Accumulation by Securitization: Commercial Poaching, Neoliberal Conservation, and the Creation of New Wildlife Frontiers

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Abstract: Part of a broader interest in the escalating securitization of conservation practice, scholars are beginning to take note of an emerging relationship between conservation-securitization, capital accumulation, and dispossession. We develop the concept of accumulation by securitization to better grasp this trend, positioning it in the critical literatures on neoliberal conservation, green grabbing, and conservation-security. The concept captures the ways in which capital accumulation, often tied to land and resource enclosure, is enabled by practices and logics of security. Security logics, moreover, are increasingly provoking the dispossession of vulnerable communities, itself enabling accumulation. We ground the concept by turning to the Greater Lebombo Conservancy (GLC) in the Mozambican borderlands. This is a new privately-held conservancy being built as a securitized buffer zone to obstruct the movement of commercial rhino poachers into South Africa’s adjacent Kruger National Park. We show how wildlife tourism-related accumulation here is enabled by, and in some ways contingent upon, the GLC’s success in curbing poaching incursions, and, related, how security concerns have become the grounds upon which resident communities are being displaced. In terms of the latter, we suggest security provides a troubling depoliticized alibi for dispossession. Like broader neoliberal conservation and green grabbing, we illustrate how accumulation by securitization plays out within complex new networks of state and private actors. Yet these significantly expand to include security actors and others motivated by security concerns.
Keywords: accumulation by dispossession, neoliberal conservation/green grabbing, securitization, displacement, commercial poaching/wildlife crime, transboundary conservation

1. Introduction

These have been sobering times for rhino conservation. South Africa has been hit particularly hard, having lost over 1,200 animals in 2014, up from only 13 in 2007. As the world’s most concentrated site of rhinos, the majority of these have been lost inside the country’s flagship Kruger National Park (SANParks, 2014; TRAFFIC, 2014). This has led to extraordinary security measures both within and beyond Kruger. Reflecting the fact that the park shares a long border with neighboring Mozambique and that the majority of those entering Kruger to poach rhinos are Mozambicans who cross through this border, the Mozambican borderlands themselves have become the site of security interventions. The most ambitious of these amounts to the 220,000-hectare Greater Lebombo Conservancy (GLC) located adjacent to Kruger’s southern half where rhino poaching is most intensive (Figure 1). As a collection of private land concessions, the GLC emerges as a new wildlife frontier, one in which massive tracts of land have been enclosed and consolidated for the purposes of wildlife conservation, the expansion of tourism-related investment capital, and especially wildlife security. In terms of the latter, the primary rationale behind the GLC is that it act as a securitized buffer zone to protect
Kruger, its eastern boundary, and most importantly its rhinos by halting the cross-border movement of poachers from Mozambique.

[Figure 1.]

As the Mozambican state grants new concessions and works with private landholders to consolidate existing private lands into a unified conservancy, local communities are experiencing various forms of displacement. On the surface, the GLC hence stands as a familiar example of neoliberal conservation as accumulation by dispossession or green grabbing. On closer look, however, these practices of green grabbing and dispossession are based not primarily on a logic of capital accumulation but rather securitization. We argue that the GLC ushers in processes of what we label *accumulation by securitization*. This is a dynamic in which capital accumulation is enabled by practices and related logics of security in ways that often provoke dispossession, with such dispossession itself further enabling accumulation. Security rationales, we show, help provide the emptied land for the development of wildlife tourism and in turn the accumulation of capital. Within the GLC, security rationales equally enable the restocking of wildlife, which had been wiped out during the Mozambican war. More specifically, the Kruger administration is offering access to its wildlife as an incentive for the concession holders to protect Kruger’s rhinos, further enabling profitable wildlife tourism. At the heart of accumulation by securitization in the GLC is hence the enclosure of both land and wildlife, which enable a securitized green spatial fix for the overaccumulation of capital. Unfolding within a larger context of neoliberal conservation, we also chart how accumulation by securitization is enabled by complex networks of state and private actors, increasingly including security actors and
those coming to the table with explicit security concerns. With the GLC, this includes not only the security forces of private reserves but also security-motivated actors coming from two states: Mozambique and, arguably more significant, South Africa, given that the conservancy is designed to protect Kruger’s rhinos. We additionally suggest this expansion of security actors provides new opportunities for accumulation in the form of security-related employment. While we develop our observations in the GLC, we see accumulation by securitization as a concerning new trend in a broader escalating relation between conservation and security.

We begin by laying the study’s theoretical groundwork by engaging with the emerging literature on conservation and security, paying attention to its treatment of issues of accumulation and dispossession, and then segue into the literature on accumulation by dispossession. We build from these to develop the concept of accumulation by securitization and then ground it in the case of the GLC. After briefly detailing the GLC’s background, we illustrate how accumulation in the conservancy is enabled by security logics and practices. We then examine how a wide array of actors motivated by security as well as economic interests are working in tandem to create the GLC as a security-oriented wildlife frontier. We conclude by turning to the trope of the frontier, showing how security interests are transforming an “unruly” frontier into a new frontier of wildlife over which sovereignty is consolidated, and finally examine several troubling implications of the merging of security and conservation we see playing out in the GLC.

