact on the detection accuracy of the machine learning algorithm used. Network traffic feature extraction can occur at three levels, namely: packet-level, flow-level, and connection-level [52]. In addition, classification depends on the level of
packet inspection (e.g. deep or shallow packet inspection). We propose using a mixture of connection and packet levels. For instance, identifying the inter-arrival time features between the packets in each connection requires gathering of packet-level data to be aggregated into connections. That is done for collecting statistical information about connection states. The features employed in our approach are extracted through two stages. First, connection features are extracted. Then, these features serve as host features (representing the host state during the sliding time-window).

3.2.1. Connection level features

This phase focuses on features that are important for the detection of the P2P botnet. In our study, 43 features are collected and gathered in accordance with our pre-determined sliding window size—see received. The features collected comprise control packets exchanged between network hosts and have 5 tuples (IP source address, IP destination address, source port, destination port, protocol).
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Feature</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Feature</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>F1</td>
<td># of control packets</td>
<td>F2</td>
<td># of transmitted control packets</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F3</td>
<td># of received control packets</td>
<td>F4</td>
<td># of transmitted bytes per flow</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F5</td>
<td># received bytes per flow</td>
<td>F6</td>
<td># of transmitted SYN packets</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F7</td>
<td># of received SYN packets</td>
<td>F8</td>
<td># of transmitted ACK packets in a sequence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F9</td>
<td># of received ACK packets</td>
<td>F10</td>
<td># of transmitted duplicate ACK packets</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F11</td>
<td># of received duplicate ACK packets</td>
<td>F12</td>
<td># Avg. length of transmitted control packets</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F13</td>
<td># of received duplicate ACK packets</td>
<td>F14</td>
<td># Avg. length of transmitted control packets</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F15</td>
<td># of transmitted failed connections</td>
<td>F16</td>
<td># of received failed connection</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F17</td>
<td># of transmitted SYN-ACK packets/connection</td>
<td>F18</td>
<td># of received SYN-ACK packets/connection</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F19</td>
<td># of transmitted SYN-ACK in a sequence/connection</td>
<td>F20</td>
<td># of received SYN-ACK in a sequence/connection</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F21</td>
<td># of bytes per connection/connection</td>
<td>F22</td>
<td># Ratio of incoming control packets/connection</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F23</td>
<td>avg. length of outgoing Ctrl pkt avg. length of Ctrl pkts</td>
<td>F24</td>
<td>Transmitted SYN - received ACK/ Avg. # of SYN</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F25</td>
<td>(transmitted SYN - received SYN-ACK)/connection</td>
<td>F26</td>
<td># of transmitted FIN-ACK packets/connection</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F27</td>
<td># of received FIN-ACK packets per connection</td>
<td>F28</td>
<td># of transmitted RST-ACK packets per connection</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F29</td>
<td># received RST-ACK packets per connection</td>
<td>F30</td>
<td>avg. time between attempts to create connections</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F31</td>
<td># of received RST packets per connection</td>
<td>F32</td>
<td>of transmitted RST-ACK pkts in a sequence/connection</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F33</td>
<td># of received RST packets per connection</td>
<td>F34</td>
<td>of transmitted RST-ACK pkts in a sequence/connection</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F35</td>
<td>Inter-arrival time b/w SYN and ACK by host/connection</td>
<td>F36</td>
<td>Inter-arrival time b/w SYN and RST by host/connection</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F37</td>
<td>Inter-arrival time b/w SYN and RST-ACK y host/connection</td>
<td>F38</td>
<td>Inter-arrival time b/w SYN from host RST from other side/connection</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F39</td>
<td>Inter-arrival time b/w SYN from host RST-ACK from other side/connection</td>
<td>F40</td>
<td>Inter-arrival time b/w FIN-ACK from host RST from other side/connection</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F41</td>
<td>Inter-arrival time b/w ACK from host and connection and RST from other side</td>
<td>F42</td>
<td>Inter-arrival time SYN from host and connection and SYN-ACK from other side</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F43</td>
<td>Connection duration</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
3.2.2. Feature reduction

Feature reduction refers to a method that can minimize the number of attributes in order to eliminate features with minimal impact on the classification problem [53, 54]. The feature reduction technique is adopted for decreasing the ‘over-fitting’ problem [55], which is crucial in overcoming the imbalanced dataset problem [56]. Thus, the quality of the feature reduction technique is an important factor given its influence over the accuracy rate of the classification algorithm.

We use the classification and regression tree (CART) [57] as the feature reduction technique. The decision tree generated by the CART algorithm has two kinds of nodes, namely: leaf nodes without children and internal nodes with two children. Internal nodes are associated with a decision function to identify the node that shall be visited next. To begin building the tree, training samples along with their class labels are required. During the designing of the tree, the training set is divided recursively into smaller subsets. Through the distribution of the classes that are within the training set, a decision matrix is created. Based on the following matrix, each obtained node would be provided with a labeled class. Internal node testing is created using measurement for impurity. It is created for selecting threshold values and features. A known measurement of impurity for CART is the entropy impurity, and is mathematically represented below:

\[
\text{Entropy}(s) = -\sum_{i=1}^{k} P\left(\frac{i}{s}\right) \log_2 P\left(\frac{i}{s}\right)
\] (1)

In the above equation, \(\text{Entropy}(s)\) denotes the entropy value at \(s\), \(p\left(\frac{i}{s}\right)\) is the relatively distribution of class \(i\) at \(s\), and \(k\) denotes the number of classes. The optimal splitting value for \((s)\) is selected from a splitting value group \((y)\); thus, the highest impurity is the impurity difference between nodes of root and
children. The equation is as follows:

$$
\triangle E(y, s) = E(s) - (P_L E_{SL}) + (P_R E_{SR})
$$

(2)

In the above equation, $\triangle E(y, t)$ denotes the the impurity drop, $E_{SL}$ and $E_{SR}$ are the nodes of the right and left branches impurities, and $P_L$ and $P_R$ are the probability of input to be in the right ($SR$) or left ($SL$) child nodes.

