
In debates about the role(s) and scale of entrepreneurial philanthropy in democracies, scholars discuss the erosion of distinctive public and private spheres and interests, and the replacement of the public sphere. This has occurred at the expense of public deliberation and participation, in favour of the reification of individuals and the role of experts/expertise. Drawing upon John Dewey’s *The Public and Its Problems* (1927/2016), I argue that there is an eclipse of the publicity of the public. This informs my case for the (re)conceptualization of philanthropy as a public, characterized by: (i) the philanthropist as a social rather than an atomistic being; (ii) the philanthropy-state dynamic and the publics’ claims; and (iii) part of the radical vision of philanthropy. To ensure that private and public have analytical and practical resonance, it is imperative to (re)frame and (re)conceptualize what these concepts mean to entrepreneurial philanthropy and for its role in democracies.

Keywords: Entrepreneurial philanthropy, John Dewey, public, private
In an era of elite entrepreneurial philanthropy, the ‘great dichotomy’ between public and private appears weak and it is subject to challenge (Bobbio 1989, p.1). The concepts of public and private are part of debates about the role(s) and scale of entrepreneurial philanthropy in modern democracies. Entrepreneurial philanthropy is defined as ‘the pursuit by entrepreneurs on a not-for-profit basis of big social objectives through active investment of their economic, cultural, social and symbolic resources’ (Harvey et al. 2011, p.428). It is characterized by transformational philanthropic giving infused with business acumen, partnership-working and return-on-investment (Maclean et al 2021). As a form of ‘conscience capitalism’, which embraces the philanthropic-capitalist “mantra” that capitalism and philanthropy are mutually complementary (Bishop and Green 2008), entrepreneurial philanthropy is implicated in the advance of neoliberalism (Maclean et al 2021; Farrell 2015). The efforts of high net-worth individuals’ philanthropy derive a legitimacy from the conflation of wealth and expertise, bolstered by the celebration and reification of their philanthropy (Haydon et al 2021; McGoey and Thiel 2018; Rojek 2014). This is complemented by the resourcing of philanthropic foundations with experts, often with corporate experience who are tasked with the development of market-based, standardized and/or scientific measurable solutions to social problems (Haydon et al 2021, p.362; Schurman 2018; Fejerskov and Rasmussen 2016). In this environment, differences between public and private interests are undermined to legitimize the range of social and economic benefits of philanthropic engagement to individuals and corporations (Patil 2021; Bernholz 2020; McGoey 2012; Mitchell and Sparke 2016).

Scholars also raise concerns about the replacement of the public sphere. Horvath and Powell (2016, pp.89-93) coin the term ‘disruptive philanthropy’ to capture how philanthropy “disrupts” the nature and frequency of public deliberation and debate as donors set the parameters of social and political discourse. In areas such as research in higher education and school reform, philanthropists decide what issues/areas need attention and resources, and how they should be addressed (ibid., pp.101-105). In educational development, Patil (2021) discusses philanthropists’ use of networks and resources to undermine state provision, democratic mechanisms, and input from civil society. Similarly, elite, expert-led networks and initiatives that are funded by philanthropy may reduce the diversity of voices

This range of existing scholarship suggests that entrepreneurial philanthropy has negative implications for the publicity of the public; that is, it crowds out plural spaces for debate, deliberation and collective problem-solving and persuasion (Patil 2021; Haydon et al 2021; Bernholz 2020; McGoey and Thiel 2018; Schurman 2018; Thompson 2018; Horvath and Powell 2016; Mitchell and Sparke 2016; Fejerskov and Rasmussen 2016; Rojek 2014). However, despite the unprecedented global scale of entrepreneurial philanthropy and calls for the pluralization of the concept of philanthropy (Fowler and Mwathi-Mati 2019), the concepts of public and private receive limited attention in the literature. Fernandez and Hager (2014) discuss the predominance of the United States-based legal/regulatory ‘hegemonic’ public-private dichotomy. Studies also analyse the private (donor-impulse) or public functions (purposes) of philanthropy as part of the publicness of philanthropy (Goodsell 2017; Brody and Tyler 2012; Frumkin 2006). Alternatively, there is a type of boundary-work (Gieryn 1983) that envisages the public as a phenomenon in need of protection from philanthropy’s encroachment (Saunders-Hastings 2018, pp.156-157). Moreover, scholars unpack public and private as part of the ‘living tradition’ of philanthropy, particularly over the course of the twentieth century (Payton 1988; Karl and Karl 1999; Karl and Katz 1981). Against this background, it is imperative to address the meaning(s) of public and private in a way that encapsulates the contingency of these concepts as part of critical assessments of the role and impact of entrepreneurial philanthropy. The over-riding contribution of this article is that it takes on this task, lest these concepts become ambiguous, lacking resonance or at worst analytically defunct. To this end, the article addresses scholarship in philanthropy which is concerned about the publicity of the public. Furthermore, it explores how attention to the publicity of the public can inform the conceptualization of public and private for the analysis of entrepreneurial philanthropy in democracies.
The discussion of public and private is also central to debates about the future of philanthropy in the wake of the COVID-19 pandemic. Debates about whether and how philanthropy serves the public good rather than private interest(s) were amplified during the pandemic (Finchum-Mason et al 2020; Orensten and Buteau 2020). Studies of grantmaking during the pandemic discuss the salience (and success) of collaborative relationships with grantees rooted in trust and a mutual understanding of issues and needs (Hampton et al 2023; Powell 2023; Kraeger 2022). To ensure that these discussions remain pertinent, the concepts of public and private must be useful to practitioners’ efforts to develop innovative and alternative ways of “doing” philanthropy. To maintain the momentum surrounding debates about how to better understand and engage with the communities they serve, we need to equip those at the forefront of these efforts with concepts of public and private that underline the salience of the publicity of the public to philanthropy.

