The Duke of Albany’s Invasion of England in 1523 and Military Mobilisation in Sixteenth-Century Scotland

[ABSTRACT]

On 22 September 1523 John Stewart, duke of Albany, disembarked at Dumbarton with a French army and began to prepare an invasion of England. After spending a month raising men and supplies, he marched to the border and laid siege to Wark. Following his bombardment of the castle from the Scottish side of the Tweed on 1 November, he sent several thousand French and Scottish soldiers across the river to assault the castle. Although the force breached Wark’s outer defences, the small English garrison under Sir William Lisle put up staunch resistance and drove Albany’s men back. When the defenders repelled a second assault and Albany learned of the approach of an English army under Thomas Howard, earl of Surrey, he lifted the siege on 3 November and returned to Edinburgh.

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2. For the siege of Wark, see Edward Hall, The Triumphant Reigne of Kyng Henry the VIII, 2 vols (Edinburgh, 1904), i. 304; State Papers Published under the Authority of His Majesty’s Commission: Henry VIII, 11 vols (London, 1830-52), iv. 52—3; George Buchanan, History of Scotland, ed. James Aikman, 2 vols (Glasgow, 1827), ii. 288; Edward Herbert, Autobiography of Edward Lord Herbert of Cherbury: The history of England under Henry VIII (London, 1870), 245;
Set beside the Flodden campaign of 1513 and the wars of the 1540s, Albany’s short siege of a border castle looks unremarkable. It typically merits only a passing comment in the extensive literature on the Anglo-Scottish wars of the sixteenth century. Yet an examination of Albany’s campaign of 1523 is important for several reasons. First, the lack of a systematic study of the campaign has produced a range of errors and misunderstandings about the progress of the expedition and its effects. One study of early modern English warfare even has James IV, who was killed at Flodden, leading the siege of Wark ten years later; another has Richard de la Pole (who


remained in France) accompany Albany to Scotland and participate in the invasion of England. A number of modern studies have also taken at face value contemporary chroniclers’ claims that the Scottish army numbered as many as 60,000 men, a figure which would have made Albany’s attack on Wark one of the largest military expeditions anywhere in Europe during this period. The French and Habsburg armies which fought at Pavia in 1525 numbered around 23,000 each, while Sultan Suleiman—who possessed the largest military resources of any European ruler—had perhaps 60,000 men when he annihilated the Hungarian royal army at Mohács in 1526. If the size of the Scottish army is typically overstated, the level of French support for the Scots is often underplayed. Indeed, the military resources Francis I sent to assist Albany were far in excess of anything previous Valois monarchs had offered the Scots—and included the dispatch of the largest French army ever sent to Scotland to that point. Meanwhile, although the campaign of 1523 is often seen as the cause


of deep divisions between Albany and the leading men of the kingdom, these impressions rest on analysis of a limited range of primary sources, many of which have been handled in an uncritical manner. Closer examination of the evidence provides a more nuanced understanding of Albany’s relationship with the principal nobles and his final attempt to re-ignite a bellicose strategy towards England.

Errors and misunderstanding aside, a second reason why Albany’s campaign is important relates to the light it sheds on military organisation. Only limited contemporary evidence survives to document the mobilisation methods of medieval and early modern armies.7 By contrast, we know more about the organisation of Albany’s expedition in 1523 than we do about any other major Scottish attack on England before the seventeenth century. The minutes of the council and the treasurer’s accounts contain a wealth of information about the mobilisation of the army in 1523.8

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8 I have used the original documents in all cases because of concerns about the reliability of the relevant published volumes: Edinburgh, National Records of Scotland [NRS], E21/18 (Accounts of John Campbell of Lundy, Treasurer, 5 Jun. 1522—15 Apr. 1524); CS5/34 (Acta Dominorum Concilii (Acts of the Lords of Council), 3 Aug. 1523—7 Dec. 1524). For the relevant sections of the printed editions, see Acts of Lords of Council in Public Affairs, 1501—1554: Selections from the Acta Dominorum Concilii introductory to the register of the privy council of Scotland, ed. R. K. Hannay (Edinburgh, 1932), 176―91; Thomas Dickson et al. (eds), Accounts of the Lord High
Military organisation in sixteenth-century Scotland has often been viewed in highly negative terms. To take one example, J. D. Mackie regarded mobilisation methods as ‘simple in the extreme’. While there has been an effort to rehabilitate the armies of the sixteenth century, this has largely focused on strategy and developments in military technology and there are few studies of the methods used to raise forces. As the mechanisms used to mobilise armies in sixteenth-century Scotland are generally seen to have been consistent with those employed in earlier centuries, a study of Albany’s actions in 1523 contributes significantly to wider understanding of warfare in medieval and early modern Scotland. Moreover, while studies of the Anglo-Scottish wars often focus on the composition of English armies because of the uneven spread of the surviving primary sources, the voluminous Scottish evidence detailing Albany’s march on England in 1523 provides


10 See especially Phillips, _Anglo-Scottish Wars_; Phillips, ‘Military revolution’; Phillips, ‘Strategy and its limitations’. There is only brief comment on recruitment in Gladys Dickinson, ‘Some notes on the Scottish army in the first half of the sixteenth century’, _SHR_ 28 (1949) 133—45, at 144 (which also does not discuss the campaign of 1523).

11 On continuity in recruitment methods, see Julian Goodare, _State and Society in Early Modern Scotland_ (Oxford, 1999), 134.
an excellent opportunity to study the conflict from a Scottish perspective.\textsuperscript{12} The article will begin with an examination of Albany’s campaign before going on to consider what it tells us about military organisation in medieval and early modern Scotland.

Albany’s campaign of 1523 was the first major attack on English territory by a Scottish army since Flodden.\textsuperscript{13} While Albany had mobilised the army in 1522 and marched to attack Carlisle, he ultimately brokered a truce with Thomas, lord Dacre, at Solam chapel. According to George Buchanan, Albany’s plans collapsed because the nobles refused to cross the border. Buchanan further claimed that ‘if these operations were intended to assist France by preventing the English from attacking them with their whole force, it was sufficient for the purpose to have made a show of war’.\textsuperscript{14} Although the accuracy of Buchanan’s account is questionable, it is clear that Francis I failed to send significant numbers of soldiers to assist the Scots in 1522 and thus failed to fulfil the terms of the treaty of Rouen (1517) which bound him to send 1,200 men to Scotland upon the resurgence of the war with England.\textsuperscript{15} While this could be seen as bad faith on Francis’s part, and as the French

\begin{footnotesize}
\textsuperscript{12} Phillips, \textit{Anglo-Scots Wars} is based on a slim selection of primary sources and does not utilise the records of the Scottish crown. On the tendency to approach the fourteenth-century Anglo-Scottish conflicts from an English point of view, see A. J. Macdonald, \textit{Border Bloodshed: Scotland, England and France at war, 1369–1403} (East Linton, 2000), 2–3. For studies of Anglo-Scottish wars from a Scottish perspective, see also Blakeway, ‘War of 1558’; Alexander Grant, ‘The Otterburn war from the Scottish point of view’, in Anthony Goodman and Anthony Tuck (eds), \textit{War and Border Societies in the Middle Ages} (London, 1992), 30—64.

\textsuperscript{13} The campaign of 1523 was also the last major Scottish attack on England until the 1540s: the brief war of 1532—3 was confined to small, if destructive, raids (R. W. Hoyle, ‘The Anglo-Scottish war of 1532—3’, \textit{Camden Society Miscellany} 31 (1992) 23—9.

\textsuperscript{14} Buchanan, \textit{History}, ii. 281.

\textsuperscript{15} Paris, Bibliothèque nationale [BN], MS français 25720, fo 207r; \textit{Catalogue des actes de François Ier}, 10 vols, ed. Paul Marichal (Paris, 1887—1908), i. 304; Alfred Spont, \textit{Semblançay (?—1527)}:
\end{footnotesize}
king exploiting the Scots for his own purposes, good reasons explain his actions. In the summer of 1522 the French were fighting English and Habsburg armies on multiple fronts. Francis sent François le Charron to Scotland in June 1522 to explain that the king was unable to send ‘as much help and succour to the said kingdom of Scotland as he would have wished to make’ because he was fielding armies in Picardy, Gascony and Italy. Indeed, Francis’s forces were so thinly spread in 1522 that he did not have enough men to prevent an Anglo-imperial army destroying thousands of acres of north-eastern France. As a result, Valois commanders in the region such as Charles de Bourbon, duke of Vendôme, could only watch as their castles and villages were destroyed before their eyes.