Table 2 describes the significance of features chosen by the CART approach, where features F34, F35, F36, F37, F26, F27, F6, F8, F31, F32, F33, F9, F15, F19, F20, F25, F1, F2, F3, F7, F6, and F43 can be used for distinguishing between malicious and legitimate connections, and features F13, F14, F16, F17, F18, F21, F4, F5, F10, F11, F12, F24, F22, F41, F23, F30, F29, F38, F39, F28, F40, and F42 cannot be used to distinguish between malicious and legitimate connections. The feature selection process is carried out based on the input samples’ contributions, and the feature’s significance is determined based on each input sample’s role. For instance, it may be a surrogate or a primary splitter. Surrogate splitters serve as backup rules that simulate the main rules splitting process. As for the features that can be used to distinguish between malicious and legitimate connections, they will be utilized for generating host features during the feature extraction phase.

Table 2: Feature ranking

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Feature</th>
<th>Significance</th>
<th>Feature</th>
<th>Significance</th>
<th>Feature</th>
<th>Significance</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>F1</td>
<td>0.812</td>
<td>F15</td>
<td>0.718</td>
<td>F32</td>
<td>0.551</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F2</td>
<td>0.810</td>
<td>F19</td>
<td>0.703</td>
<td>F33</td>
<td>0.531</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F3</td>
<td>0.787</td>
<td>F20</td>
<td>0.660</td>
<td>F34</td>
<td>0.509</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F6</td>
<td>0.774</td>
<td>F25</td>
<td>0.619</td>
<td>F35</td>
<td>0.449</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F7</td>
<td>0.763</td>
<td>F26</td>
<td>0.600</td>
<td>F36</td>
<td>0.371</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F8</td>
<td>0.754</td>
<td>F27</td>
<td>0.573</td>
<td>F37</td>
<td>0.286</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F9</td>
<td>0.743</td>
<td>F31</td>
<td>0.566</td>
<td>F43</td>
<td>0.194</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
3.2.3. Host feature extraction at network level

Table 3 shows the 16 host features collected using the proposed approach. The approach is based on the following three observations. First, bot infected hosts share particular malicious behavior, and the features differ from those of a normal host [58]. Second, the Bot’s behavior during propagation repeats itself in a frequent manner since it is attempting to infect multiple hosts [10, 59]. Third, a software program generates the Bot connections [60].

For the feature extraction phase, it may start immediately in the event that the packets are transferred between the hosts. To extract the features of a node in a manner that is more accurate, we need to collect sufficient network traffic; otherwise, feature extraction is not going to be sufficiently robust. Thus, the hosts’ behavior in the proposed approach is observed by analyzing their traffic packets during the sliding window time. This allows us to obtain the required number of packets. During the feature extraction phase, each network host has a distinctive feature record. After that, the host feature record can then be used to differentiate between legitimate network traffic and malicious botnet traffic. This can be achieved using online machine learning techniques, as well as reinforcement techniques.
Table 3: Host features of network traffic

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Features</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>F1</td>
<td>Total transmission flows per host in time-window.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F2</td>
<td>Total transmission unique connections per host in time-window.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F3</td>
<td>Total connections try per host in a time-window.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F4</td>
<td>High-severity of dest. port rates in time-window.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F5</td>
<td>The rate of use of unique dest. ports per host in time-window.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F6</td>
<td>The rate of use of unique source ports per host in time-window.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F7</td>
<td>The rate of transmission of unique host connections in time-window.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F8</td>
<td>High-severity of source port rates in time-window.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F9</td>
<td>Failures connections rates per host in a given time interval.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F10</td>
<td>Control packets Entropy rate for connections per host in time-window.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F11</td>
<td>Received Control packets entropy rate for connections per node in time-window.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F12</td>
<td>Transmitted Control packets entropy rates for connections per node in time-window.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F13</td>
<td>The avg. time between host connections.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F14</td>
<td>The avg. time between source inter-arrival control packets.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F15</td>
<td>The avg. length of the connection.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F16</td>
<td>Dispersion index.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Port scanning is the most common activity that precedes a cyber attack, as well as during various stages of a bot malware lifecycle (e.g. attack and propagation). For instance, during the propagation phase, a bot seeks to discover and contacting other peer bots within the same network. Thus, analyzing and monitoring the rate of the connections that are newly established can facilitate the detection and measurement of any malicious bot behavior. Computer ports are subdivided into two main classes, namely: low-severity and high-severity ports. Based on the information issued by the Dshield Organization [61], high-severity ports include those that are most likely to get scanned. All other ports are considered as ports of low-severity. Thus, the present study uses the port scanning method for detecting malicious cyber activities, and features F1 to F8 reflect the scanning behavior.

There are a number of botnet traffic behavior traits, such as bots showing a connection failure in the network. For example, when a bot connects to the botnet network, it must find a point of entry that may be a peer host or a C2C server, in order to deliver information about its current situation and receive
new instruction(s). Consequently, if any peer attempts to create a connection with those hosts, it may lead to a connection failure. The feature of connection failure (F9) that is based on the TCP connection shall be labeled as failed, in the event that the three-step handshake is not complete [62].