My approach is to draw upon John Dewey’s work, The Public and Its Problems (1927/2016) as a framework for the discussion of the concepts of public and private as they pertain to entrepreneurial philanthropy. The Public and Its Problems has three principal themes, which I use to organize the discussion: (i) a critique of liberalism and individualism and (ii) the role of technocratic expertise in democracies. These two themes constitute the problems that are core to the third and overarching theme; (iii) the eclipse of the publicity of the public.¹ In this article, I develop the argument that there is an eclipse of the publicity of the public in entrepreneurial philanthropy, which informs my case for the conceptualization of philanthropy as a public. This can be unearthed via inquiry into private and public as conceptualized by Dewey in The Public and Its Problems (1927/2016). Dewey’s conception of private and public underlines the consequences of human action(s) (Dewey 1927/2016, pp.66-67). An act is private when its consequences are limited to the specific parties involved in the action, but he specifies that private acts may be social in character and consequences. Dewey did not write extensively about philanthropy, but in The Public and Its Problems he acknowledges philanthropy as a private act. Dewey specifies that philanthropic giving can also be social in character and consequence(s) because the gift may affect the fortunes or well-being of a community (Dewey 1927/2016, pp.67-68). The
consequences of the gift are such that they do not require ‘control’, neither ‘by inhibition [n]or by promotion’ by external parties. Dewey’s critique of individualism and classical liberalism is implied in his conception of private; specifically, its depiction of individuals as atomistic transactional beings. (Dewey 1927/2016, p.69). This implies that individuals have natural rights and form interests independently and in isolation from each other. The social contract denotes how individuals voluntarily enter into association and transaction with each other to serve these interests. They accept that government has a role in the protection of their rights and interests (Evans 2000, pp.310-311; Dewey 1927/2016, pp.124-130).

According to Dewey, the individual develops as the result of the range of interactions and associations in society (Evans 2000, p.311). The consequences of these interactions are that individuals can fulfil their own interests but also come to recognize how these interests affect others and/or may be dependent on their cooperation (Rogers 2016, p.5). Dewey argues that a public is born when interpersonal associations give rise to the articulation of ‘indirect consequences’; that is, expansive consequences beyond those immediately party to the association and/or require concerted intervention or support, for example, from the state (Dewey 1927/2016, p. 78; p.107). The use of a rather than the public is significant. Dewey conceptualizes the public as a pluralistic phenomenon which arises out of multiple, deliberative publics. It is a fluid space that is constituted by deliberation and debate, and thus not delimited by boundaries, roles and expectations (Rogers 2016, pp.34-37). The state represents the organization of the public (Dewey 1927/2016, p.78-82). This implies that the publics’ claims and interests constitute and delimit the state, but the concept of the public is not limited to singular, fixed designations of a state.

The first part of the article elaborates on *The Public and Its Problems* (1927/2016). Part two discusses individualism, expertise and his conception of the public to frame and inform the discussion of public and private in relation to entrepreneurial philanthropy. I explore the individualism at the heart
of entrepreneurial philanthropy which reflects the individualist perspective on publicness from classical liberalism. I show how this legitimizes the individual-cum-philanthropist and enables entrepreneurial philanthropy to reconstitute the activities and relationships of the private and public domains. In tandem, there is the conflation of wealth and expertise which crowds out space for the deliberation and contestation that enable the claims and interests of a plurality of publics to be heard. My critique of individualism and expertise explicates how entrepreneurial philanthropy has expansive consequences that extend beyond those party to, or the ancillary beneficiaries of a philanthropic relationship. I do not wish to suggest that philanthropy is no longer conceptualized as private in character. The philanthropic impulse is intrinsic to the moral conscience of the individual, which Dewey was predisposed to respect and to protect (Mills 1964/1966, p.432; Cohen 1988, p.321). Moreover, private conceptions of philanthropy spurn inquiry into the personal and social motivations and ethics that drive the entrepreneurial philanthropic impulse (Harvey 2021; Harvey et al. 2011). Notwithstanding, my discussion shows how the expansive consequences of philanthropy have negative implications for the publicity of the public; that is, how they sideline plural spaces for debate, deliberation and collective problem-solving and persuasion. Drawing on this discussion, and contra Dewey, to redress the eclipse of the publicity of the public evident in my critique of individualism and the role of experts I make the case for the (re)conception of philanthropy as a public.
John Dewey, the Public and Its Problems

John Dewey (1859-1952) was a philosopher and writer who developed a radical view of democracy over the course of his writings on democracy, education and inquiry (Simich and Tilman 1978, p.419). The Public and Its Problems (1927/2016) represents the culmination of Dewey’s early thinking on democracy; thus, it is prior to the emergence of his radical perspective (Selk and Jörke 2019, p.38). My focus on The Public and Its Problems belies the vast scope of Dewey’s thinking; comparisons between Dewey and other scholars such as Habermas (Selk and Jörke 2019, p.36); and prominent critiques such as that of C. Wright Mills (Mills 1964/1966). I do not intend to engage in a defence of Dewey’s work and thinking, but rather to contribute to scholarship which takes stock of how influential thinkers prompt reflection that illuminates prescient issues and debates in the field of philanthropy (Reich 2019, pp.24-64; Fischer 1995).

I was drawn to The Public and Its Problems because there are prescient similarities between the problems that pre-occupied Dewey in the early twentieth century and the early twenty-first century. Dewey (1927/2016, pp.150-152) grappled with citizens’ concerns about the evolution of democracy; specifically, the sense of disconnection that many felt from impersonal, remote bureaucracies and democratic representatives. He also discussed the negative implications of the rising oligarchic power of economic interests over democratic processes of deliberation and debate in politics and society (Dewey 1927/2016, pp.138-139). In the twenty-first century, scholars express similar concerns about the contingency of public and private in relation to entrepreneurial philanthropy in the context of neo-liberalism (Maclean et al 2021; Bernholz 2020; Thompson 2018; Horvath and Powell 2016; McGoey 2012). Critical perspectives discuss how neo-liberal ideas and practices are engaged in the re-configuration of models of politics, economics and society, which leave many people stigmatized and alienated (Hall 2011). The economic and social disparities revealed by the COVID-19 pandemic have thrown a spotlight on how to incorporate deliberation and a concern for systemic (in)equities into the roles and practices of philanthropy in democracies (Kraeger 2022; Finchum-Mason et al 2020; Orensten and Buteau 2020). The Public and Its Problems offers a framework that prompts intellectual curiosity.
about what public and private mean to entrepreneurial philanthropy, and for its role in modern democracies. Dewey attributed the eclipse of the publicity of the public to: (i) the primacy that classical liberalism awards to the atomistic individual, which undermines the importance and benefits of (social) engagement(s) in democracies; and (ii) the role and prominence of experts, which usurps the potential for a range of voices and opinions to inform debate in a democracy. According to Dewey, the dearth of actually-existing relationships between publics is ‘the problem of the public’; the concept of the public is the third theme for discussion (Dewey’s emphasis) (Dewey 1927/2016, p.225; Asen 2003, pp.176-178).