While Francis had been unable to send soldiers in 1522, he had provided the Scots with large amounts of money and weapons. The Valois monarch gave Albany 60,800 livres obtained from melting down the silver grill at the shrine of St Martin at Tours to pay for the war against England, in addition to which Francis spent another 2,000 livres on 8,000 pikes for Scotland. His ambassador, Thiederic van Rand, informed the duke of Holstein that soldiers, ordnance, ships and money were being sent to Scotland for an invasion of England. This was more than just rhetoric designed to persuade the duke to enter into an alliance with France. With the renewal of the war in

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17 BL, MS Cotton Caligula D viii. fo 273r (LP, iii, pt. 2. no. 2540). See also BL, MS Cotton Caligula D viii. fos 271v—2r (LP, iii, pt. 2. no. 2541).
1523, Francis I sent his councillor, Jean de Langeac, abbot of Saint-Gildas-des-Bois, to Scotland to inform the lords that he was sending military aid ‘which will be sufficient not only to defend your land but also to attack our enemy and chase him out of his kingdom’. As a token of his intentions, Francis dispatched 500 soldiers to Leith later that month to join the 300 men Albany had left in Dunbar under the experienced captain Antoine Gonzolles, with an assurance that he would send a larger force once the harvest had been gathered (‘la maturité des fruiz qui sont sur terre pour l’advictaillement de l’armee’).

The promised men, money and artillery arrived in Scotland with Albany in September 1523. It is clear that the number of soldiers exceeded the 1,200 stipulated in the treaty of Rouen. Although the surviving French and Scottish records do not provide details on the size the force, the estimates

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18 Rélations politiques, i. 45; Jean de Langeac, Letters and Papers, ed. Jan Pendergrass (Geneva, 2016), 139—43; The Letters of James V, ed. R. K. Hannay and Denys Hay (Edinburgh, 1954), 93—4. Langeac attended the council on 23 Jun., which ordered the preparation of the army ‘for resisting of our auld enemys of Ingland’ (NRS, CS5/33, fo 200r). For the significant French financial aid Francis I sent to Scotland during Albany’s regency, see Amy Blakeway, Regency in Sixteenth-Century Scotland (Martlesham, 2015), 223—5. For pensions given to key Scottish lords, see Calendar of State Papers, the Scottish Series. Henry VIII, Edward VI, Mary, Elizabeth, 1509—1589, ed. M. J. Thorpe (London, 1858), 16; Francisque Michel, Les Écossais en France, les Français en Écosse, 2 vols (London and Edinburgh, 1862), i. 377—8; Rélations politiques, i. 45.

19 Langeac, Letters and Papers, 143; Rélations politiques, i. 44; LP, iii, pt. 2. nos. 3058, 3110; A diurnal of remarkable occurents that have passed within the country of Scotland since the death of King James the fourth till the year MDLXXV, ed. Thomas Thomson (Edinburgh, 1833), 8.

20 BL, MS Cotton Caligula B iii. fo 59r (LP iii. pt. 2, no. 3403); Diurnal of remarkable occurents, 8; A Chronicle of the Kings of Scotland from Fergus the First to James the Sixth, ed. J. W. Mackenzie (Edinburgh, 1830), 82—3.
given by contemporary writers range from 3,000 to 7,000 men. Our best information comes from information provided by English spies, though this evidence must be used with caution. Several early reports claimed that Albany brought 8,000 French soldiers, a figure which both Thomas Howard, who was overseeing the defence of the north, and Cardinal Wolsey considered to be an exaggeration. In contrast, other reports downplayed both the size and the quality of the French force. Thomas Dacre, warden of the English west march, initially claimed that Albany brought 1–1,500 Gascon infantry, ‘slaves and rabald fellows’ with ‘few persons of reputation’. Nonetheless, a range of reports agreed that 4,000 infantry arrived from France along with small numbers of light horsemen and men-at-arms. These reports include those provided by Margaret Tudor, who was well-placed to monitor Albany’s arrival; Isabella Hoppringle, prioress of Coldstream, who was present at Albany’s arrival at Dumbarton and followed him to Glasgow and Stirling; and the prioress of Eccles, whose agent watched the progress of the French force through Scotland. Indeed, the total of 4,000 infantry tallies with the figure provided by Archibald Douglas, earl of Angus, who was in exile at the French court when Francis I dispatched the soldiers to Scotland.

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21 Edinburgh, National Library of Scotland [NLS], MS 1746, fo 115r; S. M. Thorson, ‘Adam Abell’s The roit of quhell of tyrne: An Edition’, unpublished Ph.D. thesis (University of St Andrews, 1998), 232; Hall, Henry VIII, i. 302; Buchanan, History, ii. 284. For the treaty of Rouen, see Scottish Historical Documents, ed. Gordon Donaldson (Glasgow, 1997), 98—100; Rélations politiques, i. 4—8.

22 LP, iii, pt. 2. no. 3362; BLO, Tanner MS 90, fo 41r; State Papers, iv. 37; BL, MS Cotton Caligula B iii. fos 59r, 60r; B vi. fos 376r, 449r (LP, iii, pt. 2. nos. 3403, 3404, 3421, 3368).

23 He later revised this figure to 2,000 men (LP, iii, pt. 2. nos. 3395, 3409, 3431).

24 BL, MS Cotton Caligula B iii. fos 59r, 60r—v (LP, iii, pt. 2, nos. 3403, 3404).

When added to those men already present at Dunbar and Dumbarton, we are probably looking at a total of around 5–6,000 French soldiers in Scotland by October 1523.

English spies also provided detailed reports on the ordnance Albany brought from France, most agreeing that he had four great cannons and a number of smaller pieces (including serpentines, culverins and falconets), in addition to the cannon already stored in Edinburgh and Dunbar.\textsuperscript{26} Albany’s artillery was of particular concern to Thomas Howard because of the threat it posed to border castles. (James IV had used his artillery to force the surrender of Wark, Norham, Etal and Ford in 1513.\textsuperscript{27}) Upon arriving in Scotland, Albany placed his ordnance under the command of one Donald McGlassane and transported cannon from Kirkintilloch and elsewhere to Edinburgh for the campaign.\textsuperscript{28} These preparations provided him with a considerable arsenal and Margaret Tudor informed Howard on 29 September that Albany had twenty-eight pieces of artillery in addition to

\textsuperscript{26}BL, Cotton MS, Caligula B vi. fo 449r (LP, iii, pt. 2. no. 3368); LP, iii, pt. 2. no. 3431; NRS, E21/18, fo 27v. Spies also reported that Albany had brought with him ‘sex carts covered with steall and brassee and in evry of them viii men’ with guns which were pulled by ‘barbed horses and goeth backewarde’ (London, The National Archives [TNA], SP 49/2, fo 41r (LP, iii, pt. 2. no. 3451). See also TNA, SP 49/2, fo 37r (LP, iii, pt. 2. no. 3446). For the use of ordnance from Dunbar in the war against England in September 1523, see NRS, CS5/34, fo 12v.

\textsuperscript{27}Macdougall, \textit{James IV}, 271—3.

the four cannon already noted at his disposal.29 He sent some of these guns to Caerlaverock and Canonbie in the west march, probably both as a means to reinforce these strongholds and to keep the English guessing about which part of the frontier he would attack.30 By dividing his artillery, Albany also hoped to make it more difficult for English spies to learn the full extent of his firepower. One spy reported that Albany was offering £100 in lands or goods to anyone who ‘could shewe hym of any Scottishman’ who had provided the English with details about his ordnance.31 Yet despite these precautions, detailed reports about the Scottish artillery reached Thomas Dacre, who informed Thomas Howard on 31 October—the eve of the siege of Wark—that Albany had with him ‘8 cannons, 2 double cannons and 24 falcons and serpentines’, while further ordnance was coming from Dunbar.32

While this was the largest force a French monarch had sent to Scotland, it was only to form part of Albany’s army. Upon landing at Dumbarton, Albany summoned the council to meet at Glasgow on 1 October.33 The sitting was well-attended and despite a protest—according to Edward Hall—from Lord Forbes that ‘the realme of Scotland for the love of Fraunce suffereth great paine’, the council overwhelming backed Albany’s plans to invade England and issued a proclamation ordering ‘all our sovran lords liegis prepar and mak … redy on ther best maner bodyn for weir for

29 BL, MS Cotton Caligula B vi. fo 449r (LP, iii, pt. 2. no. 3368).

30 BL, MS Cotton Caligula B ii. fo 257r; B iii. fos 58r, 106r (LP, iii, pt. 2. nos. 3438, 3441). The status of Canonbie was also disputed, the English claiming that it was part of the ‘debatable lands’, an issue which arose during the war of 1532—3 (Hoyle, ‘War of 1532-3’, 23—4).