The number of control packets for legitimate network traffic is observed to have higher diversity in comparison to bot connection traffic. This is because users may use applications that have very different behavior for control packets. Thus, we do not expect to find trends in the frequency of the control packet. However, during the peer discovery stage, bots will attempt to contact other botnet peers, and hence that is a repeat connection behavior. Such a behavior trait is telling, and we can use an entropy algorithm [63] to measure the randomness or amount of entropy that is within the control packet variation per host. The latter can then be used to model the control packets number connected to the node as a discrete symbol. High entropy implies a legitimate connection, and a low entropy may suggest a botnet connection. Therefore, further investigation is required. The entropy of the frequency of the control packet per host (F10 to F12) is estimated through a group $C_p = [c_1, c_2, \ldots, c_n]$, where $c_i$ refers to the number of control packets per connection. This is mathematically expressed as follows:

$$E(t) = -\sum_{i=1}^{n} c_i \log c_i$$  \hspace{1cm} (3)

Features F13 to F15 are related to the network host inter-arrival control packets. The time of inter-arrival packet refers to the time needed for creating and transferring data to the transport layer by the application [64]. This time is calculated by gathering the time from two consecutive packets in the same connection. The focus of the proposed technique is the host features, which are estimated at the network. The target of the proposed technique is represented in detecting an infected machine. The focus of the proposed approach is, therefore, on the time between the packets from the host.

For feature F16, we use the index of dispersion for counts (IDC) to measure
the probability distribution dispersion for the packets sent by the host. Gusella [65] emphasize on the significance of applying the latter index in the identification of packet variability. This index is used to quantify whether an observed group is dispersed or clustered with a standard statistic model. IDC refers to the variance ($\sigma$)-to-mean ($\mu$) ratio, as expressed below:

\[ IDC = \frac{\sigma^2}{\mu} \]  

(4)

3.3. Malicious activity detection

Malicious activity detection includes an offline stage (training), an online detection stage, and a reinforcement-learning stage. In the first stage, the classifier is provided with a group of legitimate and bot feature vectors for the purpose of training. When the training ends, newly extracted features are uploaded in order to classify the hosts' activities within the network as legitimate or malicious.

A neural network is utilized to serve as a detector to identify malicious activity(ies), since the network has robust capabilities for non-linear system control and identification. That is attributed to an inherent capability of approximating an arbitrary nonlinear problem [66, 67, 68]. The resilient back-propagation-learning algorithm is used for neural network training, in order to reduce the negative impacts of the fractional derivatives’ volume. The derivative is used merely for locating the weighted update’s trend. As for the derivative’s volume, it does not have any negative role in the weight updating process. The size of the weight change can be identified using the formula listed below [69]:

\[ \Delta w_{ij}^{(t)} = \begin{cases} 
-\Delta_{ij}(t), & \text{if } \frac{\partial E(t)}{\partial w_{ij}} > 0 \\
-\Delta_{ij}(t), & \text{if } \frac{\partial E(t)}{\partial w_{ij}} < 0 \\
0, & \text{else}
\end{cases} \]  

(5)

In the above equation, $\Delta_{ij}(t)$ refers to the change in weight between the hidden and input layers that are within the current iteration ($t$). $\frac{\partial E(t)}{\partial w_{ij}}$ refers to
the partial derivative of each weight. After having the weights calculated, the newly updated weight value shall be set. That is performed using the formula listed below:

\[ \Delta^{(t)}_{ij} = \begin{cases} 
\eta^+ \cdot \Delta_{ij}(t), & \text{if } \frac{\partial E(t-1)}{\partial w_{ij}} \cdot \frac{\partial E(t)}{\partial w_{ij}} > 0 \\
\eta^- \cdot \Delta_{ij}(t), & \text{if } \frac{\partial E(t-1)}{\partial w_{ij}} \cdot \frac{\partial E(t)}{\partial w_{ij}} < 0 \\
\Delta(t-1), & \text{else}
\end{cases} \quad (6) \]

\( \Delta^{(t)}_{ij} \) refers to the updated value of the current iteration \( t \), and \( \eta^+ \) refers to the positive step value (usually 1.2). As for \( \eta^- \), it refers to the negative step value (usually 0.5 \[69\]). The neural network classifier used in this study includes 16 inputs and 2 output parameters. In order to avoid over-fitting by employing several hidden layers, we use the technique described in \[70\] to decide on the number of hidden layers neurons.

From Figure 2, one can observe during the offline stage, a group of identified malicious and legitimate attribute vectors is added to the classifier. This is done for training our detector in order to classify the host behaviors on the network as either malicious or legitimate. In order to ensure that quality of the learned neural network agent, a cross-validation technique is used to estimate the classifiers’ error rate. Through cross-validation, the dataset can be randomly partitioned into several \( N \) samples, where evaluations are run for \( N \) iterations. At each iteration, \( N - 1 \) samples can be chosen to train the model. As for the last fold of samples, it shall be applied for evaluating the classifier’s accuracy.
In the online detection stage, the agent (trained neural network) will continuously classify the host within the network. Then, the agent sends a report to the network administrator about the activities of the hosts. In addition, as observed in Figure 3, the reinforcement learning agent simultaneously operates to extract new features that shall participate in improving the performance level of the detection agent in the future.

3.4. Bot detection using reinforcement learning

Reinforcement learning (RL) techniques are widely used to handle problems that involve difficulty in determining the solution explicitly, provided that it is probable to generate the signals of reward [71, 72]. This applies in our botnet
detection problem. Specifically, the RL ‘obstacle’ is expressed in the partially observable markov decision process (POMDP) context. POMDPs are usually employed for representing dynamic systems, which include the systems used for the detection of botnet.

A POMDP is a group of states \((S)\), which characterizes the status of the neural network agent \((NN_{St})\), controller agent \((AG_{St})\), and host \((H_{St})\) states. \((NN_{At})\) denotes the actions of agent at time \(t\), and the agent of neural networks selects actions using \(\pi\) policy. \(NN^\pi (H_{St}, A)\) denotes the possibility of having the agent selecting action \(A\) when the host is in the state \((H_{St})\). \(R(AG_{St})\) represent the estimation of reward function \((T_{St})\) denotes the transition function of the controller agent system.