**Individualism**

The concept of liberalism has a complex and diverse trajectory (Bell 2014). Individualism is associated with classical liberalism and the ideas Dewey critiqued are reflected in the individualist perspective on publicness (Benn and Gaus 1983). This suffices to orient the basic conceptions of private and public that were problematic to Dewey (see Bell 2014, p. 684; Weintraub 1997, p.4, fn5; Gaus, 1983, p.198).

The individualist description of publicness has an underpinning dichotomous distinction between the public domain of the state and the private domain of the market, which ‘restricts the scope of human activity exclusively to economic activity on the assumption of individual autonomy’ (Pesch 2008, p.83). Privateness is that which pertains to a particular person or the aggregation of the interests of individuals and private associations between private persons. The formation of social networks and connections between ‘specifiable individuals’ means that their transactions take on abstract identities and characteristics in the private domain. Thus, voluntary, self-interested engagement in the market is the basis upon which notions of what is ‘non-governmental’, ranging from ‘private sector’ to ‘market economy’ to ‘civil society’ may emerge and be understood (Weintraub 1997, p.8; Benn and Gaus 1983, p.41). To regulate any conflict that emerges between autonomous individuals, or indeed to resolve it via coercion, and to protect the ‘conscience and projects’ of individuals, the political or governmental domain emerges as an ‘attribute to society’, that is, of the “not private public”. This is institutionalized in the form of the state (Benn and Gaus 1983, pp.35-41).
Dewey’s efforts to reframe, or “reconstruct” the individual as a social rather than atomistic, market-transactional being, in turn, informs the exercise of liberty. He articulates this as: ‘that secure release and fulfilment of personal potentialities which take place only in rich and manifold association with others.’ It is also complementary to the realization of equality which he characterizes as: ‘the unhampered share which each individual member of the community has in the consequences of associated action’ (Dewey 1927/2016, p.66; p.177; Mills 1964/1966, pp.432-436). Dewey advanced a conception of the individual which would protect ‘the individual moral conscience’ (Cohen 1988, p.321) whilst also exploring the circumstances under which individuals gain knowledge and understanding based on associations and communications with others (Dewey 1927/2016, p.183; Hossler and Jenness 2019; Evans 2000). For example, Seigfried (1999) discusses the connections between Dewey and Jane Addams and the Hull House Settlement (Seigfried 1999, p.212). Similar to Dewey’s emphasis on the social context of an individual’s engagements in society, in her conception of social ethics, Addams interpreted Hull House as the embodiment of the responsibilities of citizens in democracies; shaped by people’s experiences based on social justice and citizenship (Fischer 1995, p.287).

Dewey’s conception of the social being encapsulates the salience of association and ‘associational life’ that is used by scholars to define the (contested) concept of civil society and to explore its impact on social participation and pluralism in democracies (Rogers 2016, p.35; see, Dewey 1927/2016, pp. 96-97). Dewey orient the contestability of the concept of civil society to how associational life may be shaped and indeed limited in terms of domains of activity by the individualist perspective on publicness. In contrast to the individualist perspective, Dewey argued against the “hypostatization” of public and private as this may lead to anticipations of behaviours and the designation of some issues as either private or public (Selk and Jörke 2019, p.38; Asen 2003, pp.179-180). Moreover, I posit that the distinctive orientation of Dewey’s thinking in his critique of individualism comes into play when we consider that the space of the public is neither civil society nor
the state. Rather, it is the space for deliberation and debate that shapes and informs, whilst simultaneously being open to being shaped and informed by interpersonal associations and associational life (see Rogers 2016, p.37).iii Dewey underlines that this requires that there is no usurpation of opportunities for individuals to share their perspectives and views in debate and dialogue with others.

Experts and the Public

A prominent role for experts in democratic societies, and indeed a deference to their ideas prevents the blossoming and vibrancy of the space of the public. The publication of The Public and Its Problems occurred in the context of Dewey’s debate about democracy with journalist and political analyst Walter Lippmann (1889-1974). Lippmann looked to the ostensible intellectual superiority of experts to shape the future of democracy. Dewey was particularly concerned about the conflation of intellectual and political authority in such figures (Rogers 2016, pp.26-27). First, Dewey’s concern for the public is rooted in the replacement of the aristocracy with an economic class and the concomitant rise in the righteousness of the expert. He argued that this new class is constantly evolving and reliant on the promises of science and technology, which it uses to bolster and justify the management of social problems (Dewey, 1927/2016, p.221). Second, experts may be defined by the technicality of their intellect, which is instrumental in the discovery and communication of the factual information that informs policies. However, the framing of the problem which creates the need for such policies should come from citizens and their experiences, brought out through methods and processes of cooperation and exchange (Dewey 1927/2016, p.224; Rogers 2016, pp.28-30). Thus, third, Dewey conceded to Lippmann that the structures and scale of needs in modern societies required experts, but the onus is on them to discover not to dictate; to draw upon the ‘embodied intelligence’ of people and their experiences (Dewey 1927/2016, p.225). Mills criticized Dewey’s vision of cooperative inquiry and deliberation because it belies the struggle that is part and parcel of political action and debate, and the command and influence elites exercise in democratic societies (Campbell 1995, pp.235-249; Simich and Tilman 1978, pp.420-422). However, through the lens of the (re)conceptualization of the public, I posit that it is possible to orient inquiry to how elites can be part of the debate and dialogue that reframes their role(s)
and purpose(s). This can, in turn, form part of the discussion about their power and position in societies, including their use of/command of expertise; not as private interests that require protection from the state, but rather as publics in conversation with other publics as part of the public.