2. Connecting the Securitization of Conservation Practice to Conservation-Based Accumulation by Dispossession
A young but growing body of critical conservation scholarship has begun to examine the securitization of conservation space and conservation practice itself (Cavanagh et al., 2015; Devine, 2014; Duffy, 2014; Duffy, this issue; Humphreys, 2012; Humphreys and Smith, 2014; Lombard, this issue; Lunstrum, 2014; Ojeda, 2012; Peluso and Vandegeest, 2011; Ybarra, 2012). Of particular concern is the militarization of conservation practice in response to commercial poaching. Lunstrum (2014, 817), for instance, shows how “the use of military and paramilitary (military-like) actors, techniques, technologies, and partnerships in the pursuit of conservation,” is on the rise, a worrying trend she labels “green militarization.” Such militarization of conservation practice is driven and rationalized by discourses of war and national/regional security that transform poaching from a conservation issue into a security issue. Following insights from security studies, the problems of poaching and threats to wildlife conservation thus become “securitized, treated as security issues,” through speech-acts, policies, and practices (Williams, 2003, 513). Such speech acts also frame poachers as the enemy in the global war for biodiversity (Duffy, 2014; Neumann, 2004) and equally the enemy of the nation-state and its natural resources (Lunstrum, 2014). This reframing of conservation and poaching can lead to “repressive, coercive and violent practices” (Duffy, 2014, 833) including the state-sanctioned killing of poachers (Humphreys and Smith, 2014; Lunstrum, 2014; Neumann, 2004). The militarization of conservation is further facilitated by the expansion of security actors within conservation practice, often including national armies and at times soldiers for hire (Cavanagh et al., 2015; Devine, 2014; Lombard, 2012; Lunstrum, 2014; Ybarra, 2012). In fact, in post-conflict settings, militaries have at times reinvented themselves and their legitimacy by putting their skills
to use as anti-poaching and broader conservation enforcers (Devine, 2014; Lunstrum, 2014; Ybarra, 2012). Building from this work, we see the securitization of conservation as a two-step process consisting of an initial framing of conservation matters as security issues and a subsequent move to address these issues via security measures often instituted by security actors.

While not its primary focus, this emerging work on conservation-security sheds important light on how security logics along with the expansion of security actors help realize conservation-based accumulation and green grabbing often by displacing resident communities. Looking specifically at the issue of borderland security in the Southern Cone’s tri-national frontier, Ferradás (2004, 420) argues environmental concerns are “increasingly becoming conflated with other current forms of securitization, such as those concerned with terrorism, popular unrest, and narcotraffic” (also see Duffy, this issue). From here, she shows how these new discourses of securitization help “secure” nature, and more importantly nature’s value in order to commodify it, enclose it, and subsequently profit from it. Similarly, Ojeda (2012, 371) demonstrates how security logics in Colombia’s Tayrona National Park are based on “green pretexts” of spaces or species in need of protection. These logics enable land-grabbing within the park through processes of privatization, accumulation, and dispossession, what she calls the “double strategy of touristification and militarization.” Using the concept of “counterinsurgency ecotourism,” Devine (2014, 985) demonstrates how “ecotourism development has become a means by which the Guatemalan state is remilitarizing the northern forests,” a process that displaces peasants thereby making space available for profit-making tourism initiatives. Ybarra (2012, 498), also looking at Guatemala, similarly describes the
“affinities between counterinsurgency and conservation territorial projects”: both national/regional security and conservation and tourism require secure spaces, a security achieved in part through dispossession. Taken together, these studies point to a broader pattern in which neoliberal accumulation (often by dispossession) is enabled by security actors and logics, what we label accumulation by securitization. To develop the concept and show how it is unfolding within a broader context of neoliberal conservation, we turn to the critical literature on neoliberal conservation, accumulation by dispossession, and green grabbing.

Increasingly, political ecologists, among others, are turning to the related concepts of accumulation by dispossession and primitive accumulation to explain the overlapping processes of neoliberal biodiversity conservation, land grabbing, and green grabbing, that is, land and resource grabs with environmental ends (Borras et al., 2011; Brockington and Duffy, 2010; Corson and MacDonald, 2012; Fairhead et al., 2012; Hall, 2013; Igoe and Brockington, 2007). The concepts’ utility rests in their ability to capture a process whereby land and resources are enclosed and privatized and how this frequently leads to the dispossession of rural populations and concentrated accumulation of capital in the hands of a few. Emerging from debates concerning whether Marx’s notion of primitive accumulation (1992 [1867]) is confined to the “original” accumulation that kick-started capitalism by divorcing producers from the means of production (De Angelis, 2001; Glassman, 2006; Hall, 2013; Perelman, 2007), accumulation by dispossession, as articulated by Harvey (2003), posits that primitive accumulation has never gone away. Rather, it has taken new forms and operates in contexts outside of which Marx was analyzing. As such, primitive accumulation is an
ongoing process necessary for capital’s continued expansion (De Angelis, 2001; Glassman, 2006; Negi and Auerbach, 2009).

For Marx, primitive accumulation was a non-economic means of accumulation, a point echoed by others. Luxemburg (1951 [1913]), for example, pointed to the dual character of capital accumulation, namely its economic means of accumulation via the expanded reproduction of the social relations of capitalism on the one hand, and its non-economic means via force, violence, and dispossession on the other. The latter also serves as the basis for Harvey’s notion of accumulation by dispossession. Specifically, accumulation by dispossession solves the capitalist crisis of overaccumulation, or “the lack of opportunities for private investment,” by enclosing common assets and releasing them for private investment where they are then commodified, thereby ensuring capitalism’s expansion and survival (Harvey, 2003, 139). The framework of accumulation by dispossession has been employed to analyze a variety of issues in the neoliberal economic period from the privatization and commodification of utilities (Bakker, 2007; Swyngedouw, 2005), life itself (Prudham, 2007), and, closely related to this paper, the phenomenon of land grabbing (Borras and Franco, 2012; Borras et al., 2012; Hall, 2013; White et al., 2012), along with a variety of neoliberal conservation practices (Benjaminsen and Bryceson, 2012; Corson and MacDonald, 2012; Leach et al., 2012; Sullivan, 2013).

Hall (2013, 1598), for instance, demonstrates the concept is vital in understanding the “dispossessory responses to capitalist crises, the use of extra-economic means of capital accumulation, and the creation, expansion and reproduction of capitalist social relations” that are central to the phenomenon of land grabs. Writing
on green grabbing also frequently deploys the concept to make sense of “green” projects ranging from biocarbon sequestration and climate change mitigation (Leach et al., 2012; Lohmann, 2012; MacDonald and Corson, 2012) and nature-based derivatives (Little et al., 2013; Mandel et al., 2010; Sullivan, 2013) to tourism and hunting (Benjaminsen and Bryceson, 2012; Corson and MacDonald, 2012; Gardner, 2012; Snijders, 2012). Central to the latter is the contention that conservation practice—especially neoliberal conservation practice—is a form of ongoing primitive accumulation or accumulation by dispossession as it encloses land and biodiversity and dissolves common access to it, thereby dispossessing rural populations of land, resources, and livelihood opportunities to provide new avenues for capital accumulation (Büscher, 2009; Kelly, 2011; Neves and Igoe, 2012; Sullivan, 2013). Together these studies show how accumulation and related private economic gain are enabled by a prior act of violence, namely freeing up the land and resources via processes of dispossession, which range from outright eviction to the curtailment of access to resources. These practices more broadly have a long and troubling history and have reshaped landscapes across and beyond sub-Saharan Africa (Agrawal and Redford, 2009; Brockington, 2002; Brockington and Igoe, 2006; Cavanagh and Himmelfarb, 2014; Dowie, 2009; Neumann, 1998; Rangarajan and Shahabuddin, 2006; Spence, 1999). The connections between conservation and accumulation by non-economic means, moreover, can be traced back to Marx’s original writings on primitive accumulation, specifically the Game Laws in Britain (Marx, 1992 [1867]; Perelman, 2007).