31 TNA, SP 49/2, fo 37r (LP, iii, pt. 2. no. 3446).

32 LP, iii, pt. 2. no. 3489. For ordnance coming from Dunbar, see BL, MS Cotton Caligula B iii. fos 58r, 106r, 259r (LP, iii, pt. 2. nos. 3467, 3460); LP, iii, pt. 2. nos. 3478, 3489.

resisting of our enemys of Ingland’. Despite the lateness of the year and the need to raise an army quickly, Albany perhaps hoped for a reasonable turnout. He had already mobilised the army in September 1522 for an invasion of England, and now, in 1523, he again sought to harness the power of the kingdom and ordered, as John Leslie later put it, that ‘men of weir out of sindrie partes of the Realme be gatherit’.

The number who turned up at the musters was nevertheless far below what Albany had expected. On 21 October the council noted that ‘mony and divers persouns ... throw out the realm quhilks has nocht fulfillit the command ... bot remains contemnandlie at hame’. A new summons was then sent across the kingdom instructing men to ‘without any langar delay pas and follow apoun my lord governour' under of loss of life, goods and lands. While the absence of muster rolls means that it is impossible to know exactly how many men turned up at the various assembly points in 1523, other records provide an indication of how recruitment fared. The council, for example, instructed the earl of Argyll to stop Highlanders who had gathered at the musters in Glasgow from

34 NRS, CS5/34, fo 12v; Hall, Henry VIII, i. 303. For the weapons and armour Scottish soldiers were expected to bring to musters, see Dickinson, ‘Scottish army’, 133–5.

35 For the Albany’s mobilisation of the army ‘of the haill Realme on Rosling mure’ in Aug. 1522, see NRS, E21/18, fos 17v—18r. The Chronicle of Perth noted ‘Roflyne more in September 1523’. This probably refers to either the gathering of the host on Roslin Muir in the previous year, or the army to be placed under the command of the earl of Argyll in early Sept. 1523 to resist the English, though the muster point then was Threipwodrig, between Lauders and Stow (The Chronicle of Perth: A register of remarkable occurences, chiefly connected with that city, from the year 1210 to 1668 (Edinburgh, 1831), 2; NRS, CS5/34, fo 10v.) For Albany’s army in 1522, see Gordon Donaldson, Scotland: James V to James VII (Edinburgh, 1965), 20; Norman Macdougall, An Anti-dote to the English: The auld alliance, 1295—1560 (East Linton, 2001), 124.

36 Leslie, Historie, ii. 192.

37 NRS, CS5/34, fos 20v, 21r. See also NRS, E21/18, fo 28v.
harassing the local population.\textsuperscript{38} It is likely that these men were part of the personal retinue of the earl of Argyll, who controlled the largest private army anywhere in sixteenth-century Britain. (Indeed, the earls of Argyll often provided up to a quarter of the men who served in Scottish armies during this period.\textsuperscript{39}) The appearance of the Highlanders, many of whom would have travelled a significant distance to the musters at Glasgow, may have been a consequence of the council’s appointment of Argyll as lieutenant-general of the army with a remit to resist the English invasion of the Borders on 22 September 1523.\textsuperscript{40} While this summons came too late to stop Thomas Howard sacking Jedburgh, it probably meant that Argyll’s men were already assembling by the time Albany issued the orders for the nationwide mobilisation of the army ten days later.

Several sources indicate that recruitment was also high in the regions lying in or close to the east and middle marches. The treasurer’s accounts note the prominent participation of the men of ‘est and west Louthaine, Mers, and Teviotdaill’ and English spies reported that men ‘of all the Marsh, Tevedall, Heshdale [Eskdale] and Howsdaill [Ewesdale]’ had arrived at their assembly point in Lauder.\textsuperscript{41} As with Argyll’s Highlanders, it is likely that many of these men were raised by means of service to key border lords. Certainly, upon arriving in Scotland Albany focused his attention on

\textsuperscript{38} NRS, E21/18, fo 25v.


\textsuperscript{40} NRS, CSS/34, fo 12r.

\textsuperscript{41} NRS, E21/18, fo 30r; TNA, SP 49/2, fo 41r (\textit{LP}, iii, pt. 2. no. 3451). See also \textit{LP}, iii, pt. 2. no. 3478; NRS, E21/18, fos 27v, 28v.
the border lords, particularly those from the east and middle marches. Immediately upon
dismounting at Dumbarton, he had sent a messenger summoning Andrew Kerr of Cessford, Mark
Kerr of Dolphinton, Walter Scott, lord of Buccleuch, George, lord Hume, and David Hume of
Wedderburn. While many of these men were of dubious loyalty and had led the opposition to his
rule in the past, Albany perhaps hoped for their support in 1523 because they had suffered from a
series of devastating English attacks. Throughout the spring and summer of 1523 Thomas Howard
and Thomas Dacre had captured and destroyed many of their homes and villages (including castles
such as Cessford and Ferniehurst) and burned thousands of acres of the Borders.\footnote{43}

If mobilisation was high in the east and middle marches, it was low in the west and the north,
areas overseen by the earls of Lennox and Huntly. In part, this was probably because these regions
lay further from England. Yet there were also wider issues at play in these lands. Of the seventy-one
estates summoned to Irvine in 1532 to attend the wappinshawing of Cunningham—one of the
heartlands of Lennox power—forty-seven lords and tenants were absent and only three came
equipped for war. As Julian Goodare put it, ‘the strength of Cunningham ... might be counted not in
thousands but in tens’.\footnote{44} The crown also experienced great difficulty in mobilising the men of the
north-east in 1523. When James V visited Aberdeen in 1527, he issued over two hundred
remissions to men from the region who had failed to participate in Albany’s campaign and these
included twenty-three lairds.\footnote{45} As in Cunningham, given the key role that lairds played in

\footnote{42 RNS, E21/18, fo 27v.}

\footnote{43 BL, MS Cotton Caligula B ii. fos 156r—9r \textit{(LP} iii, pt. 2. no. 3039), B vii. fos 33r, 34r \textit{(LP} iii, pt. 2. no. 3364)}

\footnote{44 For the ‘valpynschlavene of Conynghame, held on the borov nur of the burgh of Irvin’, see
William Fraser, \textit{Memorials of the Montgomerries, Earls of Eglinton}, 2 vols (Edinburgh, 1859), ii.
118—20; Goodare, \textit{State and Society}, 137.}

\footnote{45 \textit{Registrum Secreti Sigilli Regum Scotorum. The Register of the Privy Seal of Scotland, A.D.
1488—1529}, ed. M. Livingstone (Edinburgh, 1908), 572—6.}
mobilising their tenants for the common army the absence of the former ensured a serious loss of manpower.

Both Lennox and Huntly claimed that mobilisation had been adversely affected by the onset of winter. Historians have often seen this as an excuse and claimed that the real reason was that the earls opposed Albany’s strategy from the beginning and sought to extricate themselves from the campaign. There are several problems with this interpretation. First, a wide range of contemporary sources describes how winter had set in early and severely, further south at least. Heavy rain and snow played a key role in the failure of Albany’s expedition and wintry conditions hampered Thomas Howard’s efforts to raise an army to resist the invasion, the Tudor commander informing Cardinal Wolsey on 9 October that he feared men from the English borders would ‘come but slackly [to the musters], considering the weather.’ Second, while the absence of Lennox and Huntly from the meeting of the council at Glasgow on 1 October is taken as evidence of their dissatisfaction with Albany and his invasion plans, other reasons explain their failure to attend. Huntly was very ill—a factor which undoubtedly contributed to his inability to recruit more effectively in the north—and he died in January 1524; Lennox, meanwhile, had attacked the episcopal palace in Glasgow during a feud earlier in 1523 and he may have been keen to avoid the town. Third, Lennox and Huntly were amongst Albany’s key supporters in the early 1520s and both men offered to bring their households on campaign in 1523. Armies were often solely formed of

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47 *LP*, iii, pt. 2. no. 3408.