The Public

The significance of Dewey’s critique of individualism and the role of experts is that it informs his (re)conceptualization of the public as much as it contests classical liberal depictions of the private. The public is a space of the plurality borne in and shaped by the range of interpersonal associations we have with each other. The state is the organization or constitution of the interests and needs that require ‘systematic care’, formed in deliberation, debate and persuasion by/amongst publics as part of the public. The state, its officials and its administrative and regulatory institutions, come about because it is needed and evolve as and when needed; that is, when the indirect consequences of certain interactions in society are such that individuals cannot provide the types of specific actions necessary to regulate and/or protect themselves and their interests (Dewey 1927/2016, p.67). Dewey uses this example: An appointment with a dentist or doctor is a private transaction between two individuals, but when the practice of medicine is viewed holistically as a profession, the regulation of the profession becomes a public issue (Dewey 1927/2016, p.97). The individualism of classical liberalism presupposes particular roles and boundaries for the individual and the state. The eschewal of these assumptions by Dewey leads him to articulate public and private as ‘fluid categories constructed in social interaction [debate, discussion, deliberation] and subject to historical transformation [thus, likely to change and evolve over time]’ (ibid., p.176). The fluidity of private and public is also dependent on improvements to the circumstances of, and approaches to how we debate, discuss and persuade others. The consequences of interpersonal associations, produced by methods of debate, deliberation, association and persuasion demarcate what is private and what is public. Notwithstanding, any demarcation is fluid and evolves on the wave of further deliberation and articulation of demands and interests, including those that require the organization of the state. Thus, Dewey states that:
‘There is no sharp and clear line which draws itself, pointing out beyond peradventure, like the line left by a receding high tide, just where a public comes into existence which has interests so significant that they must be looked after and administered by special agencies, or governmental officers. Hence, there is often room for dispute. The line of demarcation between actions left to private initiative and management and those regulated by the state has to be discovered experimentally.’ (Dewey 1927/2016, p.107).

It is important to acknowledge that Dewey’s tangible solution to the problem of the eclipse of the publicity of the public is the Great Community, which has been the subject of criticism and debate. (Dewey 1927/2016, pp.171-205). Dewey underlines the potential of person-to-person communication in a locale, which is buoyed by social scientific insights and knowledge; ‘full publicity’ constitutes the emergence and articulation of the public (ibid., p.190; pp.228-229; see Selk and Jörke 2019, p.38; Asen 2003, p.183; Mansbridge 1998; Cohen 1988). C. Wright Mills (1964/1966, pp.436-440) criticised the incremental rather than revolutionary character of intelligent action(s) and intellectual scholarship proscribed by Dewey in The Public and Its Problems (1927/2016). Asen (2003, p. 186) notes the singular and homogenous undertones of the Great Community. My focus is on the conceptual and analytical value of public and private in The Public and Its Problems (1927/2016) which I draw upon to make the case for the conceptualization of philanthropy as a public in alignment with Dewey’s articulation of the concept of public.
Dewey, individualism and philanthropy

Dewey’s critical attention to the atomistic individual in classical liberalism is relevant to the exposition of individualism in entrepreneurial philanthropy. My proposition can be summarized as follows. The individualist perspective on publicness, based on a conception of individualism connected to Adam Smith is evident in entrepreneurial philanthropy. This is commandeered to legitimize and reify popular conceptions of entrepreneurial philanthropy as a phenomenon. In an oft-cited definition, Lester Salamon (1992, p.10) defines philanthropy as ‘the private giving of time, money and valuables (money, security, property) for public purposes’ (my emphasis). In entrepreneurial philanthropy, the “public purposes” served by philanthropy are re-conceived, commodified and individualized as part of the private sphere. Legal and regulatory obligations remain characteristic of the public domain. Hence, the emphasis is on the protection of the ‘conscience and projects’ of the individual-cum-philanthropist, incorporated in the foundation form, or indeed in the individual. Hay and Muller (2014, p.637) observe that many high net-worth philanthropists ‘might be regarded as ‘corporations’ in their own right.’ However, the public domain is re-conceived to further diminish the role(s) and presence of the state in favour of the self-regulating and self-serving capacity of philanthropists, which enables them to define the character of the public domain.

Entrepreneurial philanthropy reflects the principle(s) of differentiation between public and private in the individualist perspective on publicness. Specifically, it reflects the primacy of the individual and their interests, which can be freely and voluntarily expressed in transaction or connection with others, and/or incorporated in the case of philanthropy, in the individual or foundation form. McGoey (2012, p.191), McGoey and Thiel (2018, p.115) and Farrell (2015) discuss how the ‘antecedents’ of philanthrocapitalism, a form of entrepreneurial philanthropy can be found in the thinking of scholars such as Adam Smith (1723-1790). Thompson (2018, p.54) underlines how Smith stipulated free competition and attention to social justice as conditions for the success of the ‘invisible
hand’ of the market in the satisfaction of public welfare. Though he championed self-interest in commercial endeavours, which he saw as preferable to benevolence, he also underlined the natural inclinations which predispose individuals to the (mis)fortunes of others (Acs and Phillips 2002, p.190). The pursuit of self-interest by individuals, or rather, the interests of an aggregate of individuals incorporated in a commercial endeavour, is complementary to the reconstitution of wealth that serves the needs of others:

‘Not only is it unnecessary to “disguise” self-interest, this motivation is championed as the most justifiable motive for investing in poverty alleviation. Self-interest is not a threat to altruistic efforts to advance the public good. It is but rather a prerequisite. The assertion itself is not surprising; it resembles economic assumptions at least as early as Smith.’ (McGoey 2012, p.194).

The mutual complementarity of Adam Smith’s philosophy and philanthrocapitalism reveals the implications that individualism has for the conception of public and private in entrepreneurial philanthropy. First, the individual-cum-philanthropist is reified to the extent that the public good becomes conflated with individuals’ interests and approaches to philanthropy. For example, McGoey and Thiel (2018, p.119) discuss how the dynamic between charisma and modern philanthropy is predicated on the myth that ‘extreme wealth inevitably signifies personal ‘giftedness’ and therefore an acumen for ‘solving’ global problems’ (authors’ emphasis). Similarly, the celebrity-cum-philanthropist, or celanthropist uses their fame and profile to align themselves with places, organisations and causes to model and inspire others to “help”. Typically, they develop networks to advocate for technocratic solutions and resources to address problems, whilst simultaneously bolstering their own profiles. They fail to challenge dominant perpetrators of inequalities in global capitalist systems (Rojek 2014, p.134). Wilkins (2015, p. 177) discusses how prominent female celebrities such as Madonna, Oprah Winfrey and Angelina Jolie are glorified ‘as virtuous glamorous donors’. This belies the different ways in which their philanthropy, through support for particular projects and initiatives, champions neo-liberal ideas of individual empowerment and opportunity over an engagement with the structural obstacles and inequalities individuals face.
Second, from the perspective of the individualist description of publicness, philanthropy is part of the private domain, and represents the aggregation of the interests of individuals who wish to give philanthropically. It is oriented to the promotion of the atomistic individual who is also free to pursue what their conscience and interests desire in this jurisdiction. In entrepreneurial philanthropy, the commodification of the philanthropic relationship in this domain also implies connections between philanthropists and beneficiaries as ‘specifiable individuals’, or, in incorporated form, between foundations and “public purposes”. This, in turn, advances notions of the market economy and philanthropy as wholly part of the private domain. For example, Mitchell and Sparke (2016, pp.726-729) argue that those who benefit from (millennial) philanthropy are constituted as new ‘market subjects’ who have been let down by the failings of the state, and, arguably, also of non-profit organizations (Farrell 2015, p.266). In areas such as education, for instance, parent-led networks and other organizational support for education reform are bolstered by philanthropically-funded initiatives, which also, in parallel, court political and policymakers’ support. Competition for grants and other funding is encouraged to support philanthropically-driven initiatives such as charter schools. Rather than demand protection and action from the state for the challenges and failings of the education system, these networks and other stakeholders are, in turn, encouraged to align their demands and claims to market-based solutions, couched in the language of standardization, accountability and flexibility in education, and to take (individualised) responsibility for their own destiny (op. cit., pp.736-740).