Neoliberal conservation and green grabbing more generally, however, move beyond the trends outlined above in key respects. First, as opposed to colonial
conservation, with neoliberal conservation, land and biodiversity are being opened up more directly for capitalist investment and then commodified. This leads Kelly (2011, 683) to argue that primitive accumulation as a framework of analysis exposes “the underlying economic drivers of protected area creation,” namely expanding capital’s ability to reproduce itself by transforming natural resources into commodities and expanding green markets. Related, land and biodiversity are increasingly coming under the control and ownership of private interests, often outside of state-run conservation territories. This has resulted in the expansion of actors involved in conservation well beyond the state and colonial regime to include influential elites (Brockington and Duffy, 2010; Holmes, 2012), and entrepreneurs and businesses (Büscher and Fletcher, Forthcoming; Gardner, 2012; Leach et al., 2012; Snijders, 2012). Reflecting the rising trend in conservation-security, this also includes security actors and others motivated by security logics (Cárdenas, 2012; Ojeda, 2012; Ybarra, 2012). While non-state actors have always been involved in conservation, the wider variety of actors we see today are “more deeply embedded in capitalist networks, and operating across scales” (Fairhead et al., 2012, 240).

Of particular importance are the novel ways such a diversity of actors form partnerships with each other and the state and in which different types of authority are transferred (Brockington and Duffy, 2010; Igoe and Brockington, 2007; Peluso and Lund, 2011). Given such diversity of actors, partnerships, and appropriation strategies at play, moreover, the link between control and ownership over land can be complex if not tenuous. Control, which can be defined as “practices that fix or consolidate forms of access, claiming, and exclusion for some time” (Peluso and Lund, 2011, 668), does not
necessarily entail complete ownership or even enclosure and vice-versa (Borras et al., 2012; Borras et al., 2011; Hall, 2011, 2013). In addition, the literature highlights how contemporary green grabbing and conservation-based accumulation by dispossession are enabled by the creation and sanctioning of new nature-based commodities, specifically forms of non-economic capital like carbon, wildlife, patents on life, and ecosystem services to be accumulated (Neves and Igoe, 2012). Such nature-based commodities can enable “spatial fixes for over-accumulated capital” (Corson and MacDonald, 2012, 268). Equally significant, the ability to mobilize support for these new practices of appropriation is intimately tied to new discourses of environmental governance and environmental harm (Fairhead et al., 2012).

Building from these debates, we develop the concept of accumulation by securitization, which helps us grasp important features of contemporary accumulation by dispossession and green grabbing as well as securitized conservation. Namely, in cases where conservation challenges are framed as security issues and treated as such, and where conservation and related tourism development are realized by security actors and logics, we are increasingly seeing opportunities for accumulation. Securitized conservation, in short, is enabling new patterns of accumulation. This happens most obviously through the securitized enclosure of space and resources and related dispossession of resident communities: security logics and actors clear the space, capital reaps the benefit. Accumulation is also enabled by incentives for securitization, which in the GLC materialize in the form of wildlife. And further avenues for accumulation are found in the expansion of conservation-security employment opportunities.
We ground these insights in the case of the GLC. We show first that, more than processes of accumulation by dispossession, accumulation in the conservancy is better understood as accumulation by securitization. Here, securitization, and specifically anti-poaching, plays an integral role in opening up new land and releasing new assets for private investment, specifically for “green” accumulation. In responding to Peluso and Lund’s (2011, 672) call to “take seriously new ways of understanding primitive accumulation and territorialization,” we thus highlight a set of processes through which frontiers of wildlife-based accumulation are opened up through the securitized enclosure of land. We further show how accumulation can be achieved in spaces where wildlife does not exist in sufficient numbers to warrant capital investment, namely via an exchange of wildlife for security. Accumulation is thus enabled by and provides the incentives for securitization. Security concerns and measures hence greatly expand the potential of conservation to work as a “spatial fix” to the crisis of overaccumulation. This is especially the case as conservation-related security and particularly commercial poaching gain increasing global attention and become tied to broader national, regional, and international security concerns (Duffy, 2014; Duffy, this issue; Lunstrum, 2014). Within this context, if conservation-security can create the necessary conditions leading to the release of much needed assets, for example land and wildlife, we are likely to see the expansion of security-oriented green grabbing, neoliberal conservation, and related conservation-based accumulation.

Second, the proliferation of new actors insightfully highlighted within the literature expands in the context of commercial poaching to include a whole host of security-related actors, both public and private, whose actions are shaped by security
logics and enable the underlying accumulation. Their actions help enable a spatial fix to
the crisis of overaccumulation and do so in the name of “green” security, specifically
anti-poaching. The new range of actors also speaks to the tension between ownership
and control. While the GLC partially reflects processes in which conservation-related
land and resources come to be owned by private actors (see, for e.g., Holmes, 2014;
Snijders, 2012), we show how control over them is more diffuse: it involves private
actors but also two states, especially a foreign one—here South Africa—who comes to
the table with explicit security concerns. This also underscores how ownership, control,
and accumulation do not all accrue to the same groups and the complexity of dealing
with conservation-security concerns in a contiguous cross-border context. Furthermore,
as security interests enable new conservation-security job opportunities, this expanding
network of actors underscores another way in which accumulation by securitization can
play out.