48 TNA, SP 49/2, fo 41r (*LP*, iii, pt. 2. no. 3451); *LP*, iii, pt. 2. no. 3434. Fraser, *Lennox*, i. 348—9 incorrectly states that Lennox was absent from the campaign. Following Huntly’s death, on 18 Jan.
lords and their households and Albany’s failure to raise the common army in 1523, despite issuing multiple summonses to the musters, meant that he effectively relied on the retinues of the key lords. For Richard Eaves, Albany ‘lacked support from a number of important nobles’. Yet Albany marched to invade England in 1523 accompanied by many of the leading men in the kingdom, including the earls of Arran, Argyll and Lennox, and the lords Marshall, Maxwell, Ruthven and Lyle, as well as by key families from the Borders such as the Kerrs and the Humes. The presence of Humes was a particular mark of Albany’s power because the family had previously led opposition to the duke’s rule and was absent from his march on England in 1522. Moreover, as the Humes were formerly allied with Henry VIII’s commanders in the north (Thomas Howard still sought their support in October 1523), their attendance in the Scottish host was a major blow to the English cause.

Despite Albany’s efforts to raise a sizeable army, the lords came accompanied by fewer men than he had hoped. When it became clear that large numbers had not obeyed the proclamations to join the army, the council issued a second summons on 21 October. On 27 October it was further ordered that ‘all maner of persouns our soverane lordis liegis now being in this toun of Edinburgh pas incontinent and follow my lord governour without langar delay’. Men who arrived in Edinburgh in the afternoon had to be gone by the following morning, while those who arrived in the morning

1524, James, earl of Murray, took Huntly’s place as ‘lieutenant of the north partis’ (NRS, CSS/34, fo 46r).

49 On armies, lords and their households, see below, p. 00.


51 *LP*, iii, pt. 2. no. 3487.


53 BLO, MS Tanner 90, fo 44v (*LP*, iii, pt. 2. no. 3385); *LP*, iii, pt. 2. no. 3365.
had to leave for the army the same day ‘undir the pane of lif landis and gudis’. To enforce these instructions, the council appointed officers to ‘pas, serche and seik all sic personis remanand eftir the said charge’ and bring them to the justice clerk for punishment. Those with whom such men lodged were to inform the justice clerk immediately ‘undir the pane of deid’.\(^{54}\) The council instructed ferymen not to take deserters from the army back across the Firth of Forth ‘under the pane of deid’ and John, lord Erskine, was to ensure that ‘na maner of man suld returne be the brig northwart’, though that this proclamation was issued again suggests that it was largely ‘neffectual’.\(^{55}\) Proclamations were also issued at major settlements on or near the route of the march in 1523—including Edinburgh, Haddington, Dalkeith and Lauder—stating that deserters were to be brought to the justice clerk to be ‘justifyit’ according to the punishments specified in the proclamation, namely the loss of life, lands and goods.\(^{56}\) Heralds, macers and pursuivants were also instructed to ‘serche and seiike all sic persouns remanand fra the said oist and army’ throughout the shiriffdoms and bring them to the justice clerk or his deputies to be punished ‘for thar contempioun and breking of the command and charge contenit’.\(^{57}\) Mass desertions, it should be noted, were not particular to this campaign. Edinburgh town council had sought to ensure that the numerous soldiers who passed through the town after deserting James IV’s army following the capture of Wark and Norham in 1513 were punished with ‘tynsal of lyfe land and guid’, and the ferymen of the Forth were once again instructed not to carry deserters in 1529.\(^{58}\)

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\(^{54}\) NRS, E21/18, fo 23r.

\(^{55}\) NRS, E21/18, fo 29r.

\(^{56}\) NRS, E21/18, fo 23r.

\(^{57}\) NRS, E21/18, fo 20r.

\(^{58}\) *Records of the Burgh of Edinburgh, A.D. 1403—1528*, ed. J. D. Marwick, 5 vols (Edinburgh, 1869—92), i. 143; NRS, E21/23, fo 27r. For desertions from James IV’s army in 1513, see also *LP*, i. no. 2283; Macdougall, *James IV*, 273.
Leaving Edinburgh on 22 October, Albany marched to Melrose and spent several days in that area—billeting his army in places such as Stichill and Mellerstain and probably waiting for men coming to the army following his second summons.\textsuperscript{59} Part of the army then crossed the Tweed but, according to George Buchanan, some ‘pretending the same excuses as in the former expedition to the Solway [1522]’ refused to advance into England, following which those who had crossed the Tweed returned again.\textsuperscript{60} According to Buchanan, the nobles had refused to cross into England in 1522 because they believed that war was principally for the benefit of France and, since a child sat on the Scottish throne, ‘it was their duty to act only on the defensive, to preserve the ancient boundaries, and protect the kingdom’.\textsuperscript{61} Buchanan’s account should be treated with caution for several reasons. First, it is based on the chronicle by the Englishman Edward Hall, who was writing in the 1540s (another period of Anglo-Scottish warfare) and who had sought to highlight the supposed military weakness of the Scots in comparison to the superior English. Buchanan, writing in the 1560s, took the key elements of Hall’s account and refashioned them to suit his purpose of emphasising the key role nobility played in keeping rulers in check.\textsuperscript{62} Moreover, Buchanan’s accounts of the nobles refusing to cross into England in 1522 and 1523 are not corroborated by any contemporary source.

\textsuperscript{59} \textit{LP}, iii, pt. 2. nos. 3477, 3478, 3487.

\textsuperscript{60} Buchanan, \textit{History}, ii. 287. See also Herbert, \textit{Henry VIII}, 244–5.

\textsuperscript{61} Buchanan, \textit{History}, ii. 281.

While Buchanan claimed that the nobles refused to cross the Tweed at Melrose because they did not wish to enter England, the Tweed lies at this point far from the frontier and Albany’s army still had to ford the Teviot too before reaching the border. Rather than mount an invasion from Melrose, it is more likely that Albany had travelled to Teviotdale to raise men. Indeed, an English spy reported that Albany crossed the Tweed with part of the host and then ‘sent word to the men of Tevidale to follow him’, probably representing an order from Albany that the men of Teviotdale join him as he progressed through the local sheriffsdoms.63 While Albany had failed to raise the common army from across the kingdom, he could hope to gain men in Teviotdale as this region had borne the brunt of English violence in 1523. The capture or destruction of Wark (the focus of Albany’s expedition) stood to be a major benefit for the population of the Borders, as English soldiers used the castle to launch expeditions into Teviotdale. Certainly, immediately after leaving Melrose Albany moved his army along the Tweed to attack Wark. He began to bombard the castle from the Scottish side of the river on 1 November, the men from Teviotdale taking a leading role in the action.64 In particular, Andrew Kerr, whose castle of Ferniehurst in Teviotdale was destroyed by Thomas Dacre in September 1523, led a force of 1–2,000 Scots across the swollen Tweed on boats to assault Wark with French soldiers.65

While numerous historians have called the attack on Wark a ‘fiasco’, it was not quite a humiliating failure.66 Indeed, the Scots came much closer to winning the castle than has been allowed. Although Howard claimed that the modifications made to Wark’s defences in late

63 _LP_, iii, pt. 2. no. 3478.

64 _LP_, iii, pt. 2. no. 3499.

65 Leslie, _Historie_, ii. 193; Hall, _Henry VIII_, i. 304. The Kerrs of Cessford had also suffered considerably from English attacks in 1523, including the destruction of Cessford castle, also in Teviotdale (BL, MS Cotton Caligula B ii. fo. 156r—9r [ _LP_, iii, pt. 2. no. 3039]; B vii. fos 33r, 34r [ _LP_, iii, pt. 2. no. 3364]; _Original Letters_, 1st ser., i. 216—7.

66 Ferguson, _Relations_, 54; Eaves, _Scottish Diplomacy_, 153.
September 1523 meant that it could hold out for ten days, its captain, Sir William Lisle, wrote to Howard after the second day of the siege pleading for ‘reskue this day, or els the place wold be no lenger kepte’.\(^{67}\) Indeed, while Howard claimed that the Scots had not done ten shillings worth of damage to England, Albany’s guns had destroyed Wark’s outer defences so effectively that the castle lay in a ruinous state for decades after the siege.\(^{68}\) Albany only raised the siege of Wark when he learned of the approach of a relief force under Thomas Howard, which Albany believed was many times larger than his own. Inclement weather also played an important role in the collapse of the campaign, as the Tweed, already swollen by heavy rain, continued to rise, which meant that the two parts of Albany’s army were at risk of becoming separated. Under such circumstances, withdrawal was the only sensible strategy. Yet Howard acted as if he had routed Albany’s force and he goaded the duke for his ‘shamefull departure’, claiming that ‘there was never man departed with more shame and nor with more feare than the Duke hath doon’.\(^{69}\) Cardinal Wolsey worked quickly with John Skelton, the leading English poet of the age, to produce a poem celebrating the relief of Wark entitled ‘Howe the Douty Duke of Albany, Lyke a Cowarde Knyght, Ran Away Shamefully, with An Hundred Thousande Tratlande Scottes and Faint Hearted Frenchmen’.\(^{70}\) Greg Walker has shown that this was not a victory poem celebrating a threat which had passed, but a propaganda piece designed to compromise an enemy the English crown still considered to be a very real


\(^{69}\) \textit{State Papers}, iv. 52; BL, MS Cotton B vi. fo 354v (LP, iii, pt. 2. no. 3506); \textit{Original Letters}, 1st ser., i. 232—4. For Albany’s ‘shame’, see also \textit{State Papers}, iv. 51; BL, MS Cotton Caligula B i. fo 324r (LP, iii, pt. 2. no. 3531); \textit{Original Letters}, 1st ser., i. 236.