Furthermore, there may be an openness, if not expectation that philanthropic efforts as part of partnerships and networks have the potential to reap direct economic benefits for an individual or company, for instance profit or a foothold in a market (Patil 2021; Ignatova 2017, p.2269; McGoey 2012). For instance, Ignatova (2017, p.2263) discusses the ‘donation’ of ‘pro-poor’ biotechnology (specific crops appropriate to local farmers and people’s diets) by the corporation Monsanto in Ghana (author’s emphasis). This agribusiness’s alignment to global philanthropic-led initiatives and partnerships to combat food security masks the potential this gives corporate actors to access new markets and build their reputation as leaders in this field. The argument above and the examples are presented here as part of a reframing of arguments that the distinction between public and private interests is being eroded by philanthrocapitalism. A critical view through the lens of the individualism
associated with Adam Smith and contemporaries shows that entrepreneurial philanthropy conspires to conceive philanthropy as an activity wholly immersed in the private domain.

According to the individualist description of publicness, the public is embodied in the political domain that comes about to regulate conflict, and/or protect the interests of individuals, encapsulated in the legal/regulatory hegemonic dichotomy (for example Fernandez and Hager, 2014). However, in entrepreneurial philanthropy, there is a semblance of artificiality attached to political oversight or input. According to Thompson (2018, pp.54-55) we come to define (if not accept) the interests of the philanthrocapitalist as the collective good as part of the ideology of philanthrocapitalism. Similar to McGoey (2012) she asserts that ‘private interest equals public interest’ (op. cit.). As outlined in the introduction, Horvath and Powell’s (2016, p. 89) discussion of disruptive philanthropy is informed by concerns that disruptive philanthropists are replacing the public sphere. They appear to have in mind here the sidelining of the public sector or ‘public provision’ (p. 92) and multi-stakeholder deliberative discussion, which carries the risk that philanthropy is viewed as more legitimate than the state (p.102; Reckhow et al., 2020 p.1474). Scholars also invoke the language of boundary-work (Gieryn 1983) to explore the changes that are afoot. Pressures to attract and then manage ‘mega-gifts’ from donors means that ‘university administrators operate within shifting organizational structures that blend public and private characteristics’ (Webb Farly and Olejarski 2020, p.526, my emphasis). Some authors speak of the disintegration of ‘traditional lines and demarcations [between] public, market and state’ as we consider the influence of ‘philanthropic governance’ (Ball and Olmedo 2011, p.88, my emphasis). There are concerns about how organizations are using legal mechanisms to ‘blur the lines’ between charity, politics and business (Bernholz 2020, p.7, my emphasis). The role of the state is reconfigured in public-private partnerships that include philanthropists:

‘The state’s role is rhetorically aggrandized as activist “stake-holder” but is practically diminished through becoming one of many partners in this patchwork quilt of complex alliances. 

It is further diminished vis-à-vis its traditional roles of social protection through regulation as regulation itself is
From the perspective of the individualist perspective on publicness, we can expect that what is public in relation to philanthropy is a minimal role for the state, save to protect the interests of individuals and regulate any conflict that arises between them as part of a clear division of the social realm (Pesch 2008, p.184). Exploring the contestability of the concept of the public good, Mansbridge (1998, p.5) argues that in unsettled environments powerful stakeholders use their position to manipulate and advance popular conceptions of phenomena. The orientation of philanthropy to the private domain marks its separation from the public domain. Yet its activities in the public domain are about the expansion of the private domain, encapsulated in the practices of atomistic individuals, beholden to their own interests and principles, aligned to those of the market. As the discussion above reveals, the scope and nature of the private realm has associations with Adam Smith, yet it is also appropriated to articulate a particular way of seeing (and doing) philanthropy. This, in turn, shapes how we come to think about private and public in relation to philanthropy. This is how Dewey’s attention to individualism provides an important context for the exposition of the primacy of the individual in entrepreneurial philanthropy.

**Philanthropy and the Expert**

Dewey wrote *The Public and Its Problems* (1927/2016) when the new-monied philanthropists of the early twentieth century put their faith and resources in experts, particularly in areas such as education, medical care and research to solve the pertinent social problems of their lifetime (Karl and Karl 1999, pp.53-58; Karl and Katz 1981). Thus, the influence that is exerted by foundations as a result of their connections with experts is not new. However, there is novelty in the (re)conception of the public good via the appropriation of expertise to justify and legitimize philanthropy’s activities and relationships as part of the private domain. The themes of power, method of inquiry and a need for balance, identified
by Dewey (1927/2016) are relevant here. The dynamics of expertise and philanthropy also complement the individualism that is emphasized by entrepreneurial philanthropy.