3. Background to the GLC: The coming together of security and economic interests

The GLC emerges at a time when the commercial poaching of rhinos for their
horns is reaching crisis proportions across the globe as a result of growing demand from
an increasingly affluent Asia. This has pushed the price of rhino horn to over US$65,000
per kilogram, more than gold or cocaine. South Africa has borne the brunt of this having
lost over 1,200 animals in 2014, what amounts to a nearly 100-fold increase from 2007.
The majority of these have been killed inside the country’s flagship Kruger National
Park, which is the world’s single most concentrated site of rhinos and most important
site of rhino conservation. Highlighting the more regional circuit in which rhino
poaching has unfolded, the park’s entire 350 km eastern boundary borders Mozambique (see Figure 1), and the vast majority of men commissioned by criminal syndicates to hunt Kruger’s rhinos are Mozambicans who cross through this border. In fact, the journey into the park from Mozambique can be as short as ten kilometers. With rhino horn procured, poachers then escape back across into Mozambique where Kruger’s rangers and South Africa’s military are unable to pursue them, as they would be entering the sovereign territory of another country. Reflecting the cross-border dynamics of commercial poaching along with the fact that poaching teams are heavily armed and increasingly willing to resist arrest, the South African state and broader public progressively frame the problem as one of armed criminals illegally crossing an international border, violating national territory and sovereignty, and attacking rhinos as South African national treasures (Interviews 2013, 2014; Lunstrum, 2014).

In response, South Africa has instituted a range of security measures. These include hiring additional paramilitary-trained rangers to patrol Kruger, reintroducing the military to assist rangers and guard the international border, and using increasingly sophisticated forms of aerial surveillance. Together these amount to the effective militarization of Kruger and its eastern border (Lunstrum, 2014). Another key response—one receiving far less public attention—takes us from South Africa, across the border, and into Mozambique.

In 2012, the Mozambican and South African states and private land holders in the Mozambican borderlands, backed by the South African conservation NGO the Peace Parks Foundation (PPF), created the 220,000 hectare Greater Lebombo Conservancy, more colloquially known as the GLC (see Figure 2). The GLC is a consolidated
collection of private concessions tasked with functioning as a security mechanism, namely a secured buffer zone designed to stop the movement of poachers before they enter Kruger. Reflecting the cross-border nature of poaching, South Africa in particular has hopes the conservancy will act as the “first shield of defense against rhino poaching” (SANParks, 2012b, 12). While located in Mozambique, Kruger’s parent organization South Africa National Parks (SANParks) has actually incorporated the GLC into Kruger’s rezoning and related development of the park’s Peripheral Development Zone (PDZ). In addition to enabling private economic opportunities, the PDZ—we are told in no uncertain terms—doubles as a “security zone covering rhino poaching hotspots” (SANParks, 2012a; Interviews 2013, 2014; see also Helfrich, 2012).

[Figure 2.]
The Mozambican state, like South Africa, also supports the development of the GLC as first and foremost “a zone of intensive anti-poaching” (Interview, 2013). The GLC-as-security-apparatus in fact plays an important role in repairing Mozambique’s reputation as one of “the worst offenders in the rhino horn trade,” and can help the country avoid poaching-related sanctions (Fears, 2013; IRF, 2014; WWF, 2013). Facilitating the GLC hence enables Mozambique to prove to the world it is working to stem its role in rhino poaching, a move acknowledged by South Africa (Molewa, 2014).

If the GLC is primarily driven by security concerns, its development is also motivated by desires for economic gain tied to wildlife tourism, including both non-consumptive and hunting-related safari opportunities. The Mozambican state has hopes the GLC will promote regional economic development, potentially lucrative for state coffers and well-positioned state elites (Interviews, 2013; and see below). Potential for
economic gain is not surprisingly the primary interest of the private concession holders (Interviews 2012, 2013, 2014). These economic opportunities are, however, tied to the GLC’s success in curbing rhino poaching incursions into Kruger. To begin to grasp this meeting of security and economic interests, we must take a brief detour back into the conservancy’s origin.

The 1990s were a time of immense transformation across Southern Africa. Not only did the decade usher in the demise of apartheid in South Africa, it also witnessed the end of the brutal South Africa-backed “civil” war in Mozambique (1977-1992). The conflict left the country devastated socially, politically, economically, and ecologically (Lunstrum, 2009; Vines, 1991), with much of the wildlife in the borderlands adjacent to Kruger decimated (Interviews, 2012, 2013). Emerging from these broader changes, on December 9th, 2002, the Heads of State of South Africa, Mozambique, and Zimbabwe signed an international treaty that established the Great Limpopo Transfrontier Conservation Area (GLTFCA). This is a multi-use conservation and development landscape that includes at its core the much celebrated Great Limpopo Transfrontier Park (GLTP), a tri-national Peace Park that unites South Africa’s Kruger, Mozambique’s Limpopo, and Zimbabwe’s Gonarezhou National Parks (Figure 2), along with additional parks and lands, both public and private. Initially the GLTFCA was also supposed to include the development of a buffer zone to Kruger in the Mozambican borderlands between the Crocodile and Elefants/Olfants Rivers. This was to be allocated to the private sector who could tap into Kruger’s abundant wildlife and a massive and over-saturated tourism market standing at over 1.3 million visitors annually (PPF, 2006, Interview 2013).
Almost a decade after the signing of the GLTFCA/GLTP Treaty, not much had transpired in the development of the larger conservation area, even as the cross-border park began to take concrete form. That changed radically when commercial rhino poaching entered the scene. As a response, the Mozambican and South African states, working with private landholders and backed by the PPF, revived the buffer zone proposal. And in 2012 the GLC came to life.

4. Accumulation by Securitization in the GLC

The entry of commercial rhino poaching and its framing as a (transboundary) security concern not only resuscitated the plan to build the buffer zone, it radically changed the rules of accumulation, with the establishment of the GLC as a security zone becoming the grounds upon which accumulation could be realized. It is here where we locate the process of accumulation by securitization. We show how accumulation is enabled by a two-step process, each intimately tied to securing the GLC as an anti-poaching buffer zone, with “securing” understood as both “acquiring” and “making secure.” This begins with the securing of land, which is enabled by the dispossession of communities. Such dispossession removes potential poachers, makes the space easier to police, and enables the development of safari-based tourism. If such tourism-related accumulation requires land, it also requires wildlife. We illustrate how South Africa will provide wildlife as an incentive for the concession holders to protect Kruger’s rhinos. Stated differently, the Kruger administration and private landholders are exchanging non-economic capital: that is, security capital, embodied in the buffer zone, for natural
capital, embodied in wildlife. We then bring these threads together to illustrate how security-oriented enclosures of land and wildlife act as green spatial fixes for capital.