\(^{70}\) \textit{The Poetical Works of John Skelton}, ed. Alexander Dyce, 3 vols (Boston, 1864), ii. 68-84.
danger. This view of events was then picked up by later Tudor chroniclers who fashioned a narrative of the siege of Wark in which Albany had ‘cowardly fled’ or ‘cowardly ... reurned’, which was designed to diminish Albany’s personal qualities and undermine his claims to rule.

This is not how Albany’s actions at Wark were seen in Scotland. Adam Abell, writing in Jedburgh in the 1520s and 1530s, did not castigate Albany for having withdrawn from Wark. This is all the more striking because Abell had previously criticised Albany for his failure to invade England in 1522, even suggesting that the English had paid him off. Similarly, a generation later neither John Leslie nor Robert Lindsay mentioned criticisms levelled against Albany for his actions at Wark. Leslie had Albany both rebuke Howard for ‘his waik hait and kowartnes’ and challenge him to ‘shawe him selfe a man’ by meeting in haitle; Pitcottie saw Albany as the victim of scheming by the borderers in his army. Meanwhile, George Buchanan mentioned no sense of personal shame or dishonor attached to Albany following the withdrawal from Wark. Instead, he focused on the atrocious weather conditions and appearance of a much larger English army under Howard, which he claimed was also forced to disband because of the snow ‘without effecting any thing’.


72 A breuiat cronicle contaynynge all the kinges from Brute to this daye (Canterbury, 1552); Thomas Lanquet, An epitome of chronicles (London, 1559); Ellis, Henry VIII, i. 305.

73 NLS, MS 1746, fo 115r; Thorson, ‘Roit of quheli’, 232.

74 Leslie, Historie, ii. 192; Pitcottie, Chronicles, volume?. 303. Nor does David Calderwood in the seventeenth century, who put Albany’s withdrawal down to a combination of bad weather and the approach of a large English army under Thomas Howard (David Calderwood, The History of the Kirk of Scotland, ed. Thomas Thomson, 8 vols (Edinburgh, 1842), i. 67). On the scheming of border lords, see below, p. 00.

75 Buchanan, History, ii. 288.
Nonetheless, there is a wider perception in modern historiography that the lifting of the siege of Wark was seen as a disaster in Scotland and caused the final rupture between Albany and the nobles. For David Head, Albany’s ‘credit with the Scots was ruined’ as a result of Wark, sentiments echoed by Raymond Paterson.76 Marie Stuart believed that upon his retreat from Wark the duke ‘reached probably the lowest depths of his life’.77 Certainly, in November 1523 Margaret Tudor informed Thomas Howard that Albany ‘thynkys ne scheme of it [the withdrawal from Wark] for he makys hys excus that the lords wold not pas in Ingland with hym and that my lord of Aran and my lord of Lenox wuth other lord and says that they wold haf seld hym in Ingland’.78 Yet Margaret’s claim that the campaign led to a major rift between Albany and key nobles is highly suspect and not borne out by other sources.79 Albany continued to favour Lennox and gave him the abbey of Dryburgh in December 1523, the grant made in explicit recognition of his recent help in defending the kingdom; then, the following month, Albany appointed Lennox warden of the east and middle marches.80 If, as Margaret Tudor claimed, Albany believed that Lennox would have sold him to the English, it is highly unlikely that he would then have appointed him to one of the most important positions in the kingdom, especially one that, given its geographical location on a key part of the

76 Head, ‘Scottish policy’, 8; Paterson, Anglo-Scots Wars, 159. For this view, see also Pinkerton, History, ii. 231
77 Stuart, Duke of Albany, 167.
78 BL, MS Cotton Caligula B i. fo 295r (LP, iii, pt. 2. no. 3538). Margaret was perhaps alluding to the actions of Scottish nobles in betraying her father-in-law, James III, to the English as he mustered his troops at Lauder in 1482 (Norman Macdougall, James III (Edinburgh, 1982), 158—83).
79 Certainly, as noted in Emond, Minority, 177, Margaret’s reports about dissatisfaction with Albany among Scottish lords in late 1523 was not as extensive as she claimed.
80 NRS, GD86/88, RH1/2/340, GD220/2/1/135; TNA, SP 49/2, fo 88r; Fraser, Lennox, i. 348—9, ii. 221—3.
frontier, would have enabled Lennox to cause great harm by forming an alliance with the English. Moreover, Albany, who wished to return to France, stayed in Scotland for another seven months specifically at the request of the lords of the kingdom and parliament agreed to pay him £1,297 13s 9d for his expenses ‘at the time when he was at Wark in Northumberland’. These are not the actions of a political elite which had irrevocably rejected Albany after the Wark campaign. Richard Eaves claimed that Argyll and Huntly did not attend parliament on 17 November out of fear that Albany would ‘bring charges against them for failing to co-operate in the recent military operation’. Yet there is no evidence for this and, as we have seen, Huntly’s illness kept him from the campaign while Argyll appears to have raised a significant number of men for the expedition.

Closer examination of the reports about the disagreements which arose in the wake of the campaign throws a different light on the situation. Rather than emphasising a wider rift between Albany and the political elite, it is clear that ill-feeling was specifically between Albany and ‘the gentilmen of the Merche and Tevidale’, who upon Albany’s withdrawal from Wark complained that ‘all thErle of Surrey hathe lefte undestroyed, ye and your company have clerely wasted and distroyed the same; and by the seid Erle our Border is for ever undone; and ye promised us to gif hym batayle, whereby we might recover us, and never by other meanes.’ When Albany replied ‘I woll gift hym no batayle, for I have noo convenyente company so to doo’, he was not speaking about Lennox, Arran and Argyll, as has sometimes been understood, but specifically to the borderers, who in response declared ‘we woll never serve you more, nor never woll were your bagis again’ and tore them ‘of their brestes, and threwe theym on the ground’ saying ‘wold to God we

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81 Exchequer Rolls, xv. 90. Furthermore, dismissal of Albany’s French soldiers, sometimes seen as a mark of parliament’s disfavour towards the governor, was a practical measure as a force of this size would have been a strain on the kingdom over the winter months, when it would have remained inactive. As Howard noted to Wolsey on 1 Oct., Albany must invade ‘orels retourne his Frenche men home; for the realme of Scotland is not able to susteyne theym long’ (State Papers, iv. 41).

82 Eaves, Scottish Diplomacy, 153.
were all sworne Englishe’. While Albany came to rely on the men of Teviotdale and the Merse because of his failure to mobilise the common army across other parts of Scotland, his failure to capture or destroy Wark and the depredations perpetrated by his French soldiers (who were accustomed to living off the land even in France), meant that the borderers had gained little for their efforts. This produced localized feelings of anger towards Albany.

A range of other sources also describe a breakdown in relations between Albany and the borderers at Wark. According to Pitscottie, when Albany laid siege to the castle ‘the borderaris dessaifit him and caussit his captans of weir to be hangit ower the wallis quhene they had braschit and win the house. The Inglischemen seand no Scottismen bakand thame, incontenent they cruellie dang thame fourth of the castell and hangit thair captanis.’ While there is no evidence to support Pitscottie’s grisly tale, other contemporary writers commented on the duplicity of the borderers during the siege of Wark. Adam Abell stated that ‘an lard of Twedaill’ who ‘desirand the spulye of the house and saw he cuth nocht get it, exhortit the Inglis men to perseweir in thare defence’. On 7 November Thomas Howard also reported widespread disagreement between Albany and the borderers (many of whom had suffered from infractions caused by Albany’s soldiers as they marched to the frontier), particularly those from Teviotdale of whom he wrote ‘never men were so evill contented with a captain, as they bee with the seid Duke [Albany].’