Entrepreneurial philanthropy and expertise go hand in hand as solutions based in science and the market are proffered as remedies to problems that are tackled by philanthropy (Haydon et al 2021, p.367; Edwards 2009). Building on my discussion of individualism; for example, ‘social issues are commodified to legitimize the role of businesses in providing market-compatible solutions; and development challenges are objectified in the search for standardizable solutions’ (op. cit.). Writing in 2009, Edwards (2009, p. 41) expressed the potential for philanthrocapitalism to amplify particular opinions and perspectives, at the expense of the democratization of global governance. Over ten years later, as foundations commandeer the role of expert in a neo-liberal context, their activities eclipse the publicity of the public. Wealth is conjoined with expertise to legitimate their actions, which serve narrow interests while ostensibly serving the ‘common good’ (Thompson 2018, pp.53-54). This is a common good which, to paraphrase Dewey (1927/2016), defers to their expertise by virtue of their claims that they are best placed to bear the burden of social responsibility. For example, Thomson (2019) discusses foundations’ leadership role in urban revitalization in a time of political and fiscal crisis, particularly in the Detroit Works/Detroit Future City Project. Although foundations are more likely than business to orient activities towards citizens’ needs, in the absence of meaningful engagement, they are also likely to pursue their own interpretations of solutions to citizens’ problems (ibid., p.566). Similarly, in international development cooperation, Fejerskov and Rasmussen (2016, p.844) discuss how Danish foundations’ proclivity for proactive, strategic approaches to grant-making, rather than traditional responsive practices, has led foundations to hire experts in specific areas. This represents ‘a radical shift from the traditional or conservative approach of serving the public good’ (Fejerskov and Rasmussen 2016, p.850, my emphasis). Furthermore, the engagement of philanthrocapitalists often occurs to the detriment of democratic participation/input on topics like the reform of education (Schurman 2018, p.188; Reckhow 2016; Rogers 2015, p.746). Foundations may operate strategically by investing in areas where there is unlikely to be opposition mobilized against
their activities (Finger 2018). Thus, it is imperative, as Dewey argues that we consider the method(s) of inquiry invoked by experts.

The “method(s) of inquiry” used by the foundation-cum-expert is informed by the rationalities of governance, notably the ‘technologies of agency’ (Dean 1999, p.167-168) invoked by non-state actors in neo-liberal global governance (Sending and Neumann 2006, p.657). This emphasizes practices, ideas and power as salient to unpacking the evolution of how we are governed (ibid., p.652). Schurman (2018, p.190) and Fejerskov and Rasmussen (2016, p.850) argue that beneficiaries are increasingly becoming like contractors. This denotes foundations’ extensive micro-management and direction of the grant process, especially at the stage of planning and development. Schurman (op. cit) discusses how grantees are open to working with foundations and their monitoring processes, but they feel beholden first and foremost to the foundation’s goals and strategies. However, an over-reliance on foundation-employees-as-experts and their in-house strategies sidelines, if silences beneficiaries’ knowledge and experiences. This creates a semblance of consensus rooted in consent, which obfuscates the ‘subordination and acquiescence’ that are commanded by the resources at the philanthrocapitalist’s disposal (Thompson 2018, p.56; Kohl-Arenas 2015). Examining relationships between philanthrocapitalist foundations and conservation groups in the Great Bear Forest, Tedesco (2015) discusses how the rationalities of neo-liberalism become embedded in the ‘agonistic relations’ fostered between foundations and conservationists. This, in turn, has implications for the (re)constitution of actors, processes and concepts ranging from conservation, to community, to democracy (Tedesco 2015, p.20). Philanthropic relationships have long encapsulated the problem of what Jane Addams coined as individual ethics; that is, hierarchical, unequal relationships where the individual-as-philanthropist thinks of their own needs and interests, rather than the experiences and injustices of those they seek to help (Fischer 1995, pp.288-289). A deference to experts in philanthropy further denies citizens the opportunity to shape the framework within which expertise operates. The ostensible social consequences of this activity, though it may be couched in terms of the roles and public purposes of
foundations (Reich 2019), is not constitutive of the social knowledge that Dewey felt was integral to the functioning of democracies.

Reflecting Dewey (1927/2016), the conflation of wealth and expertise in foundations’ activities and organizational cultures makes them the “new” cadre of experts who are directly implicated in governing. The constitution of expertise in relation to foundations as power and method of social inquiry suggests that they are reconstituting the social consequences of their activities, and hence, what is public about their work, on expertise that is technical and private in character and devoid of dialogue and engagement. Dewey seeks a balance between a role for experts and opportunities for the experiences and voices of the public(s). This requires a fundamental reconsideration of the concept of philanthropy as a public.

**Dewey and Philanthropy as a Public**

Drawing upon Dewey (1927/2016) and his conception of public, underpinned by the analysis I have presented above of individualism and the role of experts, I posit that we have a “problem of the public” in relation to entrepreneurial philanthropy. My argument for the conceptualization of philanthropy as a public is a response to the eclipse of the publicity of the public. This is evident in the atomistic individualism that characterizes the private domain and the ways in which the public domain is increasingly crafted in this image via the articulation and conduct of entrepreneurial philanthropy, including the alignment of philanthropy and expertise. My case for the articulation of philanthropy as a public is rooted in the exploration of the concepts of public and private so that our scholarship better reflects the fluidity and contingency of these concepts. This further informs my view that the problematization of public and private can inform debates about the conditions under which the (re)conceptualization of philanthropy as a public can enhance the publicity of the public, which I consider to organize my argument.
The first condition for the conceptualization of philanthropy as a public is that it requires a (re)conception of the atomistic individual and the consequences of philanthropic action(s). The conception of entrepreneurial philanthropy as a public articulates the philanthropist as a social being; as Dewey (1927/2016) suggests, buoyed by, and the beneficiary of interpersonal associations. This requires that we view the philanthropic individual (incorporated in the foundation) as ‘in process, as developing in the course of social interaction and by means of society’s facilities’ (Campbell 1995, p.164). The individualism at the core of entrepreneurial philanthropy is predicated on the atomistic individual, whose interests are protected, promulgated and reified. However, these interests have consequences that extend beyond the conduct of philanthropy and the exercise of a philanthropic impulse. Moreover, they are part of and follow on from the interpersonal associations of the philanthropist, or the foundation in its incorporated persona.