4.i. Securing Land, Dispossessing Resident Communities

Prior to the GLC, the Mozambican borderlands were a patchwork of private concessions and communal and state lands. To build the GLC, the Mozambican state has worked with private landholders to integrate the existing concessions, standing at 134,000 hectares, into a unitary and integrated conservancy/buffer zone. Consolidation also demands the concession holders build a fence over 200 kms long from the Elefants/Olifants to the Crocodile Rivers not along the border with Kruger but rather along the conservancy’s eastern boundary. Perhaps most profoundly, consolidation entails filling in the “gaps” within the conservancy where no reserves existed, and where other land-uses were present, by granting new concessions to investors. One prime example is the 78,000 hectares Twin City Ecoturismo (TCE) project. Hence, these “gaps” are not small. Such enclosure is dispossessing resident communities in various ways, playing a key role in enabling accumulation. This dispossession, however, is motivated primarily by security rather than economic interests, showing how securitization enables accumulation. Let us pull this apart, beginning with how dispossession is unfolding.

In some places where communities still reside, including within these gaps, the project requires their relocation beyond its borders. This is the case with the TCE reserve, which has evicted and relocated three communities totaling over 90 households with the possibility of more to come as the reserve acquires more land (Interviews,
What remains in the villages, including houses, will be burned down to prevent people from returning and to encourage those who want to remain to leave (Interviews, 2013). Along with eviction, concession-holders are instituting further restrictions aimed at local communities regarding access to resources inside the conservancy, amounting to more indirect forms of dispossession. Hunting by community members, for instance, is banned within the GLC (Interviews, 2012, 2013). Once removed, all communities will be prohibited from entering the GLC without authorization, resulting in the further curtailment of access to land and resources. These prohibitions will be enforced by the reserves’ private security forces and further facilitated by the imminent erection of the GLC’s eastern boundary fence (Interviews, 2012, 2013, 2014). These in fact will work in partnership to effectively lock resources within the conservancy while keeping local populations out. These processes will, at minimum, enable more space for wildlife and related tourist activities. The GLC hence stands as a somewhat classic example of green and neoliberal conservation practice as accumulation by dispossession given that the conservancy entails the enclosure and privatization of large tracts of land and accompanying resources, enabled by the dispossession of resident residents. Once freed up in this way, these resources allow the generation of conservation-related capital accumulation.

But the GLC differs in a fundamental way: communities there are being displaced first and foremost on poaching-related security grounds. Security concerns in the GLC insist that it is too difficult to police this space with communities living inside it, especially in strategic locations where rhino-poaching traffic is high, and given that community members are themselves involved with poaching activities (Interviews,
For instance, the former manager of one of the reserves explained how the removal of the community of Honuane (carried out by a private company) was an important step in the securing the area of the GLC and Kruger from further rhino poaching given that the community harbored poachers (Interview, 2013). Hence, village removal is an anti-poaching strategy with dispossession productive of security. Not limited to the GLC, we see similar security-related dispossession unfolding in Mozambique’s Limpopo National Park (LNP) immediately to the north (Lunstrum, Forthcoming; Interviews, 2013, 2014) (see Figure 2). Resettlement as an anti-poaching strategy in both places is built atop a discourse of security that constructs entire groups of people as joint conservation-security threats, particularly as potential rhino poachers (and those who harbor them) who are heavily armed, increasingly dangerous, and who pose a threat to (South African) national security (Lunstrum, 2014). This works to legitimize their removal and other dispossessory and oppressive tactics, including the restriction of hunting, the erection of fences, and even the raiding of communities to seek out rhino horn, firearms, and potential poachers themselves (Interviews, 2012, 2013). Furthermore, whereas members of these communities used to live, hunt, farm, and raise livestock in the space of what is now the GLC, now simply being in that space is grounds for arrest. In short, conservation security concerns provoke displacement, and they equally shape the types of disposessions that unfold.

Accumulation by securitization is thus an example of green grabbing where the “discourses through which land and resources are appropriated for green ends also construct the people who live there in particular ways” (Fairhead et al, 2012, 251). Rural communities in particular are routinely portrayed as environmentally irresponsible
peasants, a common practice used to legitimize their dispossession and the enclosure of common land and resources (Brockington, 2002; Li, 2007; Neumann, 1998; Ojeda, 2012; Spence, 1999). More than this, residents in and around the GLC are rendered environmentally destructive security threats: as rhino poachers who are heavily armed, increasingly dangerous, and who jeopardize national security (Lunstrum, 2014; also see Devine, 2014; Ojeda, 2012; Ybarra, 2012). More broadly, such rewriting of peasants as security risks in need of eviction is a disconcerting outgrowth of the growing integration of conservation, tourism, and security practice.

Beyond explicitly organizing and financing displacement from the conservancy, the private landholders are working to secure the GLC as a buffer zone in other ways. These include the hiring, equipping, and training of paramilitary security forces to patrol the concessions and building or otherwise investing in security infrastructure, ranging from telecommunications and surveillance equipment to security outposts along the fence lines. The development of security infrastructure also includes the construction of a new road outside the GLC designed to provide an “alternative” transportation route to communities as an explicit means of shutting down their use of roads within the conservancy. Concession holders must also build a perimeter fence that keeps wildlife in and people out. While these might seem removed from questions of dispossession, they play a pivotal role in ensuring that communities remain locked out.