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83 State Papers, iv. 52. Indeed, this is precisely what Thomas Howard had been working to achieve. In early Sept. 1523 the Humes negotiated with Howard to have their lands spared from burning in the forthcoming English invasion (which destroyed Jedburgh) by stating that should Albany return to Scotland they would come to England and take an oath to Henry VIII (State Papers, iv. 20—1, 25, 32, 34—5; LP, iii, pt. 2, no. 3333).

84 Pitscottie, Cronicles, volume. 303.

85 NLS, MS 1746, fo 115r; Thorson, ‘Roit of quhell of tyme’, 232.

86 State Papers, iv. 55—6.
Correspondence between Howard and Thomas Dacre confirms that among others the Kerrs, who led the siege of Wark with Albany’s French soldiers, were playing a double game and supplying the English with information about Albany’s strategy. On 30 October Walter Scott, lord of Buccleuch, and Mark Kerr of Dophinestone secretly met Sir Christopher Thirkill, Thomas Dacre’s steward, and confirmed that Albany intended to besiege Wark. This news prompted Howard immediately to summon his forces—which were spread across the frontier—to join him in the east.\(^7\) The following day, the eve of the siege of Wark, Thirkill again met Scott and Kerr at Branxton in Northumberland. They passed on information about the size and quality of the ordnance that Albany was bringing to Wark and about David Hume’s burning of villages in Northumberland.\(^8\) Other border families were also feeding information to the English. On 22 October one of the Nisbets, whose lands lay close to Jedburgh, told Sir William Bulmer, captain of Norham castle, that David Hume had joined sides with Albany, which was important news given that Hume had previously assured Howard of his loyalty.\(^9\) There is a certain irony that David Hume (who the English made considerable efforts to win over, whose father Albany had executed for treason in 1517 and whose family had often led opposition to Albany) remained loyal to Albany on the Wark campaign, while the Scotts and Kerrs (who have traditionally been portrayed as amongst the most implacable foes of the English during this period) colluded with Henry VIII’s commanders. Although by January 1524 relations between David Hume and Albany were deteriorating, Hume (as he pointed out in a letter to the governor) had worked with Lennox, the new

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\(^7\) LP, iii, pt. 2. no. 3486.

\(^8\) LP, iii, pt. 2. no. 3489. Thirkill also notified Thomas Dacre that he was meeting other Scots at Cornhill the following afternoon (BL, MS Cotton Caligula B vi. fo 498r; LP, iii, pt. 2. ro. 3456). See also Original Letters Illustrative of English History, ed. Henry Ellis, 3\(^{rd}\) ser., 4 vols (London, 1846), i. 326—30.

\(^9\) BL, MS Cotton Caligula B vi. fo 498r (LP, iii, pt. 2. no. 3456); Original Letters, 3\(^{rd}\) ser., i. 329—30.
warden of the middle and east marches, to launch raids into Northumberland. Lennox was an unusual choice for warden as his powerbase lay far to the west and he had little connection to the Borders, suggesting that Albany was distrustful of the key families of the middle and east marches in the wake of the Wark campaign and that he wanted to appoint a trusted ally to defend the frontier. Albany’s suspicion of the borderers persisted into 1524 and he requested pledges of goodwill from the many who had participated in the Wark campaign, including Andrew Kerr, Walter Scott, Mark Kerr, David Hume, George Hume and several other lairds and headsmen. The political situation of the Borders meant that the crown was just one source of political authority amongst the many with which these men had to contend. The difficulties Albany encountered in 1523 with the border lords— who looked principally to secure their own interests—were not specific to this campaign and were encountered by Scottish rulers throughout the sixteenth century.

In addition to problematic relationships with important political figures, the failure of Albany’s campaign has also been attributed to outdated methods of military mobilisation. Traditionally, rulers raised armies in two main ways. First was feudal levy, whereby men owed military service to the king for the lands they held from him. Second was service in the common army, a wider obligation by which in theory all men between the ages of sixteen and sixty owed up to forty days of military service per year. Arguably these two forms of recruitment had largely combined into a single military obligation by the thirteenth century, so that ‘there was no feudal

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90 For these attacks, see *LP*, iv. no. 118.

91 NRS. E21/18, fos 30v—31r, 32r.


army distinct from the common army of lairds and peasants’. Yet while the distinction between
the two was perhaps less pronounced by the reign of Alexander III (1249—86) than it had been in
previous centuries, rulers continued to use both systems of military mobilisation in the sixteenth
century. In 1518 James Hamilton, earl of Arran—who was acting as one of the regents during
Albany’s absence in France—mobilised ‘all fre halderis vassallis subvassallis and uthiris alswele of
regaliteis as realteis togiddir with uthir substantial gentilmen’ who were to come with their
‘honorable houshaldis fensable persouns weile bodyna’ for a campaign against the Humes in the
Merse. In 1529 a proclamation was issued to mobilise ‘all and sindri’ to accompany the earl of
Argyll to put down a rebellion in the Isles, ‘that is to say all gentilmen landit and uthiris substantius
gentilmen’. While all men were obliged to possess weapons and armour appropriate to their
station as specified in acts laid down by parliament, the elites summoned through feudal service
formed the most skilled and best armed component of armies.

It was also desirable to call on the more substantial men of the kingdom because they brought
their retinues on campaign. In particular, the great lords dominated regional military structures and
their households were formed of a number of retinues. In 1531 the army summoned to put down
the rebellion in the Isles was initially to be formed of ‘all the frehaldaris of this realm quhilkis may
expend the sowm of ane hundir pund of heritage be yer or abone … bringand with thame in nomer

94 A. A. M. Duncan, Scotland: The making of the kingdom (Edinburgh, 1975), 385. See also
Barrow, ‘Army of Alexander III’, 133—4; Alice Taylor, The Shape of the State in Medieval

95 NRS, CS5/30, fo 188r. See also CS5/30, fos 212r, 227r.

96 NRS, CS5/30, fo 80r. See also CS5/41, fos 77r—v.

97 See e.g. Records of the Parliament of Scotland [http://www.rps.ac.uk], 1430/33, 1450/1/8, 1456/4
(accessed 3 Jan. 2020)

98 Michael Brown, The Black Douglases: War and lordship in late medieval Scotland, 1300—1455
(Edinburgh, 2005), 145—6.
for ilk ane hundredth pundis that thai may dispand tua sufficient able men weil furnist for weir and 
vittalis with wapnys and uthiris necessaris’.\textsuperscript{99} When James V wanted to raise an army to enforce 
royal authority in the Borders in 1530, he summoned ‘all baronis, gentilmen landit and all 
substantious men unlandit … with thar honorable houshaldis bodin in feir of weir, wele vittalit and 
funnest fo the space of xl dais’, as well as ‘all kirkmen send thar honorable houshaldis’.
\textsuperscript{100} The 
proclamations regarding military recruitment thus also applied to prelates; indeed, an archbishop, a 
bishop and two abbots were killed fighting at Flodden, presumably with their households, while 
religious houses sent men to fight in the common army in the 1540s.\textsuperscript{101} The all-embracing nature of 
the common army meant that it was less-skilled and less-well-armed than forces raised through the 
feudal levy.\textsuperscript{102} Its role was largely defensive and it was normally only called out to resist foreign 
invasions, though it could be summoned to support the feudal host for domestic campaigns.\textsuperscript{103} For 
instance, when James V sought to raise an army against Scottish lords in the Borders in 1530 he 
first summoned ‘all baronis gentilmen landit and all substantious men unlandit’ and later called ‘all

\textsuperscript{99} NRS, CS5/41, fo 154v. The proclamation later went on to summon ‘all maner of landit men and 
uthiris within thir boundis followand betwix sexti and sextene and uthir fensable persouns’ (NRS 
CS5/42, fo 40r). For the rebellion, see Cameron, \textit{James V}, 229—32.

\textsuperscript{100} NRS, CS5/41, fos 79r—v. See also NRS, CS5/41, fos 84r, 118v. For military retinues of nobles, 
see Brown, \textit{Black Douglases}, 142—53. For James V’s campaign in the Borders, see Cameron, 
\textit{James V}, 78—80.

\textsuperscript{101} Macdougall, \textit{James IV}, 276; NRS, CH6/6/1, fos 10v—11r.