For example, McGoey and Thiel (2018, p.119) underline the significance of factors such as the social and familial networks at the disposal of the philanthropist, forms of capital derived from culture and symbolism, and courting by governments. The philanthrocapitalist’s position and significance is propelled and sustained by the economic, cultural and symbolic capital generated by a range of interpersonal associations (Shaw et al 2013, pp.588-595). The entrepreneurial philanthropist can turn their economic capital into symbolic capital; it may be argued that they are mutually complementary and reinforcing and contribute to the reconstitution of wealth in societies. To the contrary, scholars also argue that philanthropists commandeer their economic and symbolic capital to cement their hegemonic influence over beneficiaries in gift relationships, and at scale in the governance and politics of our social wellbeing (Morvaridi 2012, p.1194; Nickel and Eikenberry 2010; see, Bernholz 2020, p.19; Reich 2019; Saunders-Hastings 2018). These polarising perspectives reflect how the expansive consequences of philanthropy are already the focus of investigation and analysis. Notwithstanding, the conception of philanthropy as a public, rooted in interpersonal association(s) means that the focus of our inquiry is neither grounded in individualism, nor is it about the polarised defence/protection or wholesale critique of the consequences of philanthropic associations. Rather, the conception of philanthropy as a public represents a reframing of philanthropy as a phenomenon with expansive consequences that shape and
inform the pluralistic space of debate, deliberation and persuasion that constitutes the public. It is simultaneously shaped by the public too and recognises the significance of the range of interpersonal associations to the constitution of philanthropy.

This conception of philanthropy envisages it as open to the exploration of the conditions, dynamics and relationships that contest issues of power and hegemony, by bringing the publicity of the public into its work. Conceptually and analytically, this articulates civil society-as-associational life in a fluid, experimental dynamic with philanthropy. The dynamic is oriented to the consequences of the expression and manifestation of the pluralism of interests; rather than one which is limited by boundaried roles and expectations of what are private and public domains. There is a practical dimension to Dewey’s social conception of individuality, that, in this case the philanthropist or (in incorporated form, the foundation) may reflect on the social fluidity of public and private; how philanthropic impulses are intrinsic to them but are also affected by a range of interpersonal associations and relationships that impact on others and may require their cooperation. As Hossler and Jenness (2019) discuss in relation to The Cupertino Foundation’s role in a non-profit organization (The Fellowship Center), it may involve the reconfiguration of philanthropic relationships to mitigate donor control/dominance. The Cupertino Foundation embraced practices based on conversation and cooperation that gave back hope and confidence to an organization in crisis. Thus, the first condition for the conceptualization of philanthropy as a public is about the (re)consideration of what private and public mean to philanthropy. This embraces the contingency of these concepts, but it is specifically attuned to the exploration of the consequences of philanthropy, with an emphasis on those borne in/of the interpersonal association(s).

The second condition for the conceptualization of philanthropy as a public is to draw upon Dewey (1927/2016) to address questions about the indirect consequences entrepreneurial philanthropy has for the institutionalization of the claims of the public vis-à-vis the state. Categories of private and
public are formed (and reformed) as part of entrepreneurial philanthropy’s role in processes of
governing, policy and society as part of the ‘assemblage’ of the hegemonic neo-liberal project (Hall
2011, p.708; Sending and Neumann 2006). The language of ‘assemblage’ refers to instruments,
rationales and ideas which are encapsulated in market-oriented, self-regulating frameworks,
derpinned by ‘voluntarist’ public-private collaboration and self-motivated citizens (McCarthy and
Prudham 2004, pp.276-277). Dewey’s argument is that the state has a role in the institutionalization of
claims that require systematic care, articulated in the public as the space of deliberation, debate and
persuasion. This is downplayed, if manipulated by the individualism that underpins entrepreneurial
philanthropy. Rather, in place of associational life and inter-personal association(s), entrepreneurial
philanthropy bolsters the private as a realm of individual expression and interests, aligned to the market.
It propagates narratives about how the need for systematic care can be managed by entrepreneurial
individuals and initiatives. Echoing Farrell (2015, pp.267-268), the spaces of neo-liberalism represent
fertile ground for experimentation and discovery, and thus, for the articulation of the claims of
philanthropy as a public. However, individualism and the role of experts/expertise in the terrain of
entrepreneurial philanthropy undermines the plurality of interests and voices that are articulated in
spaces of deliberation and discussion that emerge through interpersonal associations and associational
life, if narrows the depth and scope of the terms of debate too. The result is that the philanthropist-as-
expert has the power to articulate the needs that require systematic care and in the absence of
deliberation, debate and discussion, to suggest that these needs are institutionalised in entrepreneurial
philanthropic-shaped forms. Drawing upon Dewey, a third condition for the conceptualization of
philanthropy as a public pertains to method(s) of deliberation, discussion and persuasion that can
remedy this eclipse of the public. The (re)conceptualization of philanthropy as a public can inform
debate about alternative ways of “doing” philanthropy too.

Reflective of Dewey’s vision of the Great Community, some attempts to address the eclipse of
the public in relation to philanthropy may have a locale-based dimension; for example, participatory
budgeting (MacKenzie 2020); grant-making practices that seek to mediate the hierarchy of
philanthropic relationships (Orensten and Buteau 2020); or as discussed above, context-specific practices based on co-operation and deliberation which aim to resolve a set of challenges facing an organization (Hossler and Jenness 2019). The incorporation of the full publicity of the public into the conception of philanthropy may also be part of a vision or set of principles which contest imbalances of power, for example, radical philanthropy. Dewey’s radicalism evolves through his later works, for example, Individualism: Old and New (1930), in the years that followed The Public and Its Problems (Simich and Tilman 1978). The conceptualization of the public in The Public and Its Problems may be part of a vision of radical philanthropy, though it is not conducive to a radical conception of philanthropy. Herro and Obeng-Odoom (2019, pp.884-885) identify several principles of radical philanthropy. Radical philanthropy’s commitment to inclusion and deliberation are conducive to the (re)conceptualization of philanthropy as a public because its principles are oriented to augmenting relationships between publics, the dearth of which was identified by Dewey as the problem of the public (Dewey 1927/2016, p.225). Radical philanthropy is characterized by an intersectional lens which prioritises the experiences of individuals as part of the articulation of the consequences of philanthropic action(s). The role of the state vis-à-vis the needs that require systematic care is part of deliberation and discussion. Radical philanthropy encompasses transformative, system-oriented goals. These suggest that this is a philanthropy intent on having consequences that can be projected beyond the immediate gift relationship. There are opportunities in the configuration of radical philanthropic relationships between giver and recipient for this relationship to encompass the experiences of a range of individuals/associations constitutive of the public, which can inform the character of a philanthropic public. This is a philanthropic public that is shaped by and composed of those who give and those who directly and indirectly “receive” as part of inclusive, experience-based and transformative-oriented processes. These principles and practices position philanthropy as a public amongst the plurality of publics. The conceptualization of philanthropy as a public does not become the public; it becomes part of it. The pace and process of change is incremental, much to Mills’s frustrations (1964/1966). Yet, to conceive of philanthropy as a public as part of debates about its transformative potential, grounds our intellectual curiosity about the roles and purposes of philanthropy in democracies in questions that are
neither driven nor shaped by particular agendas but based on how these debates can be the product of the publicity of the public.