4.ii. Economic Incentives for Security… or Exchanges of Non-Economic Capital: Wildlife for Security
Despite having land and investing heavily in measures to secure this space, GLC concession holders and investors are currently operating at a loss because they are missing the main thing required to attract tourists: wildlife. The Mozambican war had devastated wildlife in the borderlands from which it has never recovered (Interviews, 2012, 2013). This stands in stark contrast to Kruger’s abundance of game. The Kruger administration has agreed to drop the apartheid-era international border fence to allow wildlife to repopulate the conservancy but only \textit{after} the GLC secures rhinos by precluding the movement of poachers into Kruger, making it a viable economic enterprise. It is here where we locate the incentive for private stakeholders to invest in security, namely guaranteeing security gives them access to Kruger’s abundant wildlife, hence enabling accumulation by securitization.

To expand, unlike more traditional forms of outsourcing to private actors, no monetary payment is given to the reserves by South Africa to protect its rhinos. Instead, payment comes in the form of promises to remove the international border fence, thus allowing wildlife to cross freely into the conservancy, bringing tourists and capital in their wake. As explained by the former manager of one of the reserves, with the removal of the fence, the GLC has the potential to become “the Kruger of Mozambique” (Interview, 2013). There is even talk of eventually giving tourists the ability to cross freely within this soon-to-be-fenceless space (Interviews, 2013), which would enhance its tourism appeal and enable the generation of more profits. So, the promise and incentive for private actors to build the GLC as a security mechanism is indeed an economic one, but it takes a more circuitous path via promises of fence removal, the
border-crossing bodies of wildlife, and hopes of flocking tourists well-endowed with leisure capital.

There are several implications of this relationship for understanding accumulation by securitization. First, possibilities for accumulation so desired by the private concession holders in the GLC are not merely enabled by securitization but, in terms of wildlife, contingent upon it. This also shows how accumulation can happen through offering incentives for securitization (here as wildlife) in tandem with the securing and emptying of space. Furthermore, extending the insights of Neves and Igoe (2012), what we see here more broadly is an exchange of different types of non-economic capital, namely natural capital and security capital. Through their investment in infrastructure, training, equipment and hiring of conservation-security professionals, the individual private reserves and GLC as a whole are able to accumulate a type of security capital related to anti-poaching known as “environmental asset protection” (Interviews, 2013, 2014). Anti-poaching thus becomes not just about conservation, but about producing a secure space—for wildlife and capital—that will enable profits via tourism. More broadly, land and wildlife are natural capital that tourism and hunting enterprises need. In this case, they are held by the state—land by the Mozambican state, wildlife by the South African. The security capital needed by these two states, especially South Africa, can be generated by private actors, or at least in partnerships with them, and within a consolidated private conservancy. Hence, as the private actors in the GLC invest in security capital, this gets exchanged for natural capital in the form of South African wildlife. Furthermore, given the cross-border context and regional history of war-induced ecological destruction, this exchange plays out in a specific way within the
GLC. Yet it reflects a broader process whereby access to natural resources provides the necessary incentive for actors to invest in security practices and partnerships, what we see as a nascent theme in the conservation-security literature (see, for example, Cavanagh et al., 2015; Devine, 2014; Dunlap and Fairhead, 2014; Ferradás, 2004; Ojeda, 2012; Ybarra, 2012).

4.iii Security-oriented enclosures of land and wildlife as green spatial fixes

Bringing together the above processes of land enclosure/dispossession and security-wildlife exchanges, we return to Harvey’s concept of accumulation by dispossession and specifically the enclosure of assets and their release for private investment and commodification. Indeed, critical literature on neoliberal conservation has used this framework to analyze how biodiversity is enclosed and made available for private investment, sometimes leading to forms of green grabbing and dispossession (see above). The case of the GLC offers several contributions to this literature as assets are being enclosed and privatized in two interlocking ways, both tied to security interests. First, there is the enclosure of wildlife, a publicly held asset in South Africa owned by and under the control of the state as it is encompassed within Kruger National Park. This will be privatized—put under private control—once it moves from Kruger across the border into Mozambique. Second, there is the (further) enclosure of land in Mozambique. While the Mozambican government promotes the privatization of land in the GLC on economic and ecological grounds, its support of the project (and underlying privatization) has been given far more urgency under the banner of anti-poaching security to protect Kruger’s rhinos. In this sense, even the release of land in
Mozambique is tied to security concerns, reinforcing that the accumulation of both land and wildlife in the GLC, and hence their placement in private hands, are both instances of accumulation by securitization.

What is occurring is therefore the privatization of state-held assets in the form of South African wildlife as it crosses the border and the further privatization of space, particularly smallholder agricultural lands in Mozambique. The GLC becomes an economically viable wildlife frontier—a “green” spatial fix to the overaccumulation of capital—as these two phenomena come together, that is, as the bodies of wildlife cross an international border and, like the land they come to inhabit, become private assets. More broadly, and highlighting one of our core concerns, this accumulation is enabled by, and with the case of wildlife contingent upon, securitization. Capital accumulation in the GLC, therefore, is speculative, with private actors investing heavily in security in hopes that this will yield future profits. Accumulation thus flows not directly from dispossession, although this is important, but more directly through promises and practices of security. Like dispossession, securitization enables a non-economic means of capital accumulation. Dispossession and security are, however, intimately connected, as the dictates of security rationalize if not compel dispossession.


Standing behind the accumulation by securitization playing out within the GLC we see a complex network of actors and creation of new partnerships. This closely mirrors the broader features of neoliberal conservation and green grabbing. Where the
GLC differs is that the actors in question expand to include explicit security actors along with others motivated by security interests, underscoring an important feature of accumulation by securitization and securitized conservation more broadly. Twin City Ecoturismo (TCE), for example, is the largest reserve and investment in the GLC. TCE is made up of Twin City and Singita, two South African multinational companies, and a host of Mozambican business partners who rank among the country’s business and political elite and include the son of a former president and a former provincial governor. These Mozambican partners work to facilitate the acquisition of land by independently acquiring concessions. They then join the various independently-held concessions together into a consolidated holding by entering into a joint partnership with Twin City and Singita, which provide the capital needed for the development of the reserve, including security costs (Interviews, 2014). These new actors hence reflect a “new range of intermediary actors… emerging as critical go-betweens to secure and enable resource appropriations,” which are enabling not only green grabs in general (Fairhead et al., 2012, 250) but security-oriented green grabs in particular.