The Markovian transition function defines the system’s dynamics. It also generates the possibility \(T(AG_{St}, NN_{At}, AG_{St+1})\) of transitioning into an agent state \(AG_{St+1}\) after action \(NN_{At}\) is taken in state \(AG_{St}\). The reward function shall assign the new host’s state \((H_{St})\) number, and the overall amount of the system’s host states shall be processed as a numeric value to agent state \((AG_{St})\).

At any time, the POMDP can be representing the system’s state. When the action is chosen by the neural network agent \((NN_{At})\), the controller agent rewards and the host state value shall be estimated. After that, based on the collected reward’s size, the controller agent’s transition function \((T_{St})\) changes the neural network agent, and thus resulting in a new state \(NN_{St+1}\). In our context, the detection of a P2P bot is expressed as an RL problem. That includes a selection for the action space, reward, value state, and transition functions.

In the action space, after having the action space defined, the host on the network at each time-window is provided with the possibility of being a bot or legitimate node. Then, the RL agent shall take that possibility into account. This is also done for estimating the state’s reward.

In the agent reward function, at any time step, the reward signal is equivalent to the quantity of the new states that are processed by the hosts within the network via the time-window. The signal of reward calculates the importance
of the new state, by utilizing the value of state function in several time-windows. In our context, the new state may be a bot or a legitimate node.

In the value state function, all the \((H)\) nodes within the network have several states based on the use mode. As for the function of the value state, it represents the prospect reward of each host \((H_{st})\), according to the policy \(NN^\pi\). In every time-window, the output of the neural network for every host state is split into two sub-states of probabilities. These sub-states are legitimate \(E(L)\) and malicious \(E(M)\). Thus, the output of each host state is expressed as \((E.M(H_{st}))\) or \((E.L(H_{st}))\), and the formula below identifies the value state function evaluation for legitimate and bot hosts and controller agent.

- **Assessment the value of state function for bot hosts:**
  \[
  EV^\pi(H(M)) = \sum_{i=0}^{n} \frac{E(M_{st(i)})}{n} 
  \]  
  \((7)\)
  \(EV^\pi(H(M))\) denotes the percent of bot activity expected for the host in \(n\) time-windows, and \(E(M_{st(i)})\) is the possibility of malicious activity results using the policy of the existing neural network.

- **Assessment the value of state function for legitimate hosts:**
  \[
  EV^\pi(H(L)) = \sum_{i=0}^{n} \frac{E(N_{st(i)})}{n} 
  \]  
  \((8)\)
  \(EV^\pi(H(L))\) denotes the expected percent of host’s legitimate activity in \(n\) time-windows, and \(E(L_{st(i)})\) is the possibility of legitimate activity results based on the policy of the existing neural network.

- **Assessment of controller state value agent function:**

  \[
  V(s) = V(s) + \begin{cases} 
  V(M_{st}) = argmax(M(Actions)) & EV^\pi(H(M)_{st}) > EV^\pi(H(L)_{st}) \\
  V(L_{st}) = argmax(L(Actions)) & EV^\pi(H(M)_{st}) < EV^\pi(H(L)_{st}) 
  \end{cases}
  \]  
  \((9)\)
In the above equation, \( V(s) \) denotes the calculated states which obtain the highest reward using the existing neural network agent policy \( \text{NN}^\pi \).

Finally, for the function of transition, all techniques in the RL domain require the implementation of a policy that guarantees that a balance is achieved between exploitation and exploration. The problem lies in identifying the way to find an effective policy for action-selection. This policy should be based on sufficient exploitation and exploration data.

In our context, we attempt to find an effective method in order to strike a balance between exploitation and exploration. Thus, a directed exploration approach is adopted, which allows us to explore the state and action as much as possible before shifting to another approach.

The most straightforward directed exploration method is a greedy technique. In any host state, the state that shows the highest exposure of probability value shall be selected. In addition, after implementing the explorative strategy, several steps are followed, in order to identify the hidden goals. In case the target is a novel state to the system, the system can simply shift from exploration to exploitation.

The function of the transition is expressed below:

\[
T_{st} = \frac{\sum \text{new} V(s)}{\sum V(s)} \geq \theta
\]  

In the above equation, \( T_{st} \) denotes the rate of exploring \( \text{newstate} V(s) \) to the whole of the state \( V(s) \). Therefore, \( T_{st} \) depends on the analyzed network traffic volume. The adaptable threshold (\( \theta \)) is set by the network admin. It is set based on the desired degree of network protection. For example, in sensitive networks, \( \theta \) is very short. A low \( \theta \) value also indicates that there is a high learning rate. Table 4 summarizes the RL system parameter and symbols.
Table 4: RL parameters and symbols

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>RL symbol</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>$S$</td>
<td>Current state of environment.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$A$</td>
<td>Agent Action.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\pi$</td>
<td>Action policy.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\theta$</td>
<td>Threshold transition value.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$H_{St}$</td>
<td>Host state at time (t).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$NN_{St}$</td>
<td>State of the neural network agent at time (t).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$NN_{At}$</td>
<td>Actions of agent at time (t).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$NN^*$</td>
<td>The policy of neural network.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$AG_{St}$</td>
<td>Controller agent state at time (t).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$R(AG_{St})$</td>
<td>Represent the estimation of reward function at current state and time (t).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$T_{St}$</td>
<td>Represents the transition function of the controller agent system.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$V(s)$</td>
<td>The value of state $s$, using the current neural network agent policy $NN^*$.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$NN^*(HSt; A)$</td>
<td>Represents the possibility for the agent to selected action $A$ when the host is in the state (HSt).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$EV^*(H(L))$</td>
<td>Represents the probability rate of a legitimate behavior using the current neural network agent policy.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$EV^*(H(M))$</td>
<td>Represents the probability rate of a malicious behavior using the current neural network agent policy.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Algorithm 1 describes our proposed system. First, it extracts a new behavior from the environment. After that, it decides on the action to take, on the basis of the present policy of the neural network. As for vector $V$, it is employed to gather observation for each new states and actions. Whenever the agent collects a sufficient number of new states, it moves to the state of exploitation. This is done in order to utilize those states. At last, the main control agent assesses the new neural network agent’s performance.
Algorithm 1: Bot detection using RL technique