\textsuperscript{102} The military equipment those liable for service in common army were meant to possess was first 
set down in 1318 (RPS, 1318/6-7/22/26/29 [accessed 3 Jan. 2020]). See also Armstrong, ‘Local 
society’, 131; Michael Prestwich, ‘The wars of independence, 1296—1328’, in Spiers \textit{et al.} (eds), 
\textit{Military History}, 138.

\textsuperscript{103} For the common army and defence, see Armstrong, ‘Local society’. 
maner of personis betuix sexti and sextene yeres’ to be ready to join the host if required.\textsuperscript{104} The common army could also be summoned for invasions of England, though following legislation of 1456 poorer men were freed from military service in ‘ony radis in Inglande’.\textsuperscript{105} This exemption was probably applied in 1523, as the council ordered ‘the commone pepill that remainis at hame fra the host’ to support the war effort by participating in processions and prayers ‘for the stait and prosperite’ of Albany and his army ‘and thar returning with honour to this realm again’.\textsuperscript{106}

Yet while these two methods of army recruitment were used well after the thirteenth century, Duncan’s argument that the distinction between the feudal host and the common army became increasingly blurred probably applies to occasions such as the campaign of 1523 when there was an effort to create a large national force. Rather than issuing separate mobilisation calls, reflecting the military obligations owed by substantial landowners and those owed through common army service, a single summons was sent out across the kingdom instructing everyone ‘betuene sexti and xvi and uthir fensable personus’ to meet at the ‘certane placis assignit to thame bodyne in thar best wyse for weir and with vittalis … for resisting and invading of our auld inmyis of Ingland quhilkis has at thar power done thar utir deligence for distrucion of this realme’.\textsuperscript{107} It may be noted, however, that the proclamations of 1523 called men to the ‘army and host’, probably referring to the two forms of military obligation which had melded into one single obligation for this campaign.\textsuperscript{108}

Recent work on the mobilisation of medieval armies has focused on the men responsible for summoning the common army. For Michael Brown the common army was raised ‘according to sherrifdom and served under local royal officials’, while Alice Taylor has argued that sheriffs did

\textsuperscript{104} NRS, CS5/41, fo 79v. See also NRS, CS5/41, fo 84r; NRS, CS5/41, fo 118v.

\textsuperscript{105} RPS, 1456/4 (accessed 3 Jan. 2020).

\textsuperscript{106} NRS, CS5/34, fo 18v. Urban populations were also granted a blanket exemption from service in the host in 1523 in return for victualling the army (NRS, CS5/34, fo 21r; E21/18, fo 28r).

\textsuperscript{107} NRS, CS5/34, fo 21r.

\textsuperscript{108} For the nomenclature of the common army, see Barrow, Anglo-Norman Era, 161.
not play a significant part in local military organisation and that this role was performed by the nobles.¹⁰⁹ Meanwhile, sixteenth-century evidence shows that local lords were responsible for leading their tenants to war. In 1541 James V instructed the men of the barony of Menzies to accompany Robert Menzies of that Ilk ‘reddy bodin in feir of weir’ for the defence of the realm.¹¹⁰ As part of the landholding system, tenants owed military service to their lords and faced punishment if they did not meet these obligations. The court held in the barony of Carnwath in 1523 ruled that men who failed to appear for war against England would have ‘all thair geir escheat to my lord thairselfis to be put fortht of the baronie without ony fauroris.’¹¹¹ Yet evidence from the campaign of 1523 also shows that sheriffs played an important role in the local mobilisation of the common army. Indeed, sheriffs were instrumental to the process as they broadcast the proclamations summoning men to the army. Furthermore, sheriffs and other local officials and lords organised wappinshawings and ensured that men were ready for war.¹¹² Wappinshawings were still


¹¹¹ _The Court Book of the Barony of Carnwath, 1523—1542_, ed. W. C. Dickinson, Scottish History Soc. (Edinburgh, 1937), 165. See also _ibid._, 75, 113—4. This method of military mobilisation was still used in seventeenth-century Scotland: ‘Extracts from the court books of the baronies of Skene, Leys, and Whitehaugh, 1613—1687’, _Miscellany of the Spalding Club_, 5 vols (Aberdeen, 1841—52), v. 227. For the bonds of manrent between lords and men which underpinned these military obligations, see Jenny Wormald, _Lords and Men in Scotland: Bonds of manrent, 1442—1603_ (Edinburgh, 1985), esp. 91—114.

¹¹² For sheriffs and military mobilisation, see _Sheriff Court Book of Fife, 1515—1522_, ed. W. C. Dickinson, Scottish History Soc. (Edinburgh, 1928), pp. xli—xliii; _The Register of the Privy
irregular events in the early sixteenth century but the council gave instructions to local officials in June 1522 ‘for the wappinschawing our all the Realme’. These instructions were enacted in at least some localities. Moreover, as the officials holding the wappinschawings were required to send the chancellor ‘the stent roll and númer of all the bodin men within thare boundis’, Albany would have had a sense of the manpower available to him for an invasion of England. While there are no surviving muster lists detailing the number of men who attended wappinschawings in 1522, records from the 1540s provide an indication of the manpower that could be generated through the common army. Then it was reckoned that the forty-six lords and lairds of Dumfriesshire could provide 5,970 men, with a further 771 men coming from the seven lords of the stewartry of Kirkcudbright. Although these are only estimates, the survival of a muster role from the wappinshawing of 1541 in Annandale held by Lord Maxwell—which was attended by 1,312 men—confirms that a significant force could be raised this way. The Annandale muster role also

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_Goodare, State and Society, 136—7._

highlights the key role that the lairds played in raising men for the common army. For instance, the laird of Johnston brought one hundred tenants while the laird of Warmanbie brought sixteen.\footnote{Historical Manuscripts Commission, \textit{Fifteenth Report: Appendix, part viii (The Manuscripts of His Grace the Duke of Buccleuch and Queensberry Preserved at Drumlanrig Castle)} (London, 1897), 66. For the role of the lairds in raising men, see Duncan, \textit{Scotland}, 378—83. For the powers of the lairds, see M. M. Meikle, \textit{A British Frontier? Lairds and gentlemen in the eastern Borders, 1540—1603} (East Linton, 2004), 11—12.}

While several historians have maintained that earls were responsible for raising the common army by region, Alice Taylor has argued that by the thirteenth century the earls ‘were responsible only for the levy from the lands of their comitatus, not of the whole province’.\footnote{Taylor, \textit{Shape of the State}, 102—3 (more widely, 102—8). For the earls raising Scottish armies, see M. J. Strickland, ‘The kings of Scots at war, c. 1093—1286’, in Spiers \textit{et al.} (eds), \textit{Military History of Scotland}, 109—10; I. A. MacInnes, \textit{Scotland’s Second War of Independence, 1332—1357} (Woodbridge, 2017), 65; Alexander Grant, ‘Aspects of national consciousness in medieval Scotland’, in Claus Bjørn, Alexander Grant and K. J. Stringer (eds), \textit{Nationalism and Patriotism in the European Past} (Copenhagen, 1994), 89—92.} The evidence for Albany’s campaign shows that earls mobilised the common army across wider regions. In 1523 the council divided the kingdom into four quarters, each of which was given over to an earl: James Hamilton, earl of Arran, had the east, an area which extended from Teviotdale to Stirlingshire and included Lothian; John Stewart, earl of Lennox, had the west, which included his own powerbase in Lennox, Cunningham, Kyle and Carrick; Colin Campbell, earl of Argyll, was given responsibility for the Highlanders, while Alexander Gordon, earl of Huntly, was assigned the north, an area which in terms of military mobilisation normally began at the River North Esk.\footnote{BL, MS Cotton Caligula B vi. fo 449v, B iii. fo 60r \textit{(LP, iii. pt. 2. nos. 3368, 3404)}. It is not clear if the royal lands in the south-west and in Fife were treated separately from these divisions, or if they fell under the authority of Lennox and Huntly as lieutenants of the west and the north.} In many ways these men
were unlikely companions in arms as they were often involved in violent struggles for power. In the years following the campaign of 1523 Arran took a leading role in schemes against Albany and was involved in the murder of Lennox. Yet Albany displayed great skill at bringing together these men for national military campaigns, which again suggests that his invasion of England was supported widely by the political elite.\textsuperscript{120} Certainly, earls played a key role in mobilising the army in 1523, working with sheriffs and other local officials in their regions.\textsuperscript{121} The role of the earls was particularly important where royal authority was weakest, notably the Highlands. This meant that the earls of Argyll and Huntly played important roles in organising the military power of their regions during the war with England. When in May 1523 the council began to prepare the kingdom to resist the English invasions of the Borders which had begun in the previous month, it nominated Huntly to take charge of the mobilisation of men from the lands north of the River North Esk while Argyll was to do the same in the Highlands, roles assigned to these men again in October for the invasion of England.\textsuperscript{122}

The use of the earls to orchestrate the military mobilisation of wider regions was not specific to the campaign of 1523 and it formed an important element in the formation of armies, particularly when the crown needed to raise an especially large force or keep the army in the field for a prolonged period. For instance, the ordinance calling out the army which was issued in October 1515 by the earl of Arran stated that the ‘schyris of this realm [were] to be dividit in four partis’, each of which was put under the control of a major lord (the earls of Argyll, Lennox and Eglington, and Lord Fleming). Instead of forming one large army, the four areas were rotated so that each served for a month consecutively, which provided the governor with access to an army beyond the customary maximum period of forty days service (Kings had also used this method in the twelfth

\textsuperscript{120} All four earls also accompanied Albany when he took Tantallon castle from the Douglases in 1522 (Pinkerton, \textit{History}, ii. 211—12); Emond, \textit{Minority}, 146.