Importantly, these Mozambican partners, who are essentially national intermediaries, also facilitate negotiations with local communities, including negotiations concerning their displacement and relocation. This is a crucial step for both accumulation and, at least in theory, security as we saw earlier. At meetings with various communities to discuss compensation and logistics concerning their removal from the TCE concessions, it was not a state representative negotiating with the community but rather a Mozambican business partner, with compensation coming from a private South African company. The business partner explained his role as a facilitator saying, “We are
in a battle [of rhino-poaching] that we are trying to turn around, and part of this is the resettlement of communities and showing them what the advantages are” (Interview, 2013).

The prominence of these private actors reflects the thoroughly neoliberal way in which Mozambique supports the creation of the GLC as a conservation-security apparatus. First, it has given the reserves’ private security forces a great deal of latitude in their rhino-security efforts including the ability to conduct ambushes and raids on communities, collect intelligence and engage in surveillance, deploy roadblocks, make arrests, and evict populations (Interviews, 2012, 2013). More than this, the central government now delegates the functions of state security to the private reserves. More explicitly, Mozambique’s national border patrol Guarda Fronteira along with local law enforcement stationed within the boundaries of their concession take orders from the concessions’ heads of security. This means that Guarda Fronteira is stationed where it is told to be and brought into security operations (or not) at the discretion of the reserves’ security managers. Going one step further, once the GLC’s eastern perimeter fence is erected, border patrol itself will become the charge of the private reserves. Guarda Fronteira will hence be moved further into Mozambique to patrol the GLC’s eastern boundary amounting to an effective re-territorialization of sovereignty. In fact, Guarda Fronteira will only be allowed to enter the conservancy when accompanied by reserve security forces (Interview, 2014).

Furthermore, the Mozambican state has supported the development of the GLC by engaging with and devolving authority to Licoturismo, which is an association of the independent concession holders constituting the GLC (GoM and Licoturismo, 2012).
The state has signed a memorandum with Licoturismo that, in addition to formalizing the GLC, secures a spot for the association on the Great Limpopo Transfrontier Park’s Joint Management Board as an observer-member (GoM and Licoturismo, 2012). More importantly, because Licoturismo, as a private Mozambican entity, cannot engage or negotiate directly with South Africa, there is now a state-to-state memorandum under consideration. As explained by a former director of the Mozambican National Directorate for Conservation Areas (DNAC), this would enable

Bring[ing] the principles and objectives of Licoturismo [to the table and] assume them as the [Mozambican] state’s [own]... It will be, it must be a relationship between states. But, I think that although the memorandum will be between states, there will not be any problems with any relationships between private and state actors when it comes to day-to-day work (Interview, 2013).

The memorandum, which is more broadly aimed at “joint law enforcement and the rehabilitation of the tourism business in that [GLC] area” (Interview, 2013), would, moreover, give the GLC concession holders more control within both realms. This demonstrates yet another way in which security and tourism closely align (also see Devine, 2014; Ojeda, 2012). It equally illustrates how the Mozambican state is devolving authority even in the realm of security, traditionally understood as the proper realm of the state, to private actors.

The memorandum also reflects the GLC’s distinct bi-national nature, a reality leading to the creation of novel transnational partnerships involving state-to-state-to-non-state actors. For example, and as described above, the South African state and security forces are cooperating not only with their Mozambican counterparts, but with private actors in Mozambique. In fact, with regards to anti-poaching and securing the international border and Kruger, personnel from various reserves in the GLC work more
closely with their South African equivalents in Kruger than Mozambican state security forces. The influence of South Africa is evident in more material ways as well. As part of the agreement to remove the international border fence, the GLC’s eastern boundary fence—located squarely in Mozambique anywhere from ten to forty kilometres from the border—must adhere to Kruger’s fence specifications and standards. Hence, what we see in the GLC is South African state actors having some modicum of control—but not ownership—over land that has been privatized in Mozambique. This is a reversal of sorts from trends in the literature outlined earlier that shows how private actors have some control, but not ownership in state conservation lands (Benjaminsen and Bryceson, 2012; Büscher, 2009; Corson, 2011; Kelly, 2011). With the GLC, it is the South African state that has a great deal of control, even while lacking ownership. Moreover, the GLC demonstrates how the interlocking logics of wildlife tourism and security motivate the creation of a complex network of heterogeneous actors and relationships that defy “old ‘state-to-state’ or ‘business-to-business’ combinations” (Peluso and Lund, 2011, 670), that here traverse scales and an international border. Focusing on this expansion of actors also allows us to grasp that the GLC in particular, all told, is more than a consolidation of private reserves: it is a consolidation and strengthening of security services.

While the details of the actors and partnerships building the GLC are specific to this case, our broader point is that security interests significantly expand the roster of actors standing behind conservation-related accumulation. This includes both explicit security actors, including the security forces of private reserves and state security actors, and others motivated by security concerns, in this case two states. This reflects a trend
emerging in conservation-security practice, reflected in the related scholarship, in which there is a general blurring of security and economic actors: while the former help make accumulation possible by freeing up land and resources, the latter are increasingly implicated in producing security (Devine, 2014; Ferradás, 2004; Ojeda, 2012; Ybarra, 2012).

While we can only be suggestive here, the expansion of conservation-security actors also underscores that security dictates enable accumulation in yet another form: via expanded prospects for conservation-security employment and related opportunities. In the GLC this includes new security-related jobs within the private reserves, including those directed at patrolling and surveilling the conservancy, border patrol, building and maintaining security infrastructure, and even organizing community relocation and resettlement. Elsewhere, we see the expansion of state conservation-security actors including special anti-poaching units and national armies (Alexander, 2014; Cavanagh et al., 2015; Devine, 2014; Lombard, 2012; Lunstrum, 2014; Ybarra, 2012), the rise of private conservation-security firms such as the South African anti-poaching firm Protrack (Protrack, 2015), other organizations that offer military training for park guards (Africalab, 2015; IAPF, 2015), conservation soldiers for hire (Cavanagh et al., 2015; Lombard, 2012), and employment and investment opportunities tied to new conservation surveillance technologies such as drones (Lunstrum 2014). All of these opportunities generate profit as they work to secure conservation space.