**Input:** Host state (neural network outcomes).

**Output:** New updated neural network

1. $V(s) = 0.; T_{st} = 0.; \text{All\_Dataset} = \text{RefDataset}.; \text{Temp\_Dataset} = 0.$
2. Read the environment observation($\text{state}(S_t)$).
3. Perform action $NN^\pi(A|(S_t, S_{t+1}))$.
4. Extract the reward ($R$).
5. Estimate the probability of a Bot node:
   $$EV^\pi(H(M)) = \frac{\sum_{n=0}^{n} E(M_{st(n)})}{n}.$$
6. Estimate the probability of a legitimate node:
   $$EV^\pi(H(L)) = 1 - EV^\pi(H(M)).$$
7. Extract the state with highest expected reward:
   $$V(s) = V(s) + \begin{cases} 
   V(M_{st}) = \text{argmax}(M(\text{Actions})) & EV^\pi(H(M)_{st}) > EV^\pi(H(L)_{st}) \\
   V(L_{st}) = \text{argmax}(L(\text{Actions})) & EV^\pi(H(M)_{st}) < EV^\pi(H(L)_{st}) 
   \end{cases}$$
8. Estimate the amount of expected reward:
   $$T_{st} = \frac{\sum_{\text{new}V(s)} V(s)}{\sum V(s)}.$$
9. if ($T_{st} \geq \theta$) then
   10. \text{Temp\_Dataset} = \text{Temp\_Dataset} + V(s).
   11. Reset $V(s)$.
12. ($NN^\pi_2$): Creation and evaluation:
   - Create a new Neural Network $NN^\pi_2$ using Temp\_Dataset.
   - Evaluate the performance of $NN^\pi_2$ using cross-validation techniques.
   - Evaluate the performance of $NN^\pi_2$.
   if ($NN^\pi_2$ pass the validation test) then
      - $NN^\pi = NN^\pi_2$.
      - \text{All\_Dataset} = \text{All\_Dataset} + \text{Temp\_Dataset}.
      - Reset \text{Temp\_Dataset}.
      - \text{goto} to Step 2
   else
      \text{goto} Step 1.
13. else \text{goto} Step 2.

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The proposed approach’s key advantage is that the approach sticks to a specific strategy for a certain period. It will not end up taking 1-step in the direction of exploratory nor 1-step in the other direction. Management of the rate of learning (exploring) a new behavior (state) depends on the network traffic’s state. In comparison with low network traffic, if there is a significant volume of network traffic, the controller agent gains numerous new states. After setting the most useful amount of reward by the system, the system shifts to the exploitative strategy. This is done by creating a new dataset, by combining new extracted states with the old dataset. The new dataset is then used for training. First, a cross-valuation technique is adopted for assessing the performance of a new neural network (NN) agent. It is also adopted for assessing the performance evaluation matrices, namely: Matthews correlation coefficient (MCC), accuracy (ACC), area under the ROC (AUC), and root means square error (RMSE). Second, the new NN agent is assessed using the old reference dataset (action and state), in terms of AUC, MCC, ACC and RMSE. Third, in case the system has the assessment test, the system’s primary controller will replace the detection agent with a new one (NN agent). However, when the new NN agent has a low achievement level, the system shall retain the current NN agent. It shall also reset the action and new state buffer.

In summary, the system contains three NN agents. In the first NN, the reference dataset is utilized to train the first initial agents. The second neural network is established through the use of newly extracted features (states) from the environment. Finally, the best configuration of the neural network that passes the assessment process is utilized in the detection phase.

4. Experimental evaluation and results

4.1. Datasets and Tools

We use three primary datasets to evaluate the proposed system, which include non-malicious and malicious traffic – see Table 5. The first dataset is the information security and object technology (ISOT) dataset [73], which includes
Storm Bot, Waledac Bot, and non-malicious traffic. The second dataset includes four legitimate for P2P applications (i.e. Vuze, uTorrent, Frostwire, and eMule), and the traffic of three P2P Botnets (i.e. Zeus, Storm and Waledac) [32]. The third dataset is in the Information Security Centre of Excellence (ISCX) dataset [74], which contains legitimate network traffic.