**Conclusion**

This article drew upon John Dewey’s *The Public and Its Problems* (1927/2016) to discuss conceptions of private and public in entrepreneurial philanthropy. Drawing on the three pertinent themes in this work, which parallel themes in entrepreneurial philanthropy, I explored individualism and expertise in entrepreneurial philanthropy and considered their implications for the eclipse of the publicity of the public in entrepreneurial philanthropy. There is also debate about the absence of distinctions between public and private interests in philanthropy and the impact of philanthropy on public governance, policy and the publicity of the public domain. Yet, as I have shown, concepts of public and private are all but taken for granted and we rely on frameworks whose analytical usefulness is, at best, challenged by the contingency of entrepreneurial philanthropy and the wider neo-liberal context. A key implication of this article for future scholarship is to prompt critical reflection on the concepts that orient our arguments, and perhaps to be brave in re-assessments about how well they serve our analysis. This is salient to the development of the study of philanthropy, and timely too as prominent assessments of the field have appeared in recent years (Coule et al 2022; von Schnurbein et al 2021; Haydon et al 2021; Maclean et al 2021). To ensure the resonance of concepts especially in the fluid and contingent hegemonic neo-liberal environment, we need to embrace approaches to conceptualization that enhance our understanding of uncertainty. These approaches should enable us to engage in the analysis of the contingent implications of entrepreneurial philanthropy for democracies. This represents an additional, dynamic layer to acknowledging the contestability of a concept (Daly 2012). Rather, to unpack core concerns in the critical analysis of entrepreneurial philanthropy, in this instance the publicity of the public, we need to explore opportunities for reframing and (re)conceptualization. For the concepts of public and private we need to embrace frameworks, such as that offered by Dewey’s work, to provide in-depth analysis and reflection on what prevalent ideas and practices mean to and for entrepreneurial philanthropy in democracies.
The discussion in this article is timely too in the context of the COVID-19 pandemic as it shows how conceptions of public and private can feed into debate about the future of philanthropy, as well as critical reflection on its past too (Ornesten and Buteau 2020; Finchum-Mason et al 2020). Dewey provides a context for unpacking individualism and expertise in entrepreneurial philanthropy and their implications for the eclipse of the publicity of the public. This is important for civil society stakeholders’ engagement with donors and foundations as it can usefully inform discussion about deliberation and engagement as part of emerging debates (Kraeger 2022). The (re)conceptualization of philanthropy as a public provides a frame of reference for practitioners; to acknowledge the private impulse of the philanthropist, whilst not being beholden to it. Rather, it represents a pragmatic reframing of philanthropy that articulates the salience of public participation, debate and persuasion to the fore of the philanthropic relationship in democratic societies. It sets the terms of the conversation about the role(s) of entrepreneurial philanthropy and the philanthropic relationship as part of a symbiotic dynamic where all parties bring interests and claims to the table. If the philanthropic world is to show that it will learn long-term lessons from the inequalities revealed by COVID-19, in a wider context of neo-liberalism, then it will be crucial to equip donors, recipients and other stakeholders with the conceptual language and tools to discuss the role(s) of entrepreneurial philanthropy in democratic societies.

As an overarching framework, drawing upon Dewey (1927/2016), this paper argues for the (re)conceptualization of philanthropy as a public, characterized by (i) the philanthropist as a social rather than atomistic being; (ii) the philanthropy-state dynamic and the claims of the plural public; and (iii) part of a radical vision of philanthropy amongst a plurality of publics that shape the fluidity of the public. It would be trite to suggest that answers to the most prescient problems we face can be found in the scholarship and thinking of philosophers of the past. However, there are opportunities in this approach to further ground our field in political philosophical debates about democracy and the nature of inquiry. This article encourages scholars to take up this framework in the spirit of intellectual inquiry.
and curiosity that Dewey advocated to ensure that conceptions of public and private remain pertinent to the philanthropy field.
References


Bell, D. (2014). What is Liberalism? *Political Theory*, 42(6), 682-715. DOI: 10.1 177/0090591714535103


My interpretation of ‘publicity’ is informed by Dewey’s discussion of the term as part of a ‘vision’ of all-encompassing, communally-oriented civic participation, which is part of the discussion of the role of experts and the conception of the public. This interpretation of publicity is distinct from ‘the physical agencies of publicity’, which refers to advertising and propaganda (Dewey 1927/2016, pp.190-192; Rogers 2016, p.5). Similarly, on Habermas and the publicity of the public sphere as public opinion formed through the freedoms of rational-critical debate; Thompson, J.B.(1993).The Theory of the Public Sphere. Theory, Culture and Society,10(3),pp.178-179.

The redistribution of wealth became part of Dewey’s conception of democracy and calls for the reform of capitalism in Liberalism and Social Action (1935) (Selk and Jörke 2019, p.40). In Individualism: Old and New, Dewey (1930, pp.83-84) argues that charity and philanthropy, are markers of an ‘uneasy conscience’. They display the lack of fulfilment that individuals find in the atomistic participation cultivated in/by the market, and represent its failings rather than its successes.

The notion of the public as discussed here should not be interpreted as the public sphere, for example, as articulated by Habermas. Indeed, Selk and Jörke (2019, p.39) discuss Habermas’s critique of Dewey regarding his inadequate the ‘social pre-requisites’ of public deliberation.

Weintraub (1997,p.9) discusses the ‘bitter’ and polarising disputes between arguments for the “natural” harmonization of selfish interests’ associated with John Locke and Adam Smith, and ‘the more technocratic social engineering side’ that emphasises the manipulation of rewards and punishments as individuals follow their “‘rational” interests’, connected to Hobbes and Bentham (author’s emphasis).

My focus is on Adam Smith, but I am mindful of how ideals/ideas inherited from the past and liberalism, such as utilitarianism influence strands of philanthropy; Singer, P.(2015).The Most Good You can Do: How Effective Altruism is Changing Ideas about Living Ethically. New Haven:CT, Yale University Press.