6. Conclusion: Accumulation by Securitization and the Creation of New Wildlife Frontiers
As a way of further underscoring key features of the meeting of security, conservation, and accumulation, we close by turning to the trope of the frontier to highlight the consolidation of sovereignty playing out within the GLC and then suggest several ways in which the GLC may prove a cautionary tale. We suggested in the introduction that the GLC is emerging as a new wildlife frontier. Peluso and Lund (2011, 668), in their study of “new frontiers” of land control, define frontiers as “sites where authorities, sovereignties, and hegemonies of the recent past have been or are currently being challenged by new enclosures, territorializations, and property regimes.” The GLC is in this sense indeed a new frontier with new land-uses, new formations of control and authority, new enclosures, and indeed new possibilities for accumulation.

The GLC’s precursor of the non-consolidated Mozambican borderlands, however, suggests an older notion of the frontier as well. This is one understood as an unruly, threatening space in which centralized state power is weak at best and in which economic opportunities, while perhaps dangerous, are abundant. As such, this borderland frontier as transit route for rhino poachers into Kruger was, and largely still is, an unruly space of lucrative illicit movement into Kruger. The new wildlife frontier of the GLC is equally a site of lucrative opportunity: here opportunities for accumulation tied to wildlife tourism and conservation, which are contingent on shutting down poaching-related economic opportunities. Yet given the anti-poaching security rationale standing behind the GLC, the new frontier is, perhaps ironically, one over which sovereignty is not absent but rather consolidated. This is not simple state sovereignty but sovereignty established by two states in partnership with private land holders, realized by their security forces. As this consolidation of power and security enables the
landholders to tap into the new opportunities it provides, this new frontier is realized through processes securitization. Understanding the GLC as a new wildlife frontier, moreover, highlights that consolidation itself takes on two integrated meanings: just as the individual private reserves are consolidated into a single, unified buffer zone, sovereignty over the space is itself consolidated, especially given the buildup of state-sanctioned security forces and removal of communities deemed potentially disruptive.

The GLC is tellingly understood as a frontier in another sense as well: one productive of dispossession. Namely, framed as an unruly landscape overflowing with opportunity, here for wildlife-related tourism, resident communities are dispossessed as a means of “taming” this space and realizing these opportunities. This hence mirrors a common practice of land appropriation within settlement frontiers with deeply colonial roots (Cronon, 2011; Spence, 1999). While the long-term impacts of such displacement are not yet known, we do know for certain the GLC is provoking the outright eviction of certain communities and inciting troubling restrictions on access and movement through the now consolidated conservancy.

The reality of dispossession and the broader context of securitized conservation from which it emerges lead us to read the GLC as a cautionary tale. Looking at and beyond the conservancy, one of our core concerns is that framing conservation in security terms makes it more difficult to criticize related disposessions. In other words, conservation-related security interests act as a depoliticized alibi for green grabbing, explicitly green accumulation through green dispossession. We see this in the GLC, the LNP to the north, and are likely to see it in other commercial poaching hotspots as a range of conservation actors work to secure and consolidate existing conservation space
or create new secure wildlife frontiers. Furthermore, as wildlife and wildlife products become increasingly valuable due to growing affluence and growing demand, we will probably see more and more green grabs or enclosure and privatization of land in the name of conservation security rather than merely the drive to amass capital, as we see with the GLC and LNP. In addition to securitization likely being more violent than other forms of conservation, we are troubled by the phenomena of states devolving significant authority to private security forces (who then give orders to state security actors). To be more precise, private actors may not be accountable, especially to vulnerable rural communities, in the same way that state actors are in practice or at least in theory. Making matters even more disconcerting, dispossession as a security strategy may backfire. There is ample evidence elsewhere, including elsewhere in the GLTP, of residents evicted from protected areas, or otherwise barred from realizing their benefits, who resist such exclusion by engaging in poaching (Mavhunga, 2014; also see Neumann, 1998; Brockington, 2002). If our prediction is correct, this would reinforce a more far-reaching pattern of securitized conservation measures backfiring by alienating the very communities from which they need support (Duffy, 2014; Lunstrum, 2014).

To be up front, we take these security concerns seriously. We do not want to see the disappearance of the rhino. But how do we respond when anti-poaching strategies translate into the creation of new securitized wildlife frontiers that dispossess already vulnerable communities and concentrate capital in private hands? While we can only be suggestive here, the answer must begin by placing calls for displacement as a conservation-security strategy—anti-poaching or otherwise—within the long and globally expansive history that has rendered resident communities as conservation’s
enemies.
Works Cited


1 Research for this paper consisted of 55 key informant and semi-structured interviews with GLC investors, GLC project implementers/consultants, GLTP/Kruger/LNP officials, Kruger rangers, community leaders/members, and Mozambican and South African conservation officials. Conducted between 2012 and 2014, with 4 research trips lasting between 3 and 8 weeks, we held interviews in Shangaan with the assistance of a translator, Portuguese and English. In addition, [co-author’s name] engaged in several days of participant observation of the work of GLC implementers between 2012 and 2014, which offered possibilities for both sustained informal discussion and a view into some of the concrete practices through which the GLC is being built. We supplemented interviews and participant observation with analysis of primary and secondary documents, including GLC planning documents, maps, and newspaper articles, which were gathered online and generously provided by interviewees.

2 While securing the border ties in to broader security practices in South Africa (Humphreys and Smith, 2014; Lunstrum, 2014), rhino poaching is the security issue along the border with Mozambique given concern over rhino and related cross-border armed-incursions.

3 While many concession holders also see biodiversity conservation as a priority of the GLC, they made it clear on several occasions that their investment in conservation must yield a profit (Interviews 2013, 2014).

4 Others have noted that securitization may actually have negative ecological consequences (see, for example, Sayre and Knight, 2010). This is possible in the GLC but we do not see it as a major issue given the fact that the built security infrastructure in the GLC is of relative low-intensity compared to that which is occurring along the U.S.-Mexico border and that securitization here, unlike in the US, is being done by actors who have an interest in developing conservation landscapes and increasing the cross-border mobility of wildlife.
5 Just as Kelly (2011, 685) argues that with accumulation by dispossession the act of enclosure may be “well removed from the act of accumulation,” securitization may similarly be removed.