Table 5: Datasets

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Group</th>
<th>Traffic source</th>
<th>Purpose</th>
<th>Duration</th>
<th>packets number</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>G1</td>
<td>Strom Bot [73]</td>
<td>Training</td>
<td>3115 seconds</td>
<td>128241</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>G2</td>
<td>Waledac Bot [73]</td>
<td>Training</td>
<td>605 seconds</td>
<td>118379</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>G3</td>
<td>Normal traffic [73]</td>
<td>Training</td>
<td>126273 seconds</td>
<td>564999</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>G4</td>
<td>eMule - [32]</td>
<td>Training/Testing</td>
<td>24 hours</td>
<td>6736353</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>G5</td>
<td>uTorrent - [32]</td>
<td>Training/Testing</td>
<td>24 hours</td>
<td>6278385</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>G6</td>
<td>Vuze - [32]</td>
<td>Training/Testing</td>
<td>24 hours</td>
<td>11732688</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>G7</td>
<td>FrostWire - [32]</td>
<td>Training/Testing</td>
<td>24 hours</td>
<td>4429535</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>G8</td>
<td>Normal traffic - [74]</td>
<td>Testing</td>
<td>24 hours</td>
<td>3776931</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>G9</td>
<td>Strom Bot traffic - [32]</td>
<td>Testing/(Zero-Day attacks)</td>
<td>24 hours</td>
<td>4251875</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>G10</td>
<td>Waledac Bot traffic - [32]</td>
<td>Testing/(Zero-Day attacks)</td>
<td>24 hours</td>
<td>12915757</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The experiments are carried on an Intel Xeon processor with a six-core monster clocked at 2.1GHz (with a 2.6GHz Turbo) and 64 GB RAM, and the proposed approach is implemented using Matlab 2018b. Table 6 summarizes the tools used in the experiments.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Version</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Jpcap [49]</td>
<td>Java library for capturing and sending net-</td>
<td>0.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>work packets.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TcpReplay</td>
<td>Replays Pcap files onto the network</td>
<td>3.4.4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

4.2. Setup

An experimental dataset is created for evaluating the approach’s capability in the online detection of a new bot infection. In order to simulate a realistic network traffic condition, a testbed is constructed for replaying malicious botnet traffic, P2P application traffic, and normal daily activity traffic, using TcpReplay. Then, the JPCAP tool is used to capture the replayed network traffic.

The setup comprises the following five steps:

1. Replaying the entire legitimate and malicious trace files, and capturing packets through the use of different time-window sizes.
2. Reducing network traffic through the use of the proposed network traffic reduction method.
3. Extracting vectors of feature for hosts while capturing of packets.
4. Obtaining the classification results through the use of the testing sets and the prepared training, by adopting the proposed technique.
5. Identifying the size of time-window that provides higher levels of detection performance and stability during the online and offline stages.

Due to the significant volume of network packets to be analyzed, network traffic is divided into time-windows. In addition, time-window is required for delivering the results to the admin of network on a timely basis. The use of time-window shorter than 10 seconds is avoided due to having few captured packets that are incapable of showing the characteristics of the traffic behavior. We also avoid using time window greater than 60 seconds, so that we can detect the bot
as early as possible. Bots can generate a temporal behavior after the infection phase [50]. Thus, such a behavior is leveraged to acquire the requisite bot behaviors in the time-window. Hence, in this paper, we begin with a ten seconds time-window, which is incremented gradually. This allows us to determine an optimal performance level. Additionally, 10% of the time-window size is used to slide between time-windows to quickly detect any malicious activity, rather than idling for the entire next window.

In order to assess the proposed system’s performance level, the following metrics need to be computed:

- True positive ($TP$): The number of bot samples labeled as malicious.
- True negative ($TN$): The number of normal samples labeled as legitimate.
- False positive ($FP$): The number of normal samples labeled as malicious.
- False negative ($FN$): The number of bot samples labeled as legitimate.

The false positive rate ($FPR$) denotes the rate of legitimate samples that are misclassified as botnet samples, and is mathematically expressed as follows:

$$FPR = \frac{\sum FP}{TN + FP}$$  \hspace{1cm} (11)

The detection rate ($DR$) is mathematically expressed as follows:

$$DR = \frac{TP}{TP + FN}$$  \hspace{1cm} (12)

Accuracy ($ACC$) is the rate where samples are correctly classified, and is mathematically expressed as follows:

$$ACC = \frac{TP + TN}{TN + TP + FN + FP}$$  \hspace{1cm} (13)

Precision is the rate where bot samples correctly classified, and is mathematically expressed as follows:

$$Precision = \frac{TP}{TP + FP}$$  \hspace{1cm} (14)
The $F$-measure is used to measure the accuracy level of the test, and both recall and precision of the test are taken into consideration when calculating the score, as shown below:

$$F - \text{measure} = \frac{2 \times \text{Precision} \times \text{Recall}}{\text{Precision} + \text{Recall}} \quad (15)$$

The root mean square error ($RMSE$) is the difference between the actual value estimated by the method of detection and the target value, and is mathematically expressed as follows:

$$RMSE = \sqrt{\frac{1}{N} \sum_{i=1}^{N} (y_i - t_i)^2} \quad (16)$$

In the above equation, $N$ denotes the number of input samples, and $y_i$ denotes the model’s actual output. $RMSE = 0$ indicates that the model’s output matches the targets.

The non-dimensional error index $NDEI$ is applied to evaluate the quality of prediction, and is mathematically expressed as follows [76]:

$$NDEI = \frac{RMSE}{\text{Std}(t_i)} \quad (17)$$

The Matthews correlation coefficient ($MCC$) is adopted to estimate classifier efficiency in the event of an imbalanced dataset [77], and is mathematically expressed as follows:

$$MCC = \frac{TP \times TN - FP \times FN}{\sqrt{(TP + FP)(TP + FN)(TN + FP)(TN + FN)}} \quad (18)$$

The receiver operating characteristic (ROC) is a graphical representation, which shows the binary classifier efficiency. The x-axis represents the FPR, and the y-axis represents the TPR. The area under the ROC (AUC) denotes the performance of the classifier [78]. In addition, the AUC is generally considered a much more robust estimator of the classifier’s performance level [79].
4.3. Network traffic reduction evaluation

Our proposed network traffic reduction algorithm is designed to minimize the volume of network traffic that needs to be examined in our system. In flow-based detection schemes, such as those of [32, 41, 80, 19], every packet is analyzed. However, we argue that this is not realistic to be implemented in real-time high-speed networks. As shown in Table 7, the network traffic reduction algorithm can decrease the normal traffic by an average of over 50%.