\textsuperscript{121} NRS, E21/18, fo 27r.

\textsuperscript{122} NRS, CSS/33, fos 198r—v.
and thirteenth centuries to keep armies in the field for a prolonged period). In 1523, however, Albany called all four parts out simultaneously to fight in one campaign. Men were to assemble for by 19 October at various muster points: the Highlanders at Glasgow; the northerners at Edinburgh; men coming from the west at Moffat and those from the east at Lauder. Yet it is unlikely that this decision was a major factor in Albany’s failure to mobilise fully the common army. Many of the problems he encountered in 1523 sprung from issues which lay outwith his control. While he left it late in the year to prepare the campaign, this was largely the fault of Francis I who waited until the harvest had been gathered in France before sending his soldiers to Scotland. Although this ensured that Francis could send supplies too, it left Albany with little time to raise a large army drawn from all parts of the kingdom.

Although Albany’s invasion of England was unsuccessful, a study of his campaign enhances our understanding of military mobilisation and regency rule in sixteenth-century Scotland. In particular, Albany’s inability to raise the common army was probably a consequence of a wider

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123 NRS, CS5/27, fo 81v. For the rotation of armies in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries, see Strickland, ‘Kings of Scots at war’, 110. This system of quarters was used again in 1558 for the march on Wark (Blakeway, ‘War of 1558’, 213).

124 NRS, CS5/34, fo 18r; BL, MS Cotton Caligula B vi. fo 449v; B iii. fo 60r; B ii. fo 257r; B vi. fo 364v (LP, iii. pt. 2. nos. 3368, 3404, 3409, 3438, 3466).

125 The early onset of winter was another factor over which again Albany had no control. Heavy rain and snow made it difficult to travel, while the Tweed was swollen and dangerous to cross. Informing Henry VIII on 4 Nov. of Albany’s departure from Wark, Howard noted that it was the ‘mooste fulle’ and coldest weather ‘that I have seen’ and stated that he hoped that news of Albany’s departure was true because it would be hard to keep the army together longer at the ‘unreasonable tyme of the yere’ in such ‘foule’ weather (BL, MS Cotton Caligula B ii. fo 179r [LP, iii. pt. 2. no. 3508]). For the effect of the weather, see BL, MS Cotton Caligula B vi. fo 376v (LP, iii. pt. 2. no. 3421).
view that as regent he lacked the necessary jurisdiction to invade England. George Buchanan’s account of Albany’s failure to invade England in the early 1520s, while problematic, focuses on discussions regarding the rights of a regent to launch foreign invasions. Buchanan had the nobles declare unanimously that military actions should be contained to defence during a royal minority.\textsuperscript{126} It is worth noting that Buchanan was writing in the 1560s, not long after another attack on Wark, in 1558. On that occasion, the Scottish army refused to invade England and instead remained a defensive force, and questions were raised about the authority of the regent (Marie de Guise) to invade England.\textsuperscript{127}

A study of Albany’s campaign of 1523 also highlights the contemporary understanding of military service. As the common army was principally summoned to defend the realm from foreign invasion, there was probably reluctance for men to fight in England.\textsuperscript{128} Wappinshawings were held with the purpose of gathering the ‘fensabill men according to the custowme of his landis to defend within the contry and the schyris heirabut’, while the bonds of manrent (which underpinned the relations between lords and tenants necessary to the formation of the common army) also drew a distinction between defence and offence when it came to military service.\textsuperscript{129} While Albany was successful in persuading the great lords to fight with him, the number of men raised by this method alone was not sufficient to launch a major invasion of England. Albany’s main failure in 1523 was that he failed to persuade the lower nobles to join him. This was a major problem for rulers seeking

\textsuperscript{126} Buchanan, \textit{History}, ii. 281. See also Leslie, \textit{Historie}, ii. 189.

\textsuperscript{127} Blakeway, ‘War of 1558’, 204. On increasing restrictions placed on the powers accorded to regents from Albany to Marie de Guise, see Blakeway, \textit{Regency}, 193—5.

\textsuperscript{128} In thirteenth century Scottish kings had raised the common army to invade England but, as noted in Barrow, ‘Army of Alexander III’, 137, it was ‘limited to invasions of territory over which the Scottish crown claimed lordship’.

\textsuperscript{129} Cited in Goodare, \textit{State and Society}, 138.
to recruit large numbers because the mobilisation of the common army depended on lords raising their tenants.

The problems of raising the common army for offensive purposes which were emerging in the 1520s were faced by successive rulers throughout the sixteenth century, including kings. While James V was able to mobilise the common army to defend the kingdom in 1542, when he wanted to launch an invasion of England he had to raise a second army composed of the retinues of his nobles (a situation which stood in contrast to what his father had been able to achieve three decades earlier when he invaded England with an army of perhaps 20–30,000 men).\textsuperscript{130} Moreover, there were mass desertions in response to the call to arms for the war against England throughout the 1540s.\textsuperscript{131} While historians have often attributed the mobilisation problems which rulers encountered during the Rough Wooings to religious and political differences, an examination of Albany’s campaign shows that these problems were already apparent decades earlier and cannot simply be ascribed to the development of confessional politics.\textsuperscript{132} While the common army continued to be used in the reign of James VI, similar problems resurfaced.\textsuperscript{133} In 1596, for instance, the ‘haill gentilmen and fre halderis’ of the sheriffdom of Edinburgh and others stayed away from the host which meant that their tenants were absent too.\textsuperscript{134}

\textsuperscript{130} Cameron, \textit{James V}, 300—9.

\textsuperscript{131} Dickinson, ‘Scottish army’, 144; Mackie, ‘Flodden’, 43. There had been desertions when James IV invaded England in 1513 but these came after he had already captured border castles and when men in the common army may have believed that their mandatory period of service was complete (Macdougall, \textit{James IV}, 273).

\textsuperscript{132} For the desertions of the 1540s as a consequence of the religious and political divisions of the mid-sixteenth century, see Phillips, \textit{Anglo-Scots Wars}, 60.

\textsuperscript{133} Goodare, \textit{State and Society}, 159—60

\textsuperscript{134} Cited in Goodare, \textit{State and Society}, 136.
Overall, the Anglo-Scottish war of the early 1520s marked the beginning of a series of major
difficulties faced by successive rulers in raising armies to campaign in England. Still, the problems
of military recruitment evident in Scotland were evident elsewhere too, even in England. Musters
akin to Scottish wappinshawings remained in use across sixteenth-century Europe and, while
English soldiers (unlike Scots) were paid, the Tudor army of the 1520s was raised according to
‘quasi-feudal’ methods not dissimilar to those deployed in Scotland.\(^{135}\) During the war of the 1520s
commanders such as Dacre and Howard encountered major problems in mobilising northern
Englishmen to defend the frontier. Yet whereas the English adapted to these problems by
introducing new methods based on county levies, Scotland maintained its reliance on the tenant-
lord system for much longer and it was not until the early seventeenth century that contract armies
in the direct employ of the state began to supplant the crown’s customary reliance on the unpaid
common army.\(^{136}\)

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\(^{135}\) Gunn, *English People at War*, 56—61, 138; S. J. Gunn, David Grummitt and Hans Cools, *War,
*State and Society in England and the Netherlands*, 1477—1559 (Oxford, 2007), 98; J. J. Goring,
‘The General Proscription of 1522’, *English Historical Review* 86 (1971) 681—705; J. J. Goring,