Table 7: Packets reduction rates

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Group</th>
<th># control packets</th>
<th>Traffic reduction rate</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>G1</td>
<td>64551</td>
<td>0.5033</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>G2</td>
<td>69936</td>
<td>0.5907</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>G3</td>
<td>226308</td>
<td>0.4005</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>G4</td>
<td>2780725</td>
<td>0.4127</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>G5</td>
<td>4237135</td>
<td>0.6748</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>G6</td>
<td>741677</td>
<td>0.6321</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>G7</td>
<td>2406066</td>
<td>0.5431</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>G8</td>
<td>1686962</td>
<td>0.4466</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>G9</td>
<td>1169900</td>
<td>0.2751</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>G10</td>
<td>9395310</td>
<td>0.7274</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>G11</td>
<td>59255</td>
<td>0.5172</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The rates of control packets derived from each rule of traffic reduction technique are presented in Table 8. We also remarked that several detection systems proposed in the literature have good detection rates [81, 82, 18, 20, 21]. However, these approaches are not designed for large networks, partly due to their reliance on DPI techniques [83]. For instance, BotHunter [81] employs a signature-based detection engine and payload-based anomaly detector. Rishi [82] and BotSniffer [18] require the parsing of IRC communication content. TAMD [21] inspects the payloads of packets, with the aim of estimating similarities between content.
Our proposed network traffic reduction approach, however, focuses only on a small portion of the TCP packets that are utilized in connection initialization.

Table 8: Network packet reduction rates based on rules

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Group</th>
<th>R(1)</th>
<th>R(2)</th>
<th>R(3)</th>
<th>R(4)</th>
<th>R(5)</th>
<th>R(6)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>G1</td>
<td>34.70%</td>
<td>7.00%</td>
<td>13.00%</td>
<td>8.70%</td>
<td>16.70%</td>
<td>20.00%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>G2</td>
<td>30.00%</td>
<td>11.20%</td>
<td>8.80%</td>
<td>6.70%</td>
<td>21.30%</td>
<td>22.00%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>G3</td>
<td>22.50%</td>
<td>25.80%</td>
<td>20.50%</td>
<td>17.80%</td>
<td>8.30%</td>
<td>5.00%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>G4</td>
<td>20.0%</td>
<td>26.70%</td>
<td>15.80%</td>
<td>17.50%</td>
<td>13.30%</td>
<td>6.70%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>G5</td>
<td>26.70%</td>
<td>22.20%</td>
<td>22.80%</td>
<td>10.70%</td>
<td>7.70%</td>
<td>10.00%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>G6</td>
<td>25.00%</td>
<td>21.30%</td>
<td>18.30%</td>
<td>18.20%</td>
<td>5.20%</td>
<td>12.00%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>G7</td>
<td>26.70%</td>
<td>19.30%</td>
<td>24.00%</td>
<td>15.00%</td>
<td>8.50%</td>
<td>6.50%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>G8</td>
<td>23.80%</td>
<td>20.00%</td>
<td>19.0%</td>
<td>22.70%</td>
<td>6.70%</td>
<td>7.80%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>G9</td>
<td>29.80%</td>
<td>8.20%</td>
<td>8.50%</td>
<td>8.80%</td>
<td>22.80%</td>
<td>21.80%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>G10</td>
<td>29.00%</td>
<td>15.00%</td>
<td>6.00%</td>
<td>8.00%</td>
<td>17.00%</td>
<td>25.00%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>G11</td>
<td>30.20%</td>
<td>7.70%</td>
<td>4.00%</td>
<td>9.80%</td>
<td>20.50%</td>
<td>27.80%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 9 presents a comparative summary for the performance of our detection approach with other competing approaches [32, 41, 80, 19, 84].

Table 9: Comparison of network traffic reduction rates

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Method</th>
<th>Traffic Reduction</th>
<th>TPR</th>
<th>FPR</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>PeerRush [32]</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>99.10%</td>
<td>0.10%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zhao et al. [41]</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>98.10%</td>
<td>2.10%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Timothy et al. [80]</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>92.0%</td>
<td>11.0-15.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gu et al. [19]</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>1.0%</td>
<td>0-6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wang et al. [84]</td>
<td>&gt;70.0%</td>
<td>95.0%</td>
<td>0-3.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Proposed approach</td>
<td>(40.0-70.0)%</td>
<td>99.10%</td>
<td>0.010%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
4.4. Host feature evaluations

Table 3 presents the host features of network traffic, and Min-Max normalization \[85\] is used to calculate the normalized average value of each feature.

\[
Y' = \frac{Y_i - Y_{min}}{Y_{max} - Y_{min}}
\]  \hspace{1cm} (19)

In the above equation, \(Y'\) is the normalized value of \(Y_i\), \(Y_{min}\) is the vector of the minimum feature value, and \(Y_{max}\) refers to the vector of the maximum feature value.

Figure 4 presents the average normalization value distribution for each feature. We observe that the distribution of normal host traffic and bot host traffic.

For example, as illustrated in Figure 4 and explained in Section 3.2.3, features \(F_12, F_15, F_5, F_10\) and \(F_16\) are considered to be discriminate features that facilitate botnet detection.

Figure 5 presents a variation between bot and legitimate network flows, based on the total number of control packets’ entropy rates per host. The figure indicates that the entropy rates for the legitimate host are within the range of
0 to 5, while these rates are below 0.5 for a bot host traffic. The difference in entropy rates between a bot and legitimate hosts is attributed to the presence of the bot due to the regularity in the count of control packets per flows. As for the legitimate host flows, it shows that there is diversity and irregularity in the control packet count per flows. As a result, the legitimate hosts show an entropy value that is high, whereas the bot shows an entropy value that is low.

![Figure 5: Control-packets Entropy rates](image)

4.5. Evaluation of offline phase

Figures 6 and 7 present the result of assessing the trained agent during the offline phase of the proposed approach, where the x-axis is the size of time-window applied for phases of the feature extraction. Based on the 60 seconds time-window, the proposed approach outperforms the other approaches, in terms of detection, accuracy and F-measure rates (i.e. 99.0%, 98.30% and 98.90%, respectively). Furthermore, the lowest FPR has a 60 seconds time-window size. In the meantime, a 10 seconds time frame shows the lowest performance – see Figure 6.
Figure 6: Offline phase evaluation (ACC, DR, F-measure and FPR)

Figure 7 presents the AUC, MCC, RMSE and NDEI of the bot detection system, based on different time-window sizes. We observe that MCC and AUC rates are the highest rates, respectively at 95.60% and 99.10% based on the 60 seconds time-window.

Figure 7: Offline phase evaluation (AUC, MCC, RMSE and NDEI)

We also observe that the 60 seconds time-window has good performance with good result stability, due to the small time-window size. In addition, bots generate a temporal behavior after the phase of infection [50]. Thus, 60 seconds are appropriate for capturing the network traffic that can be used to facilitate accurate classification. As shown in Figures 6 and 7, the proposed approach can detect P2P bots with a high accuracy rate (associated with a low FPR). We emphasized that these results are obtained using only the training dataset, and the focus of the offline stage is to prepare the classification agent for online work.
4.6. Evaluation of Online Bot Host Detection Approach

We will now describe the findings of the proposed approach on the test dataset (Zero-day attack) – see Figures 8 and 9 present the overall results gained from the online experimental result analysis. As observed, the proposed approach uses an online evaluation and has the highest F-measure, accuracy, and detection rates respectively at 98.80%, 98.30% and 97.90%, based on a time-window size of 60 seconds. The 10 seconds time-window size yields the least desirable performance.

Figure 8: Online phase evaluation (ACC,DR,F-measure and FPR)

As observed from Figure 9, the MCC and AUC rates are 97.6% and 99.96% respectively. Thus, these experimental results show that the performance of our proposed online detection system is capable of handling imbalanced dataset in the 60 seconds time-window. Furthermore, RMSE and NDEI are also used evaluated, and clearly at the 60 seconds time-window size, both RMSE and NDEI achieve 0.093 and 0.187% respectively.
It is clear from Figures 9 and 10 that the proposed method has a good performance result at the time-window size of 60 seconds. Also, to evaluate the performance of our proposed approach, we examine the ROC curve – see Figure 10. Again, the 60 seconds time-window size has the highest rates for the classification of legitimate and bot traffic respectively at 0.991 and 0.98.

4.7. New botnet detection

To assess the performance of the proposed approach in detecting novel types of P2P bots, a sample was selected. The sample consists of Storm, Zeus, and
Waledac. As shown in Figure 11, the proposed approach is effective in detecting new P2P bots. In Figure 11(A), for example, the rates of detecting Zeus Bot is lower than those of Waledac and Storm Bots at the 60 seconds time-window size (i.e. 93.8%, 98.2% and 96.83%, respectively). This is because we use both Storm and Waledac for the testing and training dataset.

As observed in Figure 11 (B), our proposed approach has low FPRs for Zeus, Storm and Waledac of 0.04%, 0.07% and 0.09% respectively, at the 60 seconds time-window size.

![Figure 11: New botnet detection](image)

A comparative summary of evaluating the proposed approach’s performance with two other P2P botnet detection approaches [32, 41] is presented in Table 10. We use the dataset used by Zhao et al. [41] during the offline state, and the dataset used by Babak et al. [32] during the online state. We observe that the FPR and bot detection rates using our proposed approach are considerably better than those of the competing approaches.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 10: Performance evaluation: A comparative summary</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

35
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Methods</th>
<th>FPR</th>
<th>DR</th>
<th>Network packet reduction rates</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>PeerRush [32]</td>
<td>0.10%</td>
<td>99.50%</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D Zhao et al. [41]</td>
<td>2.10%</td>
<td>98.10%</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Proposed online method</td>
<td>0.012%</td>
<td>98.30%</td>
<td>(40-70)%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Proposed offline method</td>
<td>0.01%</td>
<td>99.10%</td>
<td>(40-70)%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

5. Conclusion and future work

Botnets remain an ongoing threat in today’s networked society, and as bot malware evolves so do the mitigation strategies. Our proposed approach uses both reinforcement learning and our traffic reduction method. One key contribution of the proposed approach is the network traffic reduction technique, since we are able to reduce the input packets by about 50%. We demonstrate in the preceding section that our proposed approach has a detection rate of 98.30% and a low FPR of 0.010% at the 60 seconds time-window size. The bottleneck of bot detection using neural network is associated with the size and dimensionality of the dataset, as the number of the packets that require scanning is significant. This is where our proposed network traffic reduction approach plays a key role. The use of such an approach can reduce the training time required, and also increase the learning rate of newly extracted features in the online system. In addition, the proposed bot detection approach is shown to achieve good accuracy rate and is able to detect new bots.

However, there remains a number of challenges that need to be addressed. For example, bot masters will continue to explore ways of circumventing detection by existing approaches, for example using rootkits. In addition, botnets change dynamically through updates, and hence their operations may change after several life cycle stages. These characteristics are also known as the drifting concept [86]. Hence, the proposed approach adopts the idea of reinforcement
learning for dynamically improving the system throughout time. However, this is a rat race between future bot malware designers and botnet detection solution designers. Hence, there is a need to continue this line of research.

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   URL http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-0-387-68768-1_